Scholars have suggested several ways in which economic development could affect interstate conflict. Supply side arguments view modern economies as more difficult to subdue or exploit through force (i.e., development creates states that are 'bitter pills'). The demand side perspective argues in contrast that development lessens the appeal of conquest among potential aggressors (i.e., development creates 'prosperous pacifists'). We offer a formal model that isolates contrasting consequences of development for initiators and targets. We use a directed dyad research design to test hypotheses drawn from the model on measures of territorial conflict. The development of potential initiators, not of possible targets, discourages conflict among nations.
We estimate the causal effect of early retirement on mortality for blue-collar workers. To overcome the problem of endogenous selection, we exploit an exogenous change in unemployment insurance rules in Austria that allowed workers in eligible regions to withdraw from the workforce up to 3.5 years earlier than those in non-eligible regions. For males, instrumental-variable estimates show a significant 2.4 percentage points (about 13%) increase in the probability of dying before age 67. We do not find any adverse effect of early retirement on mortality for females. Death causes indicate a significantly higher incidence of cardiovascular disorders among eligible workers, suggesting that changes in health-related behavior explain increased mortality among male early retirees.
We examine how natural resource location, rent sharing and fighting capacities of different groups matter for ethnic conflict. A new type of bargaining failure due to multiple types of potential conflicts (and hence multiple threat points) is identified. The theory predicts conflict to be more likely when the geographical distribution of natural resources is uneven and when a minority group has better chances to win a secessionist rather than a centrist conflict. For sharing rents, resource proportionality is salient in avoiding secessions and strength proportionality in avoiding centrist civil wars. We present empirical evidence that is consistent with the model.
I construct a theory of cultural transmission in which culture acquisition takes place in two stages, first in the family where parents transmit their own culture, and later in society where children are exposed to a wider set of cultural models. The role of models is to provide information about alternatives. Cultural variants differ in how strongly they are transmitted in the family and on how attractive they are to the children’s eyes. Attractiveness may depend on the actual models one can observe. I characterise the long run distribution of variants using directed trees and show that more visible cultural variants will have larger shares. Shares are also increasing in attractiveness and in family strength. When attractiveness is not context specific, variants competing with a wider set of variants, everything else equal, will have larger shares provided that copying is bidirectional. Expanding the set of models does not necessarily lead to annincrease in shares.
Durable goods ownership is commonly seen as a ‘defining gauge’ for the stage of development of a country. Its unprecedented economic growth and the rise of a strong and steadily growing class of consumers make China a formidable case study for the investigation of durable goods diffusion. Drawing on a household-panel with a survey period from 1989 to 2006, the empirical analysis of the driving forces behind the diffusion of durable goods shows that growth of disposable income was not equally important for all goods in their diffusion process. Rather it was the fall of individual preference thresholds (explained in part by falling durable prices) that proved to have a significant influence on the diffusion process of some goods. As it turned out, this tendency was significantly stronger in rural areas and could have counterbalanced, therefore, welfare patterns in terms of ownership contrary to the stable urban-rural gap in economic performance. Apart from changes in income and durable prices, it was found, that improvement of public services had particularly strong effects for urban poor and in rural areas. A forecast exercise up to 2030 revealed that growth in ownership rates is expected to be particularly strong for durable goods like refrigerators and cars for which households already show (or are about to do so in the case of cars) high sensitivity towards further increases in their disposable income. For other durables, like colour TVs, that are already well spread in the population there are signs of saturation with lower expected growth rates of ownership. Additionally, ownership rates are expected to pick up stronger in rural areas were households are less saturated and show higher income elasticities. As a comparison with figures from the literature demonstrates, actual and projected ownership rates depend, to some degree, also on the choice of the data set. The projections based on CHNS data could, therefore, build a reference to other commonly used data sets from the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics.
This paper provides new evidence on the relationship between innovation, competitionnand distance to the technology frontier, using enterprise surveys from 40 developing and transition countries. Different from previous empirical studies, the distance to frontier is measured by a firm's technology level relative to its main competitor. This self-reported comparison allows to capture a crucial determinant of a firm's business strategy and its response to competition. The findings from the empirical analysis are as follows. Firstly, firms with more advanced technology compared to their main competitors have more product innovations. Secondly, there is evidence that innovation and competition are more positively correlated at low levels of competition than at high levels. With some measures of competition,nthe correlation is highest at intermediate levels of competition, which suggestsnan inverted-U relationship. Thirdly, in certain specifications, competition is most positively correlated with product innovation when a firm is more advanced than its main competitor. In other cases, this correlation is strongest for firms that are at the same technology level as their competitors. However, the differences in the correlations between more and less advanced firms are not always significant.
We consider symmetric rent-seeking contests with independent private valuations of the contest prize. For a two-parameter specification with continuous types, we fully characterize the Bayesian equilibrium, and study its basic properties. The willingness to waste is a hump-shaped function of the private valuation, with the median type expending the highest share of her valuation. A first-order (second-order) stochastic increase in the common type distribution raises (lowers) ex-ante expected efforts. However, neither first-order nor second-order stochastic dominance in valuations necessarily leads to a first-order stochastic dominance ranking in efforts. We also show that, as uncertainty vanishes, the Bayesian equilibrium converges to the Nash equilibrium of the model with complete information.
This paper suggests that institutional factors which reward social networks at the expenses of productivity can play an important role in explaining brain drain. The effects of social networks on brain drain are analyzed in a decision theory framework with asymmetric information. We distinguish between the role of insidership and personal connections. The larger the cost of being an outsider, the smaller is the number and the average ability of researchers working in the domestic job market. Personal connections partly compensate for this effect by attracting highly connected researchers back. However, starting from a world with no distortions, personal connections also increase brain drain.
Temptation and self-control in intertemporal choice environments are receiving increasing attention in the theoretical economics literature. Nevertheless, there remains a scarcity of empirical evidence from controlled environments informing behavior under repeated temptations. This is unfortunate in light of the fact that in many natural environments, the same temptation must be repeatedly resisted. This paper fills that gap by reporting data from a novel laboratory study of economic decisions under repeat temptations. Subjects are repeatedly offered an option with instantaneous benefit that also entails a substantial reduction to overall earnings.nWe show that this option is 'tempting' in the sense that a substantial fraction of our subjects incur pecuniary costs to eliminate the choice, and thus commit to not choosing the tempting alternative. We compare the timing and price-elasticity of these commitment decisions to predictions from existing theoretical models of decision under temptation. Our data are broadly consistent with theory, with the notable exception that commitment often occurs with delay rather than at the first opportunity. Moreover, the timing of commitment is significantly impacted by the cost of the commitment device. The patterns we report have direct implications for economic theory, and are a first step toward designing mechanisms that promote prudent economic decisions under temptation.
Assuming that teachers are concerned with human capital formation and students - with ability signaling, in this paper we model a teacher-student relationship as an agency problem with conflicting interests. In our model, the teacher elicits effort from the student rewarding for it with a grade, the utility of which to the student is an ability signal inferred by the job market. In the event that the job market does not observe individual teachers' grading practice, teachers find grades as costless rewards and optimally choose to be lenient in grading. As a result, 'the problem of the commons' of good grades emerges leading to the depreciation of grading standards and grade inflation. The prediction of the model that the lower the expectations the teacher holds about her students' abilities, the flatter the grading rules she sets up is empirically supported.
