In this paper, preferences for income redistribution in Switzerland are elicited through a Discrete Choice Experiment (DCE) performed in 2008. In addition to the amount of redistribution as a share of GDP, attributes also included its uses (working poor, the unemployed, old-age pensioners, families with children, people in ill health) and nationality of bene?ciary (Swiss, Western European, others). Willingness to pay for redistribution increases with income and education, contradicting the conventional Meltzer-Richard (1981) model. The Prospect of Upward Mobility hypothesis [Hirschman and Rothschild (1973); Benabou and Ok (2001)] receives partial empirical support.
The purpose of this paper is twofold. First, it measures the efficiency in the provision of public goods by local jurisdictions applying Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA). Second, it relates ef- ficiency scores to a fiscal equalization scheme designed to mitigate the negative consequences of Tiebout competition. The data come from the 26 cantons of Switzerland (2000-2004), a country characterized by marked federalism. Results show the equalization scheme to indeed have a negative influence on performance, resulting in an efficiency-equity trade-off (Stiglitz, 1988). However, substitution of earmarked payments by lump-sum payments as part of the 2008 reform is likely to enhance cantonal performance.
Using a general two-stage framework, this paper gives sufficient conditions for increasing competition to have negative or positive effects on R&D-investment, respectively. Both possibilities arise in plausible situations, even if one uses relatively narrow definitions of increasing competition. The paper also shows that competition is more likely to increase the investments of leaders than those of laggards. When R&D-spillovers are strong, competition is less likely to increase investments. The paper also identifies conditions under which low initial levels of competition make a positive effects of competition on investment more likely. Extending the basic framework, the paper shows that separation of ownership and control, endogenous entry and cumulative investments make positive effects of competition on investment more likely. Imperfect upstream competition weakens the effects of competition on investment.
We estimate the effects of labor market entry conditions on wages for male individuals first entering the Austrian labor market between 1978 and 2000. We find a large negativ effect of unfavorable entry conditions on starting wages as well as a sizeable negative long-run effect. Specifically, we estimate that a one percentage point increase in the initial local unemployment rate is associated with an approximate shortfall in lifetime earnings of 6.5%. We also show that bad entry conditions are associated with lower quality of a worker's first job and that initial wage shortfalls associated with bad entry conditions only partially evaporate upon involuntary job change. These and additional findings support the view that initial job assignment, in combination with accumulation of occupation or industry-specific human capital while on this first job, plays a key role in generating the observed wage persistencies.
This paper argues that the per-capita income of importers is an important determinant of the extensive margin of trade. I formalize this by incorporating preferences that allow for binding nonnegativity constraints into an otherwise standard Ricardian model. This implies that agents adjust the set of goods from which they consume with income, which in turn affects the extensive margin of bilateral trade. I quantify the model using data on US consumer behavior and aggregate values of bilateral trade flows. I find that the behavior of the model’s extensive margin of bilateral trade is consistent with elasticities measured in the data. Two counterfactual experiments demonstrate the quantitative importance of the mechanism outlined in this paper.
This paper describes individuals' perceptions and normative valuations of executive compensation using comparable survey data for fifteen OECD member countries. An overwhelming majority of individuals (more than 90%) believes that top executives earn more than they actually deserve. However, there is also substantial variation in the actual and ethical levels of executive compensation, both within and across countries. The empirical analysis further shows that subjective estimates of executive pay are associated with objective measures of inequality and redistribution, and that individuals' perceptions and normative valuations of executive compensation are associated with their more general political preferences.
An increasing number of central banks implement monetary policy via two standing facilities: a lending facility and a deposit facility. In this paper we show that it is socially optimal to implement a non-zero interest rate spread. We prove this result in a dynamic general equilibrium model where market participants have heterogeneous liquidity needs and where the central bank requires government bonds as collateral. We also calibrate the model and discuss the behavior of the money market rate and the volumes traded at the ECB’s deposit and lending facilities in response to the recent financial crisis.
"Applied researchers often test for the difference of the variance of two investment strategies; in particular, when the investment strategies under consideration aim to implement the global minimum variance portfolio. A popular tool to this end is the F-test for the equality of variances. Unfortunately, this test is not valid when the returns are correlated, have tails heavier than the normal distribution, or are of time series nature. Instead, we propose the use of robust inference methods. In particular, we suggest to construct a studentized time series bootstrap confidence interval for the ratio of the two variances and to declare the two variances different if the value one is not contained in the obtained interval. This approach has the advantage that one can simply resample from the observed data as opposed to some null-restricted data. A simulation study demonstrates the improved finite-sample performance compared to existing methods."
Self-determination in politics has become the ideal everybody accepts. This paper argues that such contentment undermines the very idea of democracy. Democracy should be open to criticism and change. Two possible developments are considered:
(a) More political power should be given to the citizens. Direct democracy is the appropriate form of democracy for the 21st century.
(b) Many innovations are possible in democracy. The focus is on the potential role of random mechanisms to secure that the population is more fully represented in the political process both with respect to the persons in politics and the decisions taken.
Awards are widespread in all countries and are prevalent both in the public sphere and in the private sector. This paper argues, and empirically supports, that awards serve public functions and economists should take them seriously. Using a unique cross-country data set, we suggest that awards serve as signals. Awards are more prevalent the more difficult the position and status of an individual is to observe due to an anonymous and globalized setting.
