The two basic systems according to which pay-as-you-go-financed public-pension systems can be organized are the (Anglo-Saxon) Beveridge system and the (continental) Bismarck system. An ideal Beveridge system provides flat-rate benefits, whereas an ideal Bismarck system provides earnings-related benefits. This paper analyzes the circumstances under which a Beveridge system can be sustainable in systems competition with a Bismarck system. The analysis reveals a much more complicated redistributive structure of the pension systems than only between high and low incomes. As a consequence, the sustainability depends on growth rates, and equilibria can exist where, contrary to the first intuition, even poor individuals prefer a Bismarck and rich individuals prefer a Beveridge system.
Institutional change is guided by rules. In the European Union these rules are given by Art. 250-252 of the Treaty of Amsterdam. We analyze these articles as games in extensive form and characterize and compare the equilibria of these games. The analysis identifies the decisive actors and the conditions under which it comes to institutional changes in the European Union. In addition we analyze the tendencies for centralization inherent in these decision procedures as well as their ability to guarantee conflict-minimizing compromises between the institutional actors. We show that the historical evolution from Art. 250 over Art. 252 to Art. 251 implies an improved position of the European Parliament. Contrary to part of the literature we show that the move from Art. 250 to Art. 252 may have
important consequences for the policies to be implemented and that the move from Art. 252 to Art. 251 improved the position of the European Parliament. Hence, our model is able to resolve the empirical anomalies resulting in conditional-agenda setting model by Tsebelis and therefore points to the importance of the sequential structure of the decision procedures.
In Part I of this paper, we have presented a general treatment of the welfare effect of an eastern EU enlargement on incumbent countries. Part II now takes a closer look at the Austrian case. We first present a few descriptive statistics on the role that east-west trade, as well as the pertinent trade barriers, play for the Austrian economy. We then argue that a numerical simulation, based on a suitably specified general equilibrium model, is an appropriate way towards a full evaluation of the welfare and distributional consequences of enlargement. Focussing on the Austrian case, we therefore implement an enriched and parameterized version of the general model used in Part I of the paper. The model features savings and investment, based on intertemporal optimization, as well as sectoral allocation of capital and labor (skilled/unskilled), based on product differentiation and imperfect competition. In addition, the model incorporates a detailed representation of the government budget, featuring distortive taxes and subsidies, as well as transfers to domestic households, and financial transactions with the EU. The model allows us to take a quantitative view on both the costs and integration gains of an eastern enlargement. Relying on a Hicksian welfare measure which incorporates both long-run effects and short-run adjustment, our numerical simulations indicate that, in the Austrian case, the integration gains outweigh the fiscal burden.
Several European countries have recently introduced levies on bank liabilities to internalise the fiscal costs of banking crises. This paper studies the tax incidence: Building on the Monti-Klein model, we predict that banks shift the burden to borrowers by raising lending rates and that deposit rates may increase as deposits are partly exempt. Bank-level evidence for 23 EU countries in the period 2007-2013 implies a moderate increase in lending and deposit rates and net interest margins. Market characteristics and capital structure influence the magnitude: The lending rate strongly increases in concentrated markets, whereas the pass-through is weak for well-capitalised banks.
Postsendungen gehören in Europa zu den Dienstleistungen von allgemeinem wirtschaftlichen Interesse. Es handelt sich dabei um adressierte Sendungen, neben Briefsendungen z. B. auch um Zeitungen, Zeitschriften und Postpakete. Im Postbereich wurden gesetzliche Marktzutrittsschranken lange Zeit mit Universaldienstverpflichtungen begründet. Die Einführung des Wettbewerbs in europäischen Postmärkten erfolgte im Rahmen einer graduellen Marktöffnung stufenweise. In der ersten Postrichtlinie (97/67/EG) ist der minimal zu leistende Universaldienst definiert und die allmähliche Einschränkung der Monopole der nationalen Postgesellschaften verankert. Im Rahmen der zweiten Postrichtlinie (2002/39/EG) ist präzisiert, dass Postmonopole in den Mitgliedstaaten nur noch zu dem Grad zulässig sind, wie sie zur Sicherstellung des Universaldienstes dienen. Die dritte Postrichtlinie (2008/6/EG) beinhaltet schliesslich die Pflicht, die vollumfängliche Marktöffnung bis zum Jahr 2011 bei vorgegebenem minimalem Universaldienstniveau in nationales Recht umzusetzen. Vollständig aufgehoben wurde das Monopol auf Briefsendungen bisher von fünf Ländern (Finnland, Schweden, UK, Deutschland und Niederlande). Die übrigen europäischen Mitgliedstaaten werden in Kürze ihre Postmärkte ebenfalls umfassend dem Wettbewerb öffnen.
Kooperative Forschung ist einer der wichtigen Arbeitsschwerpunkte der Kooperationsstelle Hochschule und Arbeitswelt der Universität des Saarlandes, deren Initiator und Leiter Professor Dr. Hans Leo Krämer ist.
Der Kooperationsstelle Hochschule und Arbeitswelt geht es um mehr als eine allgemeine Zusammenarbeit zwischen Hochschule und Arbeitswelt. Ihre Forschungs- und Dienstleistungsaktivitäten sind - dank der Unterstützung der Arbeitskammer des Saarlandes, der Universität des Saarlandes und der Gewerkschaften - sozialinnovativ angelegt. Das heisst, sie setzt sich durch ihre Forschungsprojekte und Wissenstransfer-Dienstleistungen dafür ein, dass für alle arbeitenden Menschen im Mittelpunkt der Arbeit geforscht und Wissen transferiert wird. Dabei werden insbesondere auch diejenigen berücksichtigt, die in geringerem Masse am ökonomischen, sozialen und kulturellen Kapital in unserer Wissens- und Informationsgesellschaft partizipieren können.
Bei den hier versammelten Beiträgen handelt es sich neben einer Schrift zu Ehren von Professor Krämer um eine Fülle interessanter und zukunftsweisender Arbeiten aus den unterschiedlichsten Fachrichtungen. Zudem sind Ergebnisse und interes-sante methodische Details dargestellt, die sonst in Forschungsberichten schwer zugänglich sind oder nur verkürzt z. B. in Zeitungsmeldungen bekannt gemacht werden können.
Allen Projekten gemeinsam ist, dass sie kooperativ von mindestens einem arbeitsweltlichen Partner begleitet wurden, dessen Sichtweise und Wissen gleichberechtigt in die Arbeit mit eingegangen ist.
Without financing frictions, profit taxes reduce investment by their effect on the user cost of capital. With financing constraints, investment becomes sensitive to cash-flow. In this situation, even small taxes impose first order welfare losses, andACE and cash-flow tax systems are no longer neutral. When banks become active and provide monitoring services in addition to finance, an ACE tax yields larger investment and welfare than an equal yield cash-flow tax.
In this paper we set up a model of start-up finance under double moral hazard. Entrepreneurs lack own resources and business experience to develop their ideas. Venture capitalists can provide start-up finance and commercial support. The effort put forth by either agent contributes to the firm's success, but is not verifiable. As a result, the market equilibrium is biased towards inefficiently low venture capital support. The capital gains tax becomes especially harmful, as it further impairs advice and causes a first-order welfare loss. Once the capital gains tax is in place, limitations on loss off-set may paradoxically contribute to higher quality of venture capital finance and welfare. Subsidies to physical investment in VC-backed start-ups are detrimental in our framework.
