Compliance bedeutet, grundlegend und allgemein betrachtet: Tun, was man muss, weil man es soll. Integrity hingegen: Wollen, was man soll. Beide Seiten hängen zusammen und bedingen einander: Compliance braucht Integrity - Integrity braucht Compliance. Diesem dialektischen Zusammenhang ist bislang zu wenig Beachtung geschenkt worden, da Compliance und Integrity als Gegensätze begriffen werden. Am Beispiel der Investmentbank Credit Suisse First Bosten wird die Notwendigkeit der Etablierung einer unverkürzten, positive Sanktionen (Belohnungen) einschliessenden Compliance aufgezeigt, ohne die eine ethisch-integrierte Unternehmenssteuerung nicht gelingen kann.
In general, compliance means: Doing what one must do, because it ought to be done. Integrity means: Wanting what ought to be done. Both sides are con-nected and call for each other: Compliance needs integrity - integrity needs compliance. So far though, too little attention has been given to this dialectic interrelation, since compliance and integrity typically are understood as polar approaches. By the example of the investment bank Credit Suisse Boston, the necessity for establishing an unbiased concept of compliance is elaborated, which includes not only penalties, but also rewards. This concept is the prerequisite for directing the organisation towards ethically sound behaviour.
The philosophical reflection on the essence of what we call the market has largely disappeared from the textbooks of the economic discipline. This paper intends to contribute to a renewal of this discourse by explicitly looking on basic concepts of mainstream market theory from an ethical point of view. There are not so much new information given; rather, a different, ethically conscious light is shed on the information we already have on the market. With its philosophical emphasis on the frame of reference, which is always normative in nature, the paper contributes to the new emerging approach of "integrative economic ethics" (integrative Wirtschaftsethik), introduced by Peter Ulrich (1998a, 1998b). After touching the interrelationship of (descriptive) theory and (normative) ethics, the outlines of a brief and, as I claim, complete theory of the basic structure of the market are sketched. Central to this theory is the view of the market as a system. This systemic view allows to explain phenomena like economic growth or unemployment as well as to discover ethical problems and to raise normative questions that are often overlooked and passed over.
The overemphasis on individualism in much normative entrepreneurship discourse belies the powerful role played by local level and communal forms of barter, culturally based collectivist models of organization, social enterprise, and other forms of co-investment. Following Rindova et al., we argue innovation in entrepreneurship can be an emancipatory process with broad change potential to bring about new economic, social, institutional, and cultural environments. New forms of productive social relations and cooperative effort generate new ways of liberating individual and collective existence. However, the dark side of entrepreneurialism also casts its shadow over the pursuit of an idealized commons. Romanticizing forms of collective entrepreneurialism as a means for elevating vulnerable groups may have contrary effects, especially for those already socially and economically marginalized. Theorizing entrepreneurship from a critical perspective, we draw on Laclau's emancipation-oppression dualism. We explore the contradictions and potentialities of locally based communal entrepreneurship as expressions of a dynamic tension, which is simultaneously both transformative and exploitative in orientation.
Of late, social enterprise has been criticised for discursively transforming third sector organisations and practitioners into economic agents. This paper argues that such a critique might overestimate the degree to which the discourse of social enterprise works as a deterministic force. Asserting that discourse, rather than being imposed on the third sector, implies subjects who affirm its power, we suggest that discursive conceptualisations of ‘social enterprise' are incomplete without empirical studies focusing on how discourse infiltrates the third sector at the level of the subject. Drawing from a qualitative study in the UK, we use Pêcheux's work on dis/identification to illustrate different ways in which third sector practitioners endorse or reject the discursive invocation. Discussing how processes of identification, counter-identification or disidentification perpetuate or transgress respectively the discourse of social enterprise, we conclude by highlighting important issues which might to be dealt with through prospective research.
