infonet-economy

Der Benediktinerorden hat schon früh erstaunlich ausgefeilte Führungs- und Kontrollstrukturen entwickelt und
etabliet. Wie sich Unternehmen davon inspirieren lassen können, zeigen die Autoren des folgenden Beitrages.

This paper investigates the merger wave hypothesis for the US and the UK employing a Markov regime-switching model. Using quarterly data covering the last 30 years, for the US, we identify the beginning of a merger wave in the mid 1990s but not the much-discussed 1980s merger wave. We argue that the latter finding can be ascribed to the refined methods of inference offered by the Gibbs sampling approach. As opposed to the US, mergers in the UK exhibit multiple waves, with activity surging in the early 1970s and the late 1980s.

Speaker: Mirco Musolesi   University College London, UK Date: Thursday, March 23, 2017 Place: USI Lugano Campus, room SI-008, informatics building (Via G. Buffi 13) Time: 9:30 ...

Auditorio campus di Lugano Martedì 21 marzo ore 17:30 Prosegue il prossimo martedì 21 marzo, alle ore 17:30 nell auditorio del campus di Lugano, il ciclo rectoverso , la serie di conferenze nel corso delle quali il Rettore dell USI Prof. Boas Erez mette a tema incontro dopo incontro ...

It is common in econometric applications that several hypothesis tests are carried out at the same time. The problem then becomes how to decide whichnhypotheses to reject, accounting for the multitude of tests.nThe classical approach is to control the familywise error rate (FWE), that is, thenprobability of one or more false rejections. But when thennumber of hypotheses under consideration is large, control of the FWE can become too demanding. As a result, the number of false hypotheses rejected may be small or even zero. This suggests replacingncontrol of the FWE by a more liberal measure. To this end,nwe review a number of proposals from the statistical literature.nWe briefly discuss how these procedures apply to the general problem of model selection. A simulation study and two empirical applications illustrate the methods.

The basic distinction made in this volume compares “economic value”, expressed in monetary terms, to “cultural value”, reflecting cultural, aesthetic and artistic significance.nThis paper makes a different distinction which is rarely made explicit but which is ofncentral importance to the decision process in cultural policy. On the one hand, “value” is attached to the economic effects of cultural activities: When cultural values are created, economic activity is bolstered. The increase of commercial actitivities induced is measured by the so-called “impact effect”. On the other hand, the value of culture isnreflected in the increased utility going to consumers and non-consumers of a particularncultural activity. This type of value is measured by “willingness to pay studies”. I argue that these two values dominate cultural policy but they capture totally different aspects and are proferred by different kinds of communities.

We report on several experiments on the optimal allocation of ownership rights. The experiments confirm the property rights approach by showing that the ownership structure affects relationship-specific investments and that subjects attain the most efficient ownership allocation despite starting from different initial conditions. However, in contrast to the property rights approach, the most efficient ownership structure is joint ownership. These results are neither consistent with the self-interest model nor with models that assume that all people behave fairly, but they can be explained by the theory of inequity aversion that focuses on the interaction between selfish and fair players.

Background: A uniform package of benefits and uniform cost sharing are elements of regulation inherent in most social health insurance systems. Both elements risk burdening the population with a welfare loss if preferences for risk and insurance attributes differ. This suggests the introduction of more choice in social health insurance packages may be advantageous; however, it is widely believed that this would not benefit the elderly.

Objective: To examine the relationship between age and willingness to pay (WTP) for additional options in Swiss social health insurance.

Methods: A discrete choice experiment was developed using six attributes (deductibles, co-payment, access to alternative medicines, medication choice, access to innovation, and monthly premium) that are currently in debate within the context of Swiss health insurance. These attributes have been shown to be important in the choice of insurance contract. Using statistical design optimization procedures, the number of choice sets was reduced to 27 and randomly split into three groups. One choice was included twice to test for consistency. Two random effects probit models were developed: a simple model where marginal utilities and WTP values were not allowed to vary according to socioeconomic characteristics, and a more complex model where the values were permitted to depend on socioeconomic variables.

A representative telephone survey of 1000 people aged >24 years living in the German- and French-speaking parts of Switzerland was conducted. Participants were asked to compare the status quo (i.e. their current insurance contract) with ten hypothetical alternatives. In addition, participants were asked questions concerning utilization of healthcare services; overall satisfaction with the healthcare system, insurer and insurance policy; and a general preference for new elements in the insurance package. Socioeconomic variables surveyed were age, sex, total household income, education (seven categories ranging from primary school to university degree), place of residence, occupation, and marital status.

Results: All chosen elements proved relevant for choice in the simple model. Accounting for socioeconomic characteristics in the comprehensive model reveals preference heterogeneity for contract attributes, but also for the propensity to consider deviating from the status quo and choosing an alternative health insurance contract.

Conclusion: The findings suggest that while the elderly do exhibit a stronger status quo bias than younger age groups, they require less rather than more specific compensation for selected cutbacks, indicating a potential for contracts that induce self-rationing in return for lower premiums.

This article evaluates the effects of Swiss active labour market programmes on the job chances of unemployed workers. The main innovation is a comparison of two important dynamic evaluation estimators: the ‘matching’ estimator and the ‘timing-of-events’ estimator. We find that both estimators generate different treatment effects. According to the matching estimator temporary subsidised jobs shorten unemployment duration whereas training programmes and employment programmes do not. In contrast, the timing-of-events estimator suggests that none of the Swiss active labour market programmes shortens unemployment duration.

One can be independent, or one can be subject to decisions made by others. This paper argues that this difference, embodied in the institutional distinction between the decision-making procedures ‘market’ and ‘hierarchy’, affects individual wellbeing beyond outcomes. Taking self-employment as an important case of independence, it is shown that the self-employed derive higher satisfaction from work than those employed in organizations, irrespective of income gained or hours worked. This is evidence for procedural utility: people value not only outcomes, but also the processes leading to outcomes.