Die Fachkommission für Empfehlungen zur Rechnungslegung (Fachkommission) setzt die "Ergänzende Fachempfehlung für kotierte Unternehmenr" auf den 1. Januar 2015 in Kraft. 34 Unternehmen und Personen haben die Gelegenheit ergriffen, zur Vernehmlassung Stellung zu nehmen. Basierend auf den kommunizierten Anliegen hat die Fachkommission die Fachempfehlung angepasst und ist zuversichtlich, damit eine angemessene Lösung gefunden zu haben.
Fehlverhalten am Arbeitsplatz kann Unternehmen teuer zu stehen kommen. Ergebnisse des Schweizer HR-Barometers 2012 zeigen, dass eine Vertrauenskultur das Risiko von Fehlverhalten reduziert. Mit Hilfe eines erfüllten psychologischen Vertrages, partizipativer Entscheidungsfindung und guter Führung kann das Vertrauen in den Arbeitgeber gestärkt werden.
This paper analyzes the efficiency of three simple cost-based pricing heuristics in a twoperiod capacity planning model with uncertain demand. All policies start with full cost introductory prices but differ in second-period pricing. Under “adaptive full-cost pricing”, the firm updates second-period prices on the basis of current demand conditions and full unit costs. Under “wait-and-see pricing”, the firm sets second-period prices on the basis of updated demand information and current opportunity cost of capacity. Under “myopic fullcost pricing”, prices remain constant for both periods. Although we identify one special case for which all three heuristics replicate the optimal solution, we find that “wait-and-see pricing” dominates “adaptive full-cost pricing”, which dominates its ‘myopic’ counterpart. However, we also discuss factors that may justify the use of ‘full-cost pricing’ in real-world planning environments. We note that if the firm faces significant information and/or communication costs, or if price changes will probably only occur in the far future, even the simple “myopic full-cost pricing” heuristic may be a reasonable policy.
In this paper we analyze strategic transfer pricing with risk- and effort-averse divisional managers. In contrast to earlier literature, we find that the existence of a standard agency problem allows transfer pricing to serve as a commitment device even if the transfer prices are not mutually observable. The reason is that transfer prices are set above marginal cost to solve the agency problem and not for strategic purposes. Therefore, delegating the pricing authority to a risk-averse manager implies that he sets a higher product price than does the risk-neutral owner, because at the divisional level the transfer price represents the relevant unit cost for pricing. We show that the optimal scope of managerial authority generally depends on both the risk premium and the intensity of competition in the product market. We also identify conditions under which the delegation of pricing responsibilities to risk-averse managers constitutes a dominant strategy equilibrium.
