Reducing the externalities from energy use is crucial for sustainability. There are basically four ways to reduce
externalities from energy use: increasing technical efficiency (“energy input per unit energy service”), increasing economic efficiency (“internalising external costs”), using “clean” energy sources with few externalities, or sufficiency (“identifying ‘optimal’ energy service levels”). A combination of those strategies is most promising for sustainable energy systems. However, the debate on sustainable energy is dominated by efficiency and clean energy strategies, while sufficiency plays a minor role. Efficiency and clean energy face several problems, though. Thus,the current debate should be complemented with a critical discussion of sufficiency.
In this paper, I develop a concept of sufficiency, which is adequate for liberal societies. I focus on ethical foundations for sufficiency, as the discussion of such is missing or cursory only in the existing literature. I first show that many examples of sufficiency can be understood as (economic) efficiency, but that the two concepts do not
coincide. I then show that sufficiency based on moralization of actions can be understood as implementation of the boundary conditions for social justice that come with notions of liberal societies, in particular the duty not to harm other people. By this, to increase sufficiency becomes a duty beyond individual taste. I further illustrate this in the context of the adverse effects of climate change as externalities from energy use.
This study investigates the prevalence and extent of altruism by examining the relationship between parents’ and their adult children’s subjective well-being in a data set extracted from the German Socio-Economic Panel. To segregate the share of parents with altruistic preferences from those who are selfish, we estimate a finite mixture regression model. We control for various sources of potential bias by taking advantage of the data’s panel structure. To validate our modeling approach, we show that predicted altruists indeed make higher average transfer payments.
The trends and consequences of terrorist activities are often captured by counting the number of incidents and casualties. More recently, the effects of terrorist acts on various aspects of the economy have been analyzed. These costs are surveyed and put in perspective. As economic consequences are only a part of the overall costs of terrorism, possible approaches for estimating the utility losses of the people affected are discussed. Results using the life satisfaction approach, in which individual utility is approximated by self-reported subjective well-being, suggest that people’s utility losses may far exceed the purely economic consequences.
Discrete-choice experiments, while becoming increasingly popular, have rarely been tested for validity and reliability. This contribution purports to provide some evidence of a rather unique type. Two surveys designed to measure willingness-to-accept (WTA) for reform op-tions in Swiss health care and health insurance are used to provide independent information with regard to two elements of reform. The issue to be addressed is whether WTA values converge although the three overlapping attributes (a more restrictive drug benefit, a delayed access to medical innovation, and a change in the monthly insurance premium) are embedded in widely differing choice sets. Experiment A contains rather radical health system reform options, while experiment B concentrates on more familiar elements such as copayment and the benefit catalogue. While mean WTA values differ between experiments, they tend to vary in similar ways, suggesting at least theoretical validity and reliability.
For many kinds of capital, depreciation rates change systematically with the age of the capital. Consider an example that captures essential aspects of human capital, both regarding its accumulation and its depreciation: a worker obtains knowledge in period 0, then uses this knowledge innproduction in periods 1 and 2, and thereafter retires. Here, depreciation accelerates: it occurs at a 100% rate after period 2, and at a lowe (perhaps zero) rate before that. The present paper analyzesnthe implications of non-constant depreciation rates for the optimal timing of taxes on capital income. The main finding is that under natural assumptions, the path of tax rates over time must be oscillatory. Oscillatory tax rates are optimal when depreciation rates accelerate with the age of the capital (as in the above example), and provided that the government can commit to the path ofnfuture tax rates but cannot apply different tax rates in a given year to different vintages of capital.
The idea that there is a uniformly “optimal” governance structure for corporationsnfeatures prominently in current debates and policy proposals. In this paper, we propose andifferent, constitutional theory of corporate governance: the criterion for a good corporatengovernance structure is whether it is freely chosen by the shareholders. We illustrate ournapproach by comparing the constitutional rights of shareholders under US corporate law and Swiss corporate law. Moreover, we discuss the mandatory provisions that shareholders would likely include in corporate law at a constitutional stage, behind the veil of ignorance.
“Evaluitis” - i.e. ex post assessments of organizations and persons - has become a rapidly spreading disease. In addition to the well-known costs imposed on evaluees and evaluators, additional significant costs are commonly disregarded: incentives are distorted, ossification is induced and the decision approach is wrongly conceived. As a result, evaluations are used too often and too intensively. A viable and oftennsuperior alternative to evaluations is a careful selection of persons and afterwards leaving them to pursue their assigned tasks.
"Economists long considered money illusion to be largelynirrelevant. Here we show, however, that money illusion has powerfulneffects on equilibrium selection. If we represent payoffs in nominal terms,nchoices converge to the Pareto inefficient equilibrium; however, if we liftnthe veil of money by representing payoffs in real terms, the Pareto efficientnequilibrium is selected. We also show that strategic uncertainty about thenother players’ behavior is key for the equilibrium selection effects ofnmoney illusion: even though money illusi on vanishes over time if subjectsnare given learning opportunities in the context of an individual optimizationnproblem, powerful and persistent effects of money illusion are found whennstrategic uncertainty prevails."
Die nachhaltige Lösung von Problemen der Energieversorgung gehört zu den zentralen Herausforderungen moderner Zivilisationen. Aus ökonomischer Sicht greifen alle Antworten zu kurz, die nicht explizit das interessengeleitete Handeln der wesentlichen Akteure berücksichtigen. Deshalb behandelt dieses Buch die nachfrage- und angebotsseitigen Gesetzmäßigkeiten der verschiedenen Energiemärkte, und zwar unter Rückgriff auf industrie- und institutionenökonomische Theoriebausteine. Die technisch-naturwissenschaftlichen Bedingungen von Gewinnung, Wandlung, Transport, Verteilung und Nutzung von Energieträgern werden dabei stets berücksichtigt. Ein wichtiges Thema für die Praktiker sind die von der Liberalisierung der leitungsgebundenen Energiemärkte ausgehenden Impulse. Wo immer möglich werden die heoretisch hergeleiteten Voraussagen durch die Konfrontation mit statistischer Evidenz auf ihre Praxisrelevanz geprüft.
