The introduction of the principle of mutual recognition in EU justice and home affairs co-operation has been associated with a ‘revolution’ in internal security co-operation and has raised as many expectations as concerns. Whereas most discussions focus on the legal coherence of the concept in third pillar legislation and its potential tensions with procedural law and human rights standards, this article goes two steps back and questions at a more fundamental level the transferability of a principle of market integration into a core area of statehood and analyses the institutional preconditions for its implementation. Juxta- posing the different constellations of interdependence and governance modes in the economic and internal security spheres, it is argued that what functions as an instru- ment of liberalization in one sphere becomes a tool of governmentalization in the other, yet hampered by an unsettled tension between supranationality and states’ prerogatives.
ABSTRACT The creation of the Single European Market has been accompanied by an intense discussion on whether market-creating measures have been privileged over market- correcting ones by the institutional system of the EU. The creation of an ‘Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’ (AFSJ) launched by the Treaty of Amsterdam poses a similar question which, however, has remained heavily under-researched: will the balance between policing competencies and individual rights shift towards the former at the expense of the latter? Recent work on the ‘new raison d’e ́tat’ and the strengthening of national executives in processes of Europeanisation points in this direction. This essay explores the parallels between the Common Market and the AFSJ with regard to the relationship between the structures and substance of governance. The balance between security and individual rights is scrutinised in the main pillars of the AFSJ: asylum cooperation, judicial cooperation in criminal matters and police cooperation.
This article explores whether and under what conditions functional sectoral cooperation between the EU and the countries of the European Neighbourhood Policy promotes democratic governance. In an analysis of four countries (Jordan, Moldova, Morocco, and Ukraine) and three fields of cooperation (competition, environment and migration policy), we show that country properties such as the degree of political liberalization, membership aspirations, and geographic region do not explain differences in democratic governance. Rather, sectoral conditions such as the codification of democratic governance rules, the institutionalization of functional cooperation, interdependence, and adoption costs matter most for the success of democratic governance promotion. We further reveal a notable discrepancy between adoption and application of democratic governance in the selected ENP countries that has not been remedied in the first five years of the ENP.
EU external democracy promotion has traditionally been based on ‘linkage’, i.e. bottom-up support for democratic forces in third countries, and ‘leverage’, i.e. the top-down inducement of political elites towards democratic reforms through political conditionality. The advent of the European Neighbourhood Policy and new forms of association have introduced a new, third model of democracy promotion which rests in functional cooperation between administrations. This article comparatively defines and explicates these three models of external democracy promotion. It argues that while ‘linkage’ has hitherto failed to produce tangible outcomes, and the success of ‘leverage’ has basically been tied to an EU membership perspective, the ‘governance’ model of democracy promotion bears greater potential beyond the circle of candidate countries. In contrast to the two traditional models, however, the governance approach does not tackle the core institutions of the political system as such, but promotes transparency, accountability, and participation at the level of state administration.
The deepening of the EU’s acquis communautaire, transformations of the European continent, and intensifying webs of interdependence have, since the 1990s, prompted a progressing blurring of the functional boundaries of the European Union. Whereas the integration project has produced externalities early on, the EU has engaged in an active promotion of its norms and rules beyond the member states, designing concentric circles of flexible ‘EUropean’ integration. This article offers a typology of these evolving external circles of EU rule-export focusing on the European Economic Area, Swiss-EU bilateralism, the stabilization and enlargement policy towards the candidate countries of the Western Balkans, the European Neighbourhood Policy and countries beyond the neighbourhood. Drawing on the theoretical notion of external governance, it will be shown these outer circles of ‘EUropean’ integration fall into three groups. While the first group, the ‘quasi-member states’ of Western Europe, combine far-reaching regulatory alignment with limited opportunities for organizational inclusion in EU structures, the Eastern and Southern neighbours face less legalized forms of rule transfer along with the establishment of parallel regional organizational structures. Links with countries beyond the neighbourhood finally stress the functionally differentiated rather than political and territorial dynamics of EU external governance.
In the absence of an international migration regime, the rising salience of migration issues and the limits of unilateral policies led the European Union to seek appropriate venues for co-operation with the sending and transit countries of migrants. Many of the newer relevant multilateral or regional venues are soft law frameworks. Conversely, trade agreements provide a formal, hard law instrument for inserting migration clauses. Based on a quantitative analysis of EU trade agreements and expert interviews, this article investigates how far the EU is engaging in strategic issue-linkage when including migration clauses in its trade agreements. Testing hypotheses derived from ration- alist and institutionalist approaches, it thereby provides an empirical test of its acclaimed identity as ‘trade power’ or ‘market power’.
This contribution proposes a decentred conceptualization of Euro- pean Union (EU) international influence based on the external ramifications of its internal policies. It views the EU’s international role less as that of an emerging unitary actor than as conglomerate of loosely coupled sectoral regimes expanding their prescriptive scope towards third countries in differentiated ways. Combining conceptual approaches to (EU) power with empirical – analytical research on external governance and policy diffusion, the contribution defines the mechanisms of regu- latory extension, specifies their scope conditions, and highlights the role of transgo- vernmental networks, often involving international organizations, in ‘co-opting’ third country regulators into EU policies.
In a ‘demoi-cracy’, separate statespeoples enter into a political arrangement and jointly exercise political authority. Its proper domain is a polity of democratic states with hierarchical, majoritarian features of policy-making, especially in value-laden redistributive and coercive policy areas, but without a unified political community (demos). In its vertical dimension, demoi-cracy is based on the equality and interaction of citizens’ and statespeoples’ representatives in the making of common policies. Horizontally, it seeks to balance equal transnational rights of citizens with national policy-making autonomy. The EU belongs to the domain of demoi-cracy and has established many of its features. We argue that both vertical and horizontal demoi-cratization have been triggered by processes of supranational integration in the EU. They differ, however, in the origins and the outcomes. Vertical demoi-cratization has initially been a reaction of parliamentary institutional actors to majoritarian decision-making in regulatory policy-areas, resulting in the empowerment of the EP and the strengthening of parliamentary oversight at the national level. By contrast, horizontal demoi-cratization has been promoted by governments as an alternative to majoritarian and legally binding policy-making in core areas of statehood as well as coercive and redistributive policy-areas; it has resulted in soft, coordinative forms of policy-making, seeking to protect national autonomy. The extent to which these developments actually meet the normative standards of demoi-cracy in practice, however, is mixed.
