We examine the interplay of endogenous vertical integration and costreducing downstream investment in successive oligopoly. We start from a linear Cournot model to motivate our more general reducedform framework. For this general framework, we establish the following main results: First, vertical integration increases own investment and decreases competitor investment (intimidation effect). Second, asymmetric equilibria typically involve integrated firms that invest more into effciency than their separated counterparts. Our findings suggest that asymmetric vertical integration is a potential explanation for the initial difference between leader and laggard in investment games.
There is growing interest in discrete-choice experiments (DCE) as a method to elicit consumers' preferences in the health care sector. Increasingly this method is used to determine willingness-to-pay (WTP) for health-related goods. However, its external validity in the health care domain has not been investigated until today. This paper examines the external validity of DCE concerning the reduction of a health risk. Convergent validity is examined by comparing the value of a statistical life with other preference elicitation techniques, such as revealed preference. Criterion validity is shown by comparing WTP values derived from stated choices in the experiment with those derived from actual choices made by the same individuals. Both tests provide strong evidence in favor of external validity of the DCE method.
This paper analyzes and compares different ways of assessing how people perceived impending threats of war in the past. Conventional Nordic historiography of World War IInclaims there were few, if any, people in the Nordic countries who perceived a significantlynincreased threat of war between 1938 and early 1940. At the same time, historical methodsnface problems when it comes to capturing the often tacitly held beliefs of a large numbernof people in the past. In this paper, we analyze these assessments by looking at suddennshifts in sovereign debt yields and spreads in the Nordic bond markets at that time. Ournresults suggest that Nordic contemporaries indeed perceived significant war risk increasesnaround the time of major war-related geopolitical events. While these findings questionnsome – but not all – of standard Nordic World War II historiography, they also demonstrate the value of analyzing historical market prices to reassess the often tacitly held views and opinions of large groups of people in the past.
"Multilevel or mixed effects models are commonly applied to hierarchical data; for example,nsee Goldstein (2003), Raudenbush and Bryk (2002), and Laird and Ware (1982). Although therenexist many outputs from such an analysis, the level-2 residuals, otherwise known as randomneffects, are often of both substantive and diagnostic interest. Substantively, they are frequently used for institutional comparisons or rankings. Diagnostically, they are used to assess the modelnassumptions at the group level. Current inference on the level-2 residuals, however, typicallyndoes not account for data snooping, that is, for the harmful effects of carrying out a multitude of hypothesis tests at the same time. We provide a very general framework that encompasses both of the following inference problems: (1) Inference on the `absolute' level-2 residuals tondetermine which are significantly different from zero, and (2) Inference on any prespecified number of pairwise comparisons. Thus, the user has the choice of testing the comparisons of interest. As our methods are flexible with respect to the estimation method invoked, the user may choose the desired estimation method accordingly. We demonstrate the methods with the London Education Authority data used by Rasbash et al. (2004), the Wafer data used by Pinheiro and Bates (2000), and the NELS data used by Afshartous and de Leeuw (2004)."
"To overcome problems produced by globalization, some people see the solution in a WorldnGovernment while others see it in an autarchic global market without any governmentnintervention. Both solutions are rejected due to their major shortcomings. Two superiornsolutions are proposed: (1) A net of Functional, Overlapping Democratic Jurisdictions (FOCJ)nconfirming to a geography of problems; (2) The free choice of individuals to become citizensnnot only simultaneously in various nations but also in semi-public, non-governmental and private organizations as well as in private firms. The advantages and disadvantages of these proposals are discussed."
This paper aims at showing the relevance of procedural utility for economics: people do not only care about outcomes, as usually assumed in economics, they also value the processes and conditions leading to outcomes. The psychological foundations of procedural utility are outlined and it is discussed how the concept differs from other related approaches in economics, like outcome utility, outcome fairness or intentions. Institutions at the level of society and fair procedures are shown to be sources of procedural utility, and novel empirical evidence on the role of procedural utility in important areas of the economy, polity and society is presented.
I give necessary and sufficient conditions for the uniqueness of the equilibrium in a wide class of Rubinstein bargaining models. The requirements encompass a class of non-convex or disconnected payoff sets with discontinuous Pareto frontiers. The equilibrium of the non-cooperative game is unique if the objective function of the corresponding Nash-bargaining game has a unique maximum. I extend the analysis to games where the time between offers is not constant.
There is abundant evidence that many individuals violate the rationality assumptionsnroutinely made in economics. However, powerful evidence also indicates that violations ofnindividual rationality do not necessarily refute the aggregate predictions of standard economicnmodels that assume full rationality of all agents. Thus, a key question is how the interactions between rational and irrational people shape the aggregate outcome in markets and other institutions. We discuss evidence indicating that strategic complementarity and strategic substitutability are decisive determinants of aggregate outcomes. Under strategic complementarity, a small amount of individual irrationality may lead to large deviations from the aggregate predictions of rational models, whereas a minority of rational agents may suffice to generate aggregate outcomes consistent with the predictions of rational models under strategic substitutability.
We consider a regulator providing deposit insurance to a bank with private information about its investment portfolio. As typical in practice, we assume that the regulator does not commit to auditing afternany risk report from the bank. We first show that the optimal contract can be implemented through a direct revelation mechanism. We also show that, at the optimal contract, a high risk bank has incentivesnto misreport. We thus establish that extraction of truthful riskninformation, as done in current regulatory practice, is not compatible with the maximization of social welfare.
When the performance of a risky asset is frequently assessed, the probability of detecting a loss is high, which averts the loss averse investors. This effect is known as myopic loss aversion (MLA). This paper reexamines several recent experimental studies documenting the existence of MLA. A closer look at the experimental data reveals that the effect of MLA is largely neutralized by the overweighting of small probabilities and the underweighting of moderate and high probabilities. Remarkably, the two effects exactly balance each other out for conventional parameterizations of cumulative prospect theory. MLA alone cannot explain the observed investment decisions.
