The prevailing labor market models assume that minimum wages do not affect the labor supply schedule. We challenge this view in this paper by showing experimentally that minimum wages have significant and lasting effects on subjects’ reservation wages. The temporary introduction of a minimum wage leads to a rise in subjects’ reservation wages which persists even after the minimum wage has been removed. Firms are therefore forced to pay higher wages after the removal of the minimum wage than before its introduction. As a consequence, the employment effects of removing the minimum wage are significantly smaller than are the effects of its introduction. The impact of minimum wages on reservation wages may also explain the anomalously low utilization of subminimum wages if employers are given the opportunity of paying less than a minimum wage previously introduced. It may furthernexplain why employers often increase workers' wages after an increase in the minimum wagenby an amount exceeding that necessary for compliance with the higher minimum. At a morengeneral level, our results suggest that economic policy may affect people’s behavior by shaping the perception of what is a fair transaction and by creating entitlement effects.
The main interest of this paper is to compare the value of education systems of differentncountries. For this reason I use data on workers who have completed their education beforenimmigrating to Switzerland to estimate a country specific return to education. I estimatenthe standard Mincer-equation with the extension that I additionally allow for country specific returns to education. Results show that there are important differences between the returns to different education systems within Switzerland in the value of the basic education on the one hand and the return to an additional year of education on the other hand.
Consider the problem of testing s hypotheses simultaneously. The usual approach tondealing with the multiplicity problem is to restrict attention to procedures that controlnthe probability of even one false rejection, the familiar familywise error rate (FWER). Innmany applications, particularly if s is large, one might be willing to tolerate more than onenfalse rejection if the number of such cases is controlled, thereby increasing the ability of thenprocedure to reject false null hypotheses One possibility is to replace control of the FWERnby control of the probability of k or more false rejections, which is called the k-FWER.nWe derive both single-step and stepdown procedures that control the k-FWER in finitensamples or asymptotically, depending on the situation. Lehmann and Romano (2005a)nderive some exact methods for this purpose, which apply whenever p-values are availablenfor individual tests; no assumptions are made on the joint dependence of the p-values. Inncontrast, we construct methods that implicitly take into account the dependence structurenof the individual test statistics in order to further increase the ability to detect false nullnhypotheses. We also consider the false discovery proportion (FDP) defined as the numbernof false rejections divided by the total number of rejections (and defined to be 0 if therenare no rejections). The false discovery rate proposed by Benjamini and Hochberg (1995)ncontrols E(FDP).
We propose an a±ne term structure model which accommodates non-linearities in the drift andnvolatility function of the short-term interest rate. Such non-linearities are a consequence of discrete beta-distributed regime shifts constructed on multiple thresholds. We derive iterative closed-form formulanfor the whole yield curve dynamics that can be estimated using a linearized Kalman filter. Fitting the model on US data, we collect empirical evidence of its potential in estimating conditional volatilitynand correlation across yields.
"We study the causal effects of changes in parental leave provisions on fertility and return-to-work behavior. We exploit a policy change that took place in 1990 in Austria which extended the maximum duration of parental leave from the child’s first to the child’s second birthday. As parental leave benefits can be automatically renewed when a new mother is still on leave from a previous child, this created a strong incentive to ”bunch” the time of work in case of multiple planned children and/or to increase fertility. We study the quantitative effect of this incentive using an empirical strategy which resembles a true experimental set-up very closely. In particular, assignment to treatment is random and treated and controls face (almost) identical environmental conditions. We find that treated mothers have a 4.9 percentage points (or 15 percent) higher probability to get an additional child within the following three years; and a 3.9 percentage points higher probability in the following ten years. Thisnsuggests that not only the timing but also the number of children were affected by the policy change. We also find that parental leave rules have a strong effect on mothers’ return-to-work behavior. Pernadditional months of maximum parental leave duration, mothers’ time of work is reduced by 0.4 to 0.5 months. The effects of a subsequent policy change in 1996 when maximum parental leave duration was reduced from the child’s second birthday to the date when the child became 18 months old brought about no change in fertility behavior, but a labor supply effect that is comparable in magnitude to thenone generated by the 1990 policy change. This can be rationalized by the incentives created throughnautomatic benefit renewal."
"This paper examines the impact of a public credit registry on the repayment behavior of borrowers. We implement an experimental credit market in which loannrepayment is not third-party enforceable. We compare market outcome with a credit registry to that without a credit registry. This experiment is conducted forntwo market environments: first a market in which interactions between borrowers and lenders are one-off and, second, a market in which borrowers and lenders cannchoose to trade repeatedly with each other. In the market with one-off interactions the credit market collapses without a credit registry as lenders rightly fear that borrowers will default. The introduction of a registry in this environment significantlynraises repayment rates and the credit volume extended by lenders. In the market where repeat transactions are possible a credit registry is not necessary to sustain high market performance. In such an environment relationship banking enforces repayment even when lenders cannot share information, so that there is little valuenadded of a public credit registry."
Awards in the form of orders, medals, decorations and titles are ubiquitous in monarchies andnrepublics, private organizations, not-for-profit and profit-oriented firms. Nevertheless, economists have disregarded this kind of non-material extrinsic incentive.nThe demand for awards relies on an individual’s desire for distinction, and the supply ofnawards on the provision of incentives. Relative price and income effects are shown to benidentifiable and strong. A number of empirically testable propositions are formulated. Asnawards are (at least so far) impossible to measure adequately, empirical tests are carried outnusing the technique of analytic narratives.
In this note we show that no solution to coalition formation games can satisfy a set of axioms that we propose as reasonable. Our result points out that “solutions” to the coalition formation cannot be interpreted as predictions of what would be “resting points” for a game in the way stable coalition structures are usually interpreted.
We ask whether offering a menu of unemployment insurance contracts is welfare improving in a heterogeneous population. We adopt a repeated moral-hazard framework as in Shavell/Weiss (1979) supplemented by unobservednheterogeneity about agents’ job opportunities. Our main theoretical contribution is an analytical characterizationnof the sets of jointly feasible entitlements that renders annefficient computation of these sets feasible. Our main economicnresult is that optimal contracts for ”bad” searchers tend to be upward-sloping due to an adverse-selection effect.nThis is in contrast to the well-known optimal decreasingntime-profile of benefits in pure moral hazard environmentsnthat continue to be optimal for ”good” searchers in our model.
We propose an extended PAYG social security system that conditions pension benefits on the aggregate wage sum and on the wage of one’s children. The latter increases parents’ incentives to provide their children with good within-familyneducation. However, since wages depend stochastically on parents’ unobservable investment in their children’s human capital, some insurance against the productivity risk of one’s children is provided because retirement income still depends on aggregate wages. We analyze the effects of such a social security system on the endogenousndistribution of human capital and compare it to real world systems which typically do not condition benefits on the wages of one’s children. Our approach suggests a novel role for a well-designed social security system: it can foster human capital accumulation and act as an intra-generational insurance against productivitynrisk.
