The paper considers a two stage capacity and production planning model under uncertainty. The optimal second stage production policy falls into three cases: When capacity is slack the firm will produce with the cost minimizing production rate and adjust the production time to meet its output target. When the capacity constraint is binding, the firm will first adjust the production rate and then again produce with a constant production rate but employ overtime to meet the output target.
The optimal capacity choice of the first stage is determined by the trade off between the sunk costs of slack labor and the expected opportunity costs of adjusting the production rate and employing overtime in the case of a binding capacity constraint.
The key item determining the firm’s labor demand is the overtime premium. The amount of contracted labor strictly increases with the overtime premium and the expected overtime strictly decreases. Since then latter effect dominates the former for small overtime premia, the firm’s labor demand is first decreasing and then increasing with the overtime premium.
A reduction of overtime premia can be Pareto improving because it does not only lead to substantial cost savings but also an increasing labor demand.
This paper compares the performance of transfer pricing and tidy cost allocations in a multiproduct firm in presence of output market competition and production externalities. In absence of competition, tidy cost allocations are creating inefficient allocations within the firm while transfer prices can always be adjusted to replicate the first best solution of the centralized firm. While the second result is well known, the first result draws a parallel to the impossibility of solving the free rider problem in team production by a profit sharing scheme. Under duopolistic competition, transfer prices are still the best accounting rule but the solution depends on the nature of competition on the final product market. When firms compete in prices, the strategic rationale requires to allocate more than the total cost of the congested service to the duopolistic departments. While transfer prices can still be adjusted accordingly, the tidiness requirement prevents the cost allocation scheme from providing the desired strategic incentives to the firms' managers. Under quantity competition, the strategic motive requires to allocate less than the cost of the service to the duopolistic departments. Although a tidy cost allocation scheme does not contradict the required direction of the strategic effect, the optimal allocation is at best found incidentally while the transfer prices can again always be adjusted in an optimal way.
We investigate how corporate venture capitalists (CVCs) can rapidly attain central positions in venture capital syndication networks. Using data of CVC investments by U.S. corporations between 1996 and 2005, we complement prior research, which suggests that centrally positioned VCs predominantly invest together with other centrally positioned VCs. While we find clear support for the social network theory arguments that prior central positions in syndication networks significantly explain future network positions of CVCs, we also find a negative interaction effect between past centrality and corporate resources. This finding implies that resources of CVCs can substitute for their lack of prior centrality and allow them to gain rapidly central positions in rigid VC syndication networks.
The literature suggests that established firms need to balance their exploration and exploitation activities in order to achieve superior performance. Yet, previous empirical research has modeled this balance as the interaction of orthogonal activities. In this study, we show that there is a trade-off between exploration and exploitation and that the optimal balance between exploration and exploitation depends upon environmental conditions. Using a novel methodology to measure the relative exploration versus exploitation orientation, we find an inverted U-shaped relationship between the relative share of explorative orientation and financial performance. This relationship is positively moderated by the R&D intensity of the industry in which the firm operates.
We show that the optimal asset allocation for an investor depends crucially on the theory with which the investor is modeled. For the same market data and the same client data different theories lead to different portfolios. The market data we consider is standard asset allocation data. The client data is determined by a standard risk profiling question and the theories we apply are mean-variance analysis, expected utility analysis and cumulative prospect theory.
Im Zuge der Bankenkrise ist der Ruf nach einer schärferen Regulierung der Managergehälter laut geworden. Der Autor zeigt, dass staatliche Vorschriften in der Vergangenheit kaum je nützten und häufig unerwünschte Nebenwirkungen hatten. Erfolgversprechender wäre, den Aktionären mehr Kontrollrechte in Vergütungsfragen zu geben.
