Der Streitpunkt in der aktuellen Vergütungsdiskussion in Publikumsgesellschaften dreht sich um die Frage, ob die Managementvergütungen durch reine Marktkräfte oder aber durch unternehmensinterne Machtverhältnisse als Ausfluss einer ungenügenden Corporate Governance - determiniert werden. Die hier präsentierte Untersuchung von rund 3/4 aller an der SIX Swiss Exchange kotierten Gesellschaften von 2007 bis 2010 hat zumZ iel, dies dank der neu eingeführten Offenlegungsvorschriften für den Schweizer Kapitalmarkt empirisch zu klären.
Despite the importance of gathering technological knowledge from external sources, many firms are not well-placed to collect information from beyond their own boundaries. Government policies designed to improve access to technological knowledge often encourage firms to develop strong ties with competitors, suppliers or customers. But although strong ties are valuable, especially when tacit knowledge needs to be communicated, firms in individualistic cultures may resist entering into close relationships with other firms. As a result, policies that encourage such firms to form weak ties may be a more effective way of promoting the spread of technological knowledge in individualistic cultures. In this paper, we develop a set of propositions concerning the suitability of strong and weak ties in cultures that are relatively more individualistic or collectivist. Our arguments are illustrated with survey data from Australia and Finland. In the final section, we make some policy recommendations for improving the diffusion of technological knowledge among firms in individualist cultures.
This paper analyzes the efficiency of three simple cost-based pricing heuristics in a twoperiod capacity planning model with uncertain demand. All policies start with full cost introductory prices but differ in second-period pricing. Under “adaptive full-cost pricing”, the firm updates second-period prices on the basis of current demand conditions and full unit costs. Under “wait-and-see pricing”, the firm sets second-period prices on the basis of updated demand information and current opportunity cost of capacity. Under “myopic fullcost pricing”, prices remain constant for both periods. Although we identify one special case for which all three heuristics replicate the optimal solution, we find that “wait-and-see pricing” dominates “adaptive full-cost pricing”, which dominates its ‘myopic’ counterpart. However, we also discuss factors that may justify the use of ‘full-cost pricing’ in real-world planning environments. We note that if the firm faces significant information and/or communication costs, or if price changes will probably only occur in the far future, even the simple “myopic full-cost pricing” heuristic may be a reasonable policy.
