infonet-economy

Summary: In this evaluation study the causal effects of different types of rehabilitation programmes on labour market outcomes are estimated. Compared to previous research its main feature is that it evaluates simultaneously multiple programmes by nonparametric matching estimators. The study is based on a sample of 6287 persons in Western Sweden who are long-term sick observed during 1991 to 1994. The results indicate that, on the one hand, rehabilitation programmes prolong the sick-ness spell. On the other hand no positive effects of rehabilitation on re-integration into the labour market compared to non-participation are found. Among the rehabilitative programmes vocational workplace training appears superior, while educational training may even harm labour market prospects. Zusammenfassung: In dieser Evaluierungsstudie werden die kausalen Effekte von Rehabilitationsmassnahmen auf die Wiedereingliederung in den Arbeitsmarkt geschätzt. Ein wichtiger Aspekt dieser Studie, im Unterschied zu üblichen Evaluierungsstudien, ist die simultane Schätzung der Effekte verschiedener Massnahmen mittels eines nichtparametrischen Matching-Verfahrens. Die Untersuchung basiert auf einer Stichprobe von 6287 Langzeiterkrankten in Westschweden, beobachtet in den Jahren 1991 bis 1994. Die Ergebnisse zeigen einerseits, dass die Teilnahme an Rehabilitationsmassnahmen die registrierte Krankheitsdauer verlängert. Andererseits konnten keine positiven Wiedereingliederungseffekte rehabilitierender Massnahmen im Vergleich zur Nichtteilnahme gefunden werden. Zwischen den Rehabilitationsmassnahmen erscheint die berufsbezogene Arbeitsplatzrehabilitation am erfolgreichsten, während berufsbezogene Bildungsmassnahmen die Wiedereingliederung in den Arbeitsmarkt eher erschweren. Résumé: Cette étude estime les effets de différents programmes de réhabilitation sur les perspectives professionnelles des participants. La caractéristique principale de cette étude par rapport aux précédentes est l'estimation simultanée des effets de différents programmes à l'aide d' un estimateur matching non-paramétrique. Cette enquête se base sur un échantillon de 1991 à 1994, comprenant 6287 personnes habitant la partie occidentale de la Suède et ayant été en "longue maladie". Les résultats montrent, d'une part, que la participation aux programmes de réhabilitation prolonge la durée déclarée de la période de maladie et d'autre part, qu' aucune amélioration des perspectives professionnelles n'a pu être constatée pour les participants aux programmes de réhabilitation en comparaison avec les non-participants. Parmi ces programmes, ceux qui ont lieu en entreprise semblent les plus efficaces tandis que les programmes de formation apparaissent plutôt contre-productifs.
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Abschlussbericht im Auftrag des seco

We explore the incentives countries face in trade litigation within the new WTO Dispute Settlement System. Our analysis yields a number of interesting predictions. First, because sanctions are ruled out during the litigation process, the Dispute Settlement System does not preclude all new trade restrictions. However, the agenda-setting capacity of the complainant, including its right to force a decision, make traderestrictions less attractive than under the WTO's predecessor GATT. Second, the system's appellate review provides the losing defendant with strong incentives to delay negative findings, and both parties with a possibility to signal their determinacy in fighting the case. Third, a relatively weak implementation procedure potentially reinforces incentives to violate WTO trade rules. Fourth, bilateral settlements are more likely at an early stage in the process and are biased towards the expected outcome of the formal dispute settlement procedure. empirical evidence based on a first data set of cases at an advanced stage of the litigation process provides qualitative support for our claims. (pdf, 230k)

This paper analyzes the new World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute settlement system as a dynamic game under uncertainty, and explores its strategic elements and incentive structure. Our model delivers a number of implications, confirmed by already settled cases: Governments are often tempted to introduce trade restrictions which can guar- antee a positive payoff for a certain period of time. The complainant's agenda{setting capacity, nevertheless, can enhance economic efficiency by limiting the period in which trade restrictions are active. The losing party has a strong incentive to appeal the first instance findings of the procedure. Bilateral settlements can become feasible at different intermediate stages of the process. (pdf, 311k)

We use a change in the voting procedures of one of the two chambers of the Swiss parliament to explore how transparency affects the voting behavior of its members. Until 2013, the Upper House (Council of States) had voted by a show of hands. While publicly observable at the time of the vote, legislators' decisions could only be verified ex post through the time-consuming screening of online videos. In 2014, halfway through the legislative period, the chamber switched to electronic voting. Since then, the individual votes of legislators have become more transparent and observable as their votes are now recorded electronically and, in some cases, published online.

Our analysis is based on individual voting behavior in all final passage votes during the 2011- 2015 legislative period. In a difference-in-difference framework, the larger chamber, the Lower House (National Council), serves as a control group. Not only have the voting procedures of the Lower House remained unchanged since 2007 but also the legislative texts on which both chambers vote are the same. This unique framework makes it possible to estimate the causal effects of voting procedures on legislators' choices.

Since the voting system reform, members of the Upper House are significantly less likely to deviate from their party line. Our results reflect the increased observability of legislators' votes and the greater conformity pressure exerted by political parties, as easier monitoring enables them to enforce discipline among their members.

Der Beitrag berichtet über eine empirische Analyse einer Version der IAB-Beschäftigtenstichprobe, die um Zeiten der Fortbildung und Umschulung angereichert wurde. Die betrachteten Personen hatten zwischen Januar 1993 und Dezember 1994 eine neue Arbeitslosigkeitsperiode mit Bezug von Arbeitslosengeld oder -hilfe begonnen und wurden getrennt nach westlichen und östlichen Bundesländern untersucht. Besonderes Augenmerk wurde auf den so genannten 'Lock-in-Effekt' gelegt, der darauf beruht, dass Teilnehmer während der Massnahme nicht in gleichem Masse Arbeit suchen wie die Nichtteilnehmer. Es ergibt sich bei Umschulungsmassnahmen ein stark negativer Beschäftigungseffekt, während kürzere Fortbildungsmassnahmen erheblich besser abschneiden. Umschulungen zeigen andererseits langfristig die stärksten positiven Beschäftigungswirkungen. Es wird daher empfohlen, dass Massnahmen eine Chance bekommen sollten, ihre Wirkung erst einmal zu entfalten. Der anfangs zu beobachtende 'Lock-in-Effekt' wird meist langfristig kompensiert. [http://www.iab.de/asp/internet/dbdokShow.asp?pkyDoku=k050823805]

In many countries, caseworkers in a public employment office have the dual roles of counselling and monitoring unemployed persons. These roles often conflict with each other leading to important caseworker heterogeneity: Some consider providing services to their clients and satisfying their demands as their primary task. Others may however pursue their strategies even against the will of the unemployed person. They may assign job assignments and labour market programmes without consent of the unemployed person. Based on a very detailed linked jobseeker-caseworker dataset, we investigate the effects of caseworkers' cooperativeness on the employment probabilities of their clients. Modified statistical matching methods reveal that caseworkers who place less emphasis on a cooperative and harmonic relationship with their clients increase their employment chances in the short and medium term.
(doi:10.1111/j.1467-985X.2009.00600.x)

We evaluate a randomized experiment of a statistical support system developed to assist caseworkers in Swiss employment offices in choosing appropriate active labour market programmes for their unemployed clients. This statistical support system predicted the labour market outcome for each programme and thereby suggested an 'optimal' labour market programme for each unemployed person. The support system was piloted in several employment offices. In those pilot offices, half of the caseworkers used the system and the other half acted as control group. The allocation of the caseworkers to treatment and control group was random. The experiment was designed such that caseworkers retained full discretion about the choice of active labour market programmes, and the evaluation results showed that caseworkers largely ignored the statistical support system. This indicates that stronger incentives are needed for caseworkers to comply with statistical profiling and targeting systems.

In this paper the motivation and various concepts of statistical systems for assisting case workers in assigning unemployed persons to active labour market programmes (ALMP) are examined and the particular implementation of such a statistical system in Switzerland, which was introduced in the form of a randomized pilot study, is discussed.