(with Kim Peijnenburg) überarbeitet und neu eingereicht "Review of Economic Dynamics"
We analyze the effect of means-tested benefits on annuitization decisions. Most
industrialized countries provide a subsistence level consumption floor in old age, usually in the form of means-tested benefits. The availability of such means-tested payments creates an incentive to cash out (occupational) pension wealth for low and middle income earners, instead of taking the annuity. Agents trade-off the advantages from annuitization, receiving the wealth-enhancing mortality credit, to the disadvantages, giving up "free" wealth in the form of means-tested supplemental benefits. We find that the availability of means-tested benefits can reduce the desired annuitization levels substantially. Using individual level data, we show that the model's predicted annuitization rates as a function of the level of pension wealth are roughly consistent with the cash-out patterns of occupational pension wealth observed in Switzerland.
This paper analyzes a recent ballot in which two virtually identical popular initiatives, both demanding a decrease in the legal age of retirement in Switzerland, led to differences in approval rates of nearly seven percentage points. Based on this unique natural experiment, the existence of emphasis framing effects is tested for and their determinants are identified outside of the controlled settings of laboratories. Nonetheless, the analyzed setting allows for considerably more control than usually available in the field: All party, government and interest group recommendations were symmetric for both initiatives, and the simultaneous vote rules out potential variation of individual preferences and compositional changes of the electorate over time. Using community and individual level data it is shown that the difference in approval rates is largely due to the different emphases in the initiatives' titles.
This chapter takes Switzerland’s much praised three-pillar system to illustrate some of the challenges reforms to pension systems face in an aging society. It shows that policymakers are confronted by some individuals with behavioral anomalies and by others who strategically exploit the system. The trade-off between providing incentives and adequate retirement income limits policy options, especially if reformers do not want to impose too many restrictions on individual choice and wish to avoid excessive burdens on the young generation. Pension reforms can also be seriously challenged by political constraints, in particular, when voters have a direct say on proposed changes.
This chapter takes Switzerland's much praised three-pillar system to illustrate some of the challenges pension system reforms face in an aging society. It shows that policymakers are confronted by some individuals with behavioral anomalies, and by others who strategically exploit the system The trade-off between providing incentives and adequate retirement income limits policy options, especially if reformers do not want to impose too many restrictions on individual choice and avoid excessive burdens for the young generation. Pension reforms can also be seriously challenged by political constraints, in particular, when voters have a direct say on proposed changes.
