This paper presents an application of evolutionary portfolio theory to stocks listed in the Swiss Market Index (SMI). We study numerically the long-run outcome of the competition of rebalancing rules for market shares in a stock market with actual dividends taken from firms listed in the SMI. Returns are endogenous because prices are determined by supply and demand stemming from the rebalancing rules. Our simulations show that in competition with rebalancing rules derived from Mean-Variance Optimization, Maximum Growth Theory and Behavioral Finance, the evolutionary portfolio rule discovered in Hens and Schenk-Hoppé (2001) will eventually hold total market wealth. According to this simple rule the portfolio weights should be proportional to the expected relative dividends of the assets.
People are likely to obtain utility not only from actual outcomes, but also from the conditions which lead to these outcomes. This paper empirically tests the notion of procedural utility for the context of work relationships. Using a large survey among British workers, we find substantial procedural effects on the utility workers derive from their pay. Utility from pay is not only strongly influenced by economic outcomes (the pay levels workers get for given inputs), but also by the way pay is determined. The findings are robust to a series of alternative explanations.
Does individual well-being depend on the absolute level of income and consumption or is it relative to one's aspirations? In a direct empirical test, it is found that higher income aspirations reduce people's utility, ceteris paribus. Individual data on reported satisfaction with life are used as a proxy measure for utility, and income evaluation measures are applied as proxies for people's aspiration levels. Consistent with processes of adaptation and social comparison, income aspirations increase with people's income as well as with the average income in the community they live in.
"This note shows that permanent fluctuations in the Cobweb model — though inconsistent with a rational expectations equilibrium — can be justified as being rational when reinterpreting the model in the theory of rational beliefs."
This work gives a brief overview of the portfolio selection problem following the mean-risk approach first proposed by Markowitz (1952). We consider various risk measures, i.e. variance, value-at-risk and expected-shortfall and we study the efficient frontiers obtained by solving the portfolio selection problem under these measures. We show that under the assumption that returns are normally distributed, the efficient frontiers obtained by taking value-at-risk or expected-shortfall are subsets of the mean-variance efficient frontier. We generalize this result for all risk measures that can be written as a particular combination of mean and variance and we show that for these measures Tobin separation holds under some restrictions.
This paper reports the results of a series of competitive labour market experiments in which subjects have the possibility to reciprocate favours. In the high stake condition subjects earned between two and three times their monthly income during the experiment. In the normal stake condition the stake level was reduced by a factor of ten. We observe that both in the high and the normal stake condition fairness concerns are strong enough to outweigh competitive forces and give rise to non-competitive wages. There is also no evidence that effort behaviour becomes generally more selfish at higher stake levels. Therefore, our results suggest that, contrary to common beliefs, fairness concerns may play an important role even at relatively high stake levels.
Public choice theory takes citizens as rationally ignorant about political issues, because the costs of being informed greatly exceed the utility individuals derive from it. The costs of information (supply side) as well as the utility of information (demand side), however, can vary substantially depending on the political system under which citizens live. Using survey data from the European Union and Switzerland, we present empirical evidence that citizens are politically better informed when they have more extended political participation rights. The results corroborate theoretical arguments and circumstantial evidence that voter information should be treated as endogenously determined by political institutions.
Economics and psychology are both sciences of human behaviour. This paper gives a survey of their interaction. First, the changing relationship between the two sciences isndiscussed: while economics was once imperialistic, it has become a science inspired by psychological insights. In order to illustrate this, recent developments and evidence for three major areas are presented: bounded rationality, non-selfish behaviour, and the economics of happiness.
Survival in academia depends on publications in refereed journals. Authors only get their papers accepted if they intellectually prostitute themselves by slavishly following the demands made by anonymous referees without property rights on the journals they advise. Intellectual prostitution is neither beneficial to suppliers nor consumers. But it is avoidable. The editor (with property rights on the journal) should make the basic decision of whether a paper is worth publishing or not. The referees only give suggestions on how to improve the paper. The author may disregard this advice. This reduces intellectual prostitution and produces more original publications.
"In Europe, ever more private museums are now entering the field. This paper investigates the behavior of one of these private museums, using an institutional approach of cultural economics. The Beyeler museum in Basle, Switzerland, is a privately founded art museum with an extraordinary collection of art works. Though less than five years old, it is acknowledged to be the most successful museum in Switzerland in terms of number of visitors. However, the Beyeler museum is not completely private but receives public support. We analyze how this influences the museum’s behavior: (1) The directorate of the Beyeler museum stays away from the art market with its collection as public institutions do. (2) The museum embarks on a self-propelling process concerning special exhibitions, therewith losing some of its uniqueness. (3) Concerning visitors’ amenities, differences between private and publicnmuseums emerge but to a lesser extent than expected according to theory."
