Im Schweizer HR-Barometer 2009 werden neben allgemeinen Trends die Themen Mobilität und Arbeitgeberattraktivität eingehend untersucht. Erfasst werden das tatsächliche Mobilitätsverhalten und die potenzielle Bereitschaft der Arbeitnehmenden, sich in der Arbeitswelt «mobil» zu verhalten. Weiter wird untersucht,welche Faktoren dazu führen, dass Unternehmen für Arbeitnehmende attraktiv sind und zu «Wahlarbeitgebern» werden. Die Themen der Vorjahre werden, im Hinblick auf die Trendentwicklungen von 2005 bis 2008 und auf den Vergleich zwischen deutsch- und französischsprachiger Schweiz, prägnant präsentiert. Das Schweizer HR-Barometer wird von einem wissenschaftlichen Forschungsteam der ETH und der Universität Zürich im jährlichen Turnus herausgegeben, jeweils mit einem Schwerpunktthema.
We show theoretically and empirically that Pay-for-Performance, like many management fashions, has not achieved its intended aim. Our research focuses on previous
empirical studies that examine the relation between variable executive pay and firm performance on various different dates. Our results indicate that a variable CEO income contributes very little to the increase of the firm’s performance, and that CEO salary and firm performance are not linked. The example of Pay-for-Performance shows that in the long run, many management fashions do not solve the problems that they promise to
solve.
The purpose of this study is to analyze whether previous results describing the effect of uncertainty of outcome on match attendance in team sports have been driven by heterogeneity in fan demand. We apply censored quantile regression methods and place particular emphasis on the relationship between match uncertainty and attendance demand, as previous results are highly ambiguous. This is more surprising, as each season association and league officials continue to spend millions on enhancing this uncertainty. We also control for season ticket holders, who are unlikely to be influenced by match specificities. Based on data from German soccer, our results indicate that fan demand shows heterogeneity across quantiles and that increasing match uncertainty of outcome exclusively benefits teams who already face strong attendance demand.
Historically, European team sports leagues were run by their respective national and international associations and were legally independent from the professional clubs playing in these leagues. Recently, European leagues have adopted an organizational form similar to their North American counterparts who are organized since their beginning in a cooperative-like manner. Based on a comparative institutional analysis, we explain the advantages of the cooperative form of league organization over contractual governance. With our four-stage game-theoretic model, we show that contractual governance of sports leagues leads to larger investment distortions than cooperative league organization.
