We examine how globalization affects firms incentives to train workers. In our model, firms invest in productivity-enhancing worker training before Cournot competition takes place. When two separated product markets become integrated and are thus replaced with a market with greater demand and greater firm number, training by each firm increases provided the two countries are suffciently small. When barriers between large markets are eliminated, training is reduced. Similar results hold when firms in countries with different training systems face globalization of product markets. In particular, apprenticeship systems are threatened by a large-scale integration of product markets. Contrary to product market integration, labor market integration has no effect on training incentives.
The standard solution to adverse selection is the separating equilibrium introduced by Rothschild and Stiglitz. Usually, the Rothschild-Stiglitz argument is developed in a model that allows for two states of the world only. In this paper adverse selection is dis-cussed for continuous loss distributions. This gives rise to the new problem of finding the proper form of an insurance contract to impose partial insurance of the low risks. This paper contributes to the discussion on optimal insurance. It analyzes two basic forms of insurance contracts: A contract with a deductible and a contract imposing a positive co-insurance rate. Since high risks can always self-reveal themselves as high risks and buy the optimal insurance contract at high risks’ premiums the Pareto-superior insurance contract is the one that leaves the low risks with higher expected utility while deterring high risks from joining the contract that is designed for low risks. The deductible contract turns out to be superior if premiums contain a sufficiently high loading.
We provide a framework for analyzing bilateral mergers when there is two-sided asymmetric information about firms’ types. We show that there is always a "no-merger" equilibrium where firms do not consent to a merger, irrespective of their type. There may also be a "cut-off" equilibrium if the expected merger returns satisfy a suitable single crossing condition, which will hold if a firm’s merger returns are "essentially monotone decreasing" in its type. Applying our analysis to the linear Cournot model, we show how the merger pattern depends on the cost effects of mergers, the extent of uncertainty, and the way profits are split. Specifically, we show how increasing uncertainty about competitor types may foster mergers as firms hope for strong rationalization effects.
This paper is concerned with a comparison of immigrants and Swiss citizens with respect to level of education, labor market outcomes and healthcare utilization. The evidence is based on data for 1999 from the first wave of the Swiss Household Panel. In order to control for confounding influences, linear and non-linear (negative binomial) regressio nmodels are used. The main result is that differences in economic position between immigrants and Swiss nationals tend to be smaller than those found in other countries. The observed differences (higher employment levels of immigrant women, lower earnings of immigrant men, higher healthcare utilization rates of all immigrants) tend to be no larger than those observed between Swiss citizens living in different parts of the country.
Die Studie untersucht die Eigenschaften der Unternehmen, die als Erste in einen sich neu oeffnenden Markt investieren. Fuer den ersten Investor bestehen gewisse Vorteile (first-mover-advantages), die einen moeglichst fruehen Eintritt in den Markt nahe legen. Andererseits fuehrt die politische und wirtschaftliche Unsicherheit in Osteuropa zu einem Anreiz, die Investitionsentscheidung hinauszuzoegern, um von den Erfahrungen der anderen zu profitieren. Die Einflussfaktoren fuer die Wahl des Zeitpunktes der ersten Direktinvestition in Osteuropa werden anhand der Daten von rund 1000 Industrieunternehmen aus der Schweiz geschaetzt. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass grosse und international erfahrene Unternehmen aus dem Konsumgueterbereich einen fruehen Markteintritt bevorzugen. Zudem werden Direktinvestitionen, die auf den lokalen Markt ausgerichtet sind, frueher getaetigt als Investitionen zur Ausnutzung der niedrigen Arbeitskosten.
Individuals make systematic mistakes in their decisions, because they mispredict utility from choice options. When deciding, extrinsic attributes of choice options are more salient than intrinsic attributes. Adaptation is neglected, recollection of feelings is distorted, decisions are rationalized and wrong intuitive theories of happiness are applied. People overestimate extrinsic attributes and therefore put too much emphasis on acquiring income and gaining status. In contrast, they underestimate intrinsic attributes and devote too littlentime to their family, friends or hobbies, which lowers their utility level. The theoreticalnanalysis is consistent with an econometric study on commuting decisions using reported subjective well-being data.
World governance today is characterized by international organizations lacking democratic legitimacy and control by the citizens they claim to represent. They are also criticized for being inefficient. This leads to violent protests and to NGOs having great influence. To address these problems, we propose international governance base on the democratic idea of citizen participation: All citizens of the member countries of international organizations have the potential right to participate in the decision-making of international organizations via initiatives, referendums and recalls. In order to reduce transaction costs, a representative group of citizens is randomly selected who can actually exercise their participation rights.
From a game theoretic point of view, fraudulent accounting to em-bellishnthe financial status of a firm and the use of drugs to enhancenperformance in sports are very similar. We study the replicator dy-namicsnof both applications within the same model. We allow for het-erogenousnpopulations, such as highly talented versus more mediocrenathletes, or high quality managers versus less able colleagues. Inter-estingly,nfor some parameters, the replicator dynamics is character-izednby cycles. Thus, we may see cycles of doping and clean sport,nand cycles of fraudulent and honest accounting. Moreover, in somencases, high ability players are more likely to commit fraud than lownability types.
"The self-employed are substantially more satisfied with their worknthan employed persons. We document this relationship for 23 countries andnshow that the higher job satisfaction can directly be attributed to thengreater autonomy that self-employed persons enjoy. ""Being your own boss""nseems to provide non-pecuniary benefits from work that point to thenexistence of procedural utility: autonomy is valued beyond outcomes as angood decision-making procedure. The results hold not only for WesternnEuropean, North American and former communist Eastern European countries,nbut largely also for countries with a non-western cultural background."
We suggest a simple asset market model in which we analyze competitive and strategic behaviornsimultaneously. If for competitive behavior two-fund separation holds across periods then itnalso holds for strategic behavior. In this case the relative prices of the assets do not dependnon whether agents behave strategically or competitively. Those agents acting strategically willnhowever invest less in the common mutual fund. Constant relative risk aversion and absencenof aggregate risk are shown to be two alternative sufficient conditions for two-period fundnseparation. With derivatives further strategic aspects arise and strategic behavior is distinctnfrom competitive behavior even for those utility functions leading to two-fund separation.
