Die Fachkommission für Empfehlungen zur Rechnungslegung (Fachkommission) setzt die "Ergänzende Fachempfehlung für kotierte Unternehmenr" auf den 1. Januar 2015 in Kraft. 34 Unternehmen und Personen haben die Gelegenheit ergriffen, zur Vernehmlassung Stellung zu nehmen. Basierend auf den kommunizierten Anliegen hat die Fachkommission die Fachempfehlung angepasst und ist zuversichtlich, damit eine angemessene Lösung gefunden zu haben.
This paper analyzes a capacity-planning and pricing problem of a monopolist facing uncertain demand. The model incorporates .soft. and .hard. capacity constraints (soft constraints can be relaxed at a cost while hard constraints cannot be relaxed) and demand uncertainty. The firm receives additional demand information within the planning horizon. The solution to the planning problem depends crucially on what is known about demand at the time of the capacity decision as well as the pricing decision. Historical acquisition costs of capacity are relevant for pricing whenever the same information is available for capacity planning and pricing. However, when the firm receives additional demand information before making the pricing decision, only marginal cost is relevant for pricing. Different types of capacity constraints, i.e., soft vs. hard, affect how much capacity the firm obtains, but not how the firm sets prices.
In this paper we analyze strategic transfer pricing with risk- and effort-averse divisional managers. In contrast to earlier literature, we find that the existence of a standard agency problem allows transfer pricing to serve as a commitment device even if the transfer prices are not mutually observable. The reason is that transfer prices are set above marginal cost to solve the agency problem and not for strategic purposes. Therefore, delegating the pricing authority to a risk-averse manager implies that he sets a higher product price than does the risk-neutral owner, because at the divisional level the transfer price represents the relevant unit cost for pricing. We show that the optimal scope of managerial authority generally depends on both the risk premium and the intensity of competition in the product market. We also identify conditions under which the delegation of pricing responsibilities to risk-averse managers constitutes a dominant strategy equilibrium.
