"Since World War II there have been about fifty episodes of large-scale mass killings of civilians and massive forced displacements. They were usually meticulously planned and independent of military goals. We provide a model where conflict onset, conflict intensity and the decision to commit mass killings are all endogenous, with two main goals: (1) to identify the key variables and situations that make mass killings more likely to occur; and (2) to distinguish conditions under which mass killings and military conflict intensity reinforce each other from situations where they are substitute modes of strategic violence.nWe predict that mass killings are most likely in societies with large natural resources, significant proportionality constraints for rent sharing, low productivity and low state capacity. Further, massacres are more likely in a civil than in an interstate war, as in the latter group sizes matter less for future rents.nIn non polarized societies there are asymmetric equilibria with only the larger group wanting to engage in massacres. In such settings the smaller group compensates for this by fighting harder in the first place. In this case we can talk of mass killings and fighting efforts to be substitutes. In contrast, in polarized societies either both or none of the groups can be ready to do mass killings in case of victory. Under the 'shadow of mass killings' groups fight harder. Hence, in this case massacres and fighting are complements.nWe also present novel empirical results on the role of natural resources in mass killings and on what kinds of ethnic groups are most likely to be victimized in massacres and forced resettlements, using group level panel data."
Museums have many different goals beyond efficiency such as social equity, financial revenue, attracting donors and gaining international, regional or local prestige. Various pricing schemes are being discussed with the aim of reaching these goals. Thenclassical ones are entry prices and free entry. The museum club solution or exit donationsnallow for various additional goals. Each scheme has clear advantages and disadvantages.nWe propose an innovative pricing instrument: Exit prices, which are charged according to the time spent in a museum. This scheme has a number of notable advantages, in particular the better choice available to the visitors, which increases their satisfaction.
We study a dynamic general equilibrium model where innovation takes the form of the introduction new goods, whose production requires skilled workers. Innovation is followed by a costly process of standardization, whereby these new goods are adapted to be produced using unskilled labor. Our framework highlights a number of novel results. First, standardization is both an engine of growth and a potential barrier to it. As a result, growth in an inverse U-shaped function of the standardization rate (and of competition). Second, we characterize the growth and welfare maximizing speed of standardization. We show how optimal IPR policies affecting the cost of standardization vary with the skill-endowment, the elasticity of substitution between goods and other parameters. Third, we show that the interplay between innovation and standardization may lead to multiple equilibria. Finally, we study the implications of our model for the skill-premium and we illustrate novel reasons for linking North-South trade to intellectual property rights protection.
Academic rankings today are the backbone of research governance, which seem to fit the aims of “new public management” on the one side and the idea of the “republic of science” on the other side. Nevertheless rankings recently came under scrutiny. We discuss advantages and disadvantages of academic rankings, in particular their unintended negative consequences on the research process. To counterbalance these negative consequences we suggest (a) rigorous selection and socialization, and (b) downplaying the impact of rankings in order to reconcile academic self-governance with accountability to the public.
Although dependence in financial data is pervasive, standard doctoral-level econometrics texts do not make clear that the common central limit theorems (CLTs) contained therein fail when applied to dependent data. More advanced books that are clear in their CLT assumptions do not contain any worked examples of CLTs that apply to dependent data. We address these pedagogical gaps by discussing dependence in financial data and dependence assumptions innCLTs and by giving a worked example of the application of a CLT for dependent data to the case of the derivation of the asymptotic distribution of the sample variance of a Gaussian AR(1). We also provide code and the results for a Monte-Carlo simulation used to check the results of the derivation.
This paper introduces three methodological advances to study the optimal design of static and dynamic markets. First, we apply a mechanism design approach to characterize all incentive-compatible market equilibria. Second, we conduct a normative analysis, i.e. we evaluate alternative competition and innovation policies from a welfare perspective. Third, we introduce a reliable way to measure competition in dynamic markets with non-linear pricing. We illustrate the usefulness of our approach in several ways. We reproduce the empirical finding that innovation levels are higher in markets with lower price-cost margins, yet such markets are not necessarily more competitive. Indeed, we prove the Schumpeterian conjecture that more dynamic markets characterized by higher levels of innovation should be less competitive. Furthermore, we demonstrate how our approach can be used to determine the optimal combination of market regulation and innovation policies such as R&D subsidies or a weakening of the patent system. Finally, we show that optimal markets are characterized by strictly positive price-cost margins.
The results of a new experimental study reveal highly systematic violations ofnexpected utility theory. The pattern of these violations is exactly the opposite of thenclassical common ratio effect discovered by Allais (1953). Two recent decision theories—nstochastic expected utility theory (Blavatskyy, 2007) and perceived relative argumentnmodel (Loomes, 2008)—predicted the existence of a reverse common ratio effect. However, these theories can rationalize only one part of the new experimental data reported in this paper. The other part appears to be neither predicted by existing theories nor documented in the existing empirical studies.
Although Unified Growth Theory presumes the existence of the Maltusian mechanism in pre-industrial England recent empirical studies challenged this assumption. This paper studies the interaction of vital rates and real wages in the period from 1540 to 1870 in England. We employ time-varying VARs, an approach which addresses potential shortcomings such as parameter instability and declining volatilities in the previous literature. In contrast to recent studies, the main Malthusian mechanisms - the preventive and the positive check - were both at work until the mid-19th century. The preventive check was decreasing and the positive check increasing in importance. Most remarkably, the positive check dominated after the 1750s. The results indicate that instead of disappearing before the advent of the industrial revolution, the Malthusian mechanism rather changed its face over time.
Research on happiness has produced valuable insights into the sources of subjective well-being. A major finding from this literature is that people exhibit a 'baseline' happiness that shows persistent strength over time, and twin studies have shown that genes play a significant role in explaining the variance of baseline happiness between individuals. However, these studies have not identified which genes might be involved. This article presents evidence of a specific gene that predicts subjective well-being. Using data from the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health, we show thatnindividuals with a transcriptionally more efficient version of the serotonin transporter gene (5HTT) are significantly more likely to report higher levels of life satisfaction. Having one or two alleles of the more efficient type raises the average likelihood of being very satisfied with one's life by 8.5% and 17.3%, respectively. This result maynhelp to explain the stable component of happiness and suggests that genetic association studies can help us to better understand individual heterogeneity in subjective well-being.
This paper shows how non-individualistic preferences can be individual fitness maximizing in the presence of general equilibrium externalities. In the model, individuals share an endowment, which can be consumed on its own and/or used as a means of exchange to purchase goods from merchants on the external market if such exists. Assuming that increased consumption means increased individual fitness, we show that inequity-averse behavior with respect to endowment distribution can benan optimal response to merchants' price discrimination and lead to the evolution ofninequity-averse preferences. The findings presented here are supported by empirical evidence on the endogeniety of people's preferences with respect to exposure to market exchange.
