Research rankings based on publications and citations today dominate governance of academia. Yet they have unintended side effects on individual scholars and academic institutions and can be counterproductive. They induce a substitution of the “taste for science” by a “taste for publication”. We suggest as alternatives careful selection and socialization of scholars, supplemented by periodic self-evaluations and awards. Neither should rankings be a basis for the distributions of funds within universities. Rather, qualified individual scholars should be supported by basic funds to be able to engage in new and unconventional research topics and methods.
Democracy is defined by two core tenets: voice and pluralism. Within these constraints, a wide variety of regime types can be designed. We show that the only new, untested form of democracy is when every citizen is governed by the political party of his/her choice. Multiple full-fledged governments would coexist in the same national territory at the same time, each one sovereign only over the people who chose to vote for it - hence the name: "Choice Democracy". Choice Democracy can be regarded as pure polyarchy, the broadest form of political competition, and a robust mechanism for disciplining government agencies. We argue that this system makes democracy more stable by reducing the risk of revolutionary and financial crises. We develop a theory for the optimal number of governments per countries, where the answer is determined by a trade-off between cooperation and competition. We also provide evidence indicating that Choice Democracy would be viable in the real world.
The artistic labor market is marked by several adversities, such as low wages, above-average unemployment, and constrained underemployment. Nevertheless, it attracts many young people. The number of students exceeds the available jobs by far. A potential explanation for this puzzle is that artistic work might result in exceptionally high job satisfaction, a conjecture that has been mentioned at various times in the literature. We conduct the first direct empirical investigation of artists’ job satisfaction. The analysis is based on panel data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Survey (SOEP). Artists on average are found to be considerably more satisfied with their work than non-artists, a finding that corroborates the conjectures in the literature. Differences in income, working hours, and personality cannot account for the observed difference in job satisfaction. Partially, but not fully, the higher job satisfaction can be attributed to the higher self-employment rate among artists. Suggestive evidence is found that superior “procedural” characteristics of artistic work, such as increased variety and on-the-job learning, contribute to the difference in job satisfaction.
No voters cast their votes based on perfect information, but better educated and richer voters are on average better informed than others. We develop a model where the voting mistakes resulting from low political knowledge reduce the weight of poor voters, and cause parties to choose political platforms that are better aligned with the preferences of rich voters. In US election survey data, we fi*nd that income is more important in a*ffecting voting behavior for more informed voters than for less informed voters, as predicted by the model. Further, in a panel of US states we fi*nd that when there is a strong correlation between income and political information, Congress representatives vote more conservatively, which is also in line with our theory.
We bring together some recent advances in the literature on vector autoregressive moving-average models creating a relatively simple specification and estimation strategy for the cointegrated case. We show that in the cointegrated case with fixed initial values there exists a so-called final moving representation which is usually simpler but not as parsimonious than the usual Echelon form. Furthermore, we proof that our specification strategy is consistent also in the case of cointegrated series. In order to show the potential usefulness of the method, we apply it to US interest rates and find that it generates forecasts superior to methods which do not allow for moving-average terms.
Do financial market participants free-ride on liquidity? To address this question, we construct a dynamic general equilibrium model where agents face idiosyncratic preference and technology shocks. A secondary financial market allows agents to adjust their portfolio of liquid and illiquid assets in response to these shocks. The opportunity to do so reduces the demand for the liquid asset and, hence, its value. The optimal policy response is to restrict (but not eliminate) access to the secondary financial market. The reason for this result is that the portfolio choice exhibits a pecuniary externality: An agent does not take into account that by holding more of the liquid asset, he not only acquires additional insurance but also marginally increases the value of the liquid asset which improves insurance to other market participants.
Traditional tools of welfare economics identify the envy-related welfare loss from conspicuous consumption only under very strong assumptions. Measured income and life satisfaction o*ers an alternative for estimating such consumption externalities. The approach is developed in the context of luxury car consumption (Ferraris and Porsches) in Switzerland. Results from household panel data and *xed e*ects panel regressions suggest that the prevalence of luxury cars in the municipality of residence has a negative impact on own income satisfaction.
The bivariate probit model is frequently used for estimating the eff*ect of an endogenous binary regressor (the "treatment") on a binary health outcome variable. This paper discusses simple modifi*cations that maintain the probit assumption for the marginal distributions while introducing non-normal dependence using copulas. In an application of the copula bivariate probit model to the effect of insurance status on the absence of ambulatory health care expenditure, a model based on the Frank copula outperforms the standard bivariate probit model.
I present a game-theoretic model where economic competition and attention competition are interdependent. On the one hand the e*ort to attract consumer attention depends on the value of attention to the *rm which depends on the grade of price competition among all perceived *rms. On the other hand attracting attention involves costs which must be covered by the earnings from competition. It is the task of this paper to clarify the consequences of such an interdependence between attention competition and economic competition for prices, attention e*ort and market structure as determined by the strategic equilibrium. Under limited attention the market as perceived by consumers and not the e*ective market is relevant to the *rms which implies that prices also re ect the scarcity of attention. Less attentive consumers lead to higher prices but at the same time getting attention is more valuable which intensi*es the competition for attention and leads to higher attention costs. I show that if attention competition is relatively inelastic or the commodities are strong substitutes then the gains from consumer inattention outweigh the costs of attracting attention which leads to higher pro*ts and larger e*ective markets.
Social preference research has received considerable attention in recent years. Researchers have demonstrated that the presence of people with other-regarding preferences can have important implications in many economic dimensions. However, it is important to be aware of the fact that the empirical basis of this literature relies to a large extent on experiments that do not provide anonymity between experimenter and subject. It has been argued that this lack of experimenter-subject anonymity may create selfish incentives to engage in seemingly other-regarding behavior. If this were the case these experiments would overestimate the importance of social preferences. Previous studies provide mixed results and methodological di*erences within and across studies make it dificult to isolate the impact of experimenter-subject anonymity on prosocial behavior. In this paper we use a novel procedure that allows us to examine the impact of the exact same ceteris-paribus variation in anonymity on behavior in three of the most commonly used games in the social preference literature. Our data reveals that introducing experimenter-subject anonymity has only minor, insigni*cant, effects on prosocial behavior.
