Using data of Swiss referenda from 1981 to 1999, this paper presents new empirical results which allow us to discriminate better between the decision and mobilisation hypotheses of electoral participation. First, theoretical considerations which lead to these hypotheses are presented as well as the theory of expressive voting, and a survey of the available empirical evidence is given. Then, we describe the empirical approach before we come to its results. Those are much in line with the mobilisation but do not support the decision hypothesis. They are, however, also only partly compatible with the theory of expressive voting.
Seit Downs (1957) seinen ökonomischen Ansatz zur Erklärung des Wählerverhaltens vorgestellt hat, ist die Frage, ob die erwartete Knappheit Auswirkungen auf die Beteiligung an Wahlen (und Abstimmungen) hat, Gegenstand vieler theoretischer wie empirischer Untersuchungen. Für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland konnte in einer Reihe von Untersuchungen für die Zeit seit 1983 gezeigt werden, dass — unter bestimmten Umständen — die Beteiligung bei den Bundestagswahlen in jenen Wahlkreisen — ceteris paribus — signifikant höher ist, in denen ein knapper Ausgang bezüglich der Erststimmen und damit bezüglich der direkten Vertretung des Wahlkreises in Bonn bzw. Berlin zu erwarten ist (Kirchgässner 1990; Kirchgässner und Schimmelpfennig 1992; Kirchgässner und Meyer zu Himmern 1997; Feld und Kirchgässner 2001). Zu den „Umständen“ gehört, dass die Wählerinnen und Wähler Erwartungen darüber bilden können, ob die Entscheidung in einem Wahlkreis knapp wird oder nicht. Ganz allgemein dürfte nach den heute vorliegenden empirischen Arbeiten kaum mehr zu bestreiten sein, dass dieser „Knappheitseffekt“ zwar nicht immer, aber doch bei vielen Wahlen auftritt.1
In the past there was hardly any use of economic instruments in environmental policy, mainly command and control measures were used. More recently, ecological taxes as well as tradable permits became more popular and voluntary agreements have been implemented. Using the Public Choice approach we ask for the reasons of this wider acceptance of economic instruments. We conclude that the use of market based instruments in environmental policy has not increased very much and their impact on the actual situation is still rather low, but there is hope of a at least some increase in the future.
In a recent paper in this journal, Mantzavinos (2010) discussed the relation between federalism and individual liberty. Federalism leads to greater diversity among political units. Between this diversity and individual liberty he presumed two relations. (a) Greater diversity enhances individual liberty insofar as it increases the choice set of the citizens. (b) Greater diversity reduces individual liberty insofar as it increases exit costs. Thus, he arrives at an optimal degree of federalism. Both of these relations, but their combination in a common model in particular, have to be questioned. His first relation is in the dimension of rights, the second one, however, in the dimension of costs and benefits and to compare them causes problems. Moreover, his first relation is correct whenever we evaluate individual liberty in the dimension of rights, but not necessarily in the dimension of individual benefits. His second relation neglects the most important part of exit costs which usually decrease with greater liberty. Thus, the opposite relation between diversity and exit costs seems to be more plausible. In the following, these points are discussed.
