This study assesses whether economic interest groups (business associations and trade unions) enjoy better access to the policymaking process than citizen groups. It compares the interest group population in Switzerland with those sets of groups present in the administrative and legislative venues. The study devises an aggregate measure of access to policymaking as a whole, which weights access according to different venues' importance. It theorizes the granting of access as a sequential process. Policymakers first decide whether to grant any access at all (selection stage) and then decide on the amount of access (allocation stage). Empirical evidence shows that policymakers do not discriminate between economic and citizen groups at the selection stage, but that they subsequently grant more access to economic groups. These findings qualify existing research, which interprets economic groups' superior access as the resilience of neo-corporatism, while also questioning the pluralizing effect of multiple policymaking venues.
This article develops the concept of ‘‘Functional Regulatory Space'' (FRS) in order to analyze the new forms of State action addressing (super) wicked problems. A FRS simultaneously spans several policy sectors, institutional territories and levels of government. It suggests integrating previous policy theories that focused on ‘‘boundary-spanning regime,'' ‘‘territorial institutionalism'' or multi-level governance. The FRS concept is envisaged as a Weberian ‘‘ideal-type'' of State action and is applied to the empirical study of two European cases of potential FRS: the integrated management of water basins and the regulation of the European sky through functional airspace blocks. It will be concluded that the current airspace regulation does match the ideal-type of FRS any better than the water resource regulation does. The next research step consists in analyzing the genesis and institutionalization of potential FRS addressing other (super) wicked problems such as climate change and economic, security, health and immigration issues in different insti- tutional contexts as well as at various levels of governance.
Referendums have experienced some sort of a comeback. Citizen involvement in political decisions is seen increasingly as a healthy add-on in democratic polities. While earlier writers on democratic theory often saw a danger in increased participation of citizens, more recently several authors suggest that this participation should be fostered. I argue in this paper that both sides in the debate neglect important aspects of referendums. Discussing whether direct participation by the citizens is a good or bad thing addresses only half the story. More precisely, we have to get a better idea about how referendums interact with the traditional institutions of representative democracy.
Contents 1- A summary of the main argument. 2- Two comparative tables of different (integration) regimes for third States. 3- A list of 12 common misconceptions on the Swiss-EU agreement. 1- Summary Main argument : Swiss-EU bilateral agreements are the worst form of EU agreement with (close) third countries, except for all the others.- This assertion is based on the assumption that the UK wants to maintain maximum access to the EU Single market, while preserving maximum formal sovereignty and independence. It is useful to adopt a comparative perspective to explain why the Swiss-EU bilaterals compare well with other regimes (see also table 1 and 2 below): 1) The European Economic Area (EEA, also known as the " Norway model ") represents the best option for the UK to preserve its trade with the EU. Indeed, the EEA offers full access to the Single Market for EFTA states (Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein). However, EEA membership would come with significant loss of sovereignty for the UK. EFTA countries are not part of EU institutions and have no decision-making rights. EFTA experts are only consulted in early EU legislation phases. The EEA institutional framework is cumbersome and possesses supranational dimensions (EFTA surveillance authority and EFTA court- which closely follow the ECJ's case law). Besides, EEA membership comes with important financial obligations. EFTA countries are obliged to pay substantial amounts for the reduction of socio-economic disparities in the EU. Last but not least, EEA-EFTA States would have to accept UK's application to join the EEA/EFTA pillar unanimously. It appears that the Norwegian government has strong reservations on the matter. 2) The association agreements that the EU concluded with Ukraine (the " DCFTA " being the trade part of the agreement) have also been cited as a potential blueprint for the UK. The text of the DCFTA offers gradual access to the 1 Authors are grateful to Angus Wallace (GSI-University of Geneva) for his editing support.
Supporters of European integration have always argued that it has brought peace. Yet no scientific study has ever developed a critical approach to such a claim. To remedy this surprising deficiency, the author builds a typology that will help to distinguish the two main opposing approaches to this question: that of the Europeanists and that of the Eurosceptics. The dialectical confrontation between these two approaches is the red thread of the book. Taken up in each of the chapters, it provides a synthetic point of view aimed at overcoming this opposition. The author shows that the contribution of the European construction to peace lies in the nuances, thus distinguishing itself from the irenical slogans of the Europeanists while dismantling the arguments of the Eurosceptics. He concludes that the EU will never be able to prevent extremist and belligerent tendencies among the European states and/or peoples. It can, however, limit the damage those tendencies could cause through the rules and institutions which the Member States have committed to respecting.
Cet article prend appui sur une histoire qui occupa la chronique genevoise pendant quelques années: une institutrice, travaillant au Département de l'instruction publique du canton de Genève, convertie à l'Islam, affirmait sa volonté de donner la classe revêtue du foulard islamique. Le Département lui signifia son opposition et son interdiction de le faire. Il s'en suivit une longue controverse judiciaire dont le point final fut une décision de la Cour européenne des droits de l'homme, qui donnait raison au gouvernement genevois et confirmait l'interdiction. Le présent travail n'aborde pas les questions de droit impliquées dans cette affaire mais tente d'analyser les présupposés et les implications des divers arguments invoqués par les parties et cela du point de vue de la théorie politique, en particulier du point de vue des théories libérales et communautariennes.
Quels sont les apports de l'Union européenne? Rares sont les textes qui traitent simplement à cette question. Ce texte y répond par une analyse de type contrefactuelle. Autrement dit: que serait-il passé si l'UE n'avait pas été mise en place?
Switzerland is unique in its reluctance to join the EU. Indeed, all governments and parliaments in Europe have at least once in their history sought to become a member. This is not the case for Switzerland, which has never started accession negotiations and does not intend to do so soon. Currently the debate is between supporters of maintaining bilateral agreements with the EU and rejectionists who are even ready to give it up. Thus, paradoxically, the British Eurosceptics, who modeled the bilateral agreements between Switzerland and Switzerland, would appear in Switzerland as integrators. To clarify this very particular case, this chapter is based on an analysis grid composed of several levels of explanations (historical, political and economic). The results obtained show that the political theories of euroscepticism are not sufficiently developed to explain this Swiss phenomenon.
This chapter applies the methodological tools of formal social network analysis tbNelË illustraæ the mdtifk functions currently performed by puUiic aàmi*stration(s) in steering public policy.
