This paper considers the problem of testing s null hypotheses simultaneously while controlling the false discovery rate (FDR). Benjamini and Hochberg (1995) provide a method for controlling the FDR based on p-values for each of the null hypotheses under the assumption that the p-values are independent. Subsequent research has since shown that this procedure is valid under weaker assumptions on the joint distribution of the p-values. Related procedures that are valid under no assumptions on the joint distribution of the p-values have also been developed. None of these procedures, however, incorporate information about the dependence structure of the test statistics. This paper develops methods for control of the FDR under weak assumptions that incorporate such information and, by doing so, are better able to detect false null hypotheses. We illustrate this property via a simulation study and two empirical applications. In particular, the bootstrap method is competitive with methods that require independence if independence holds, but it outperforms these methods under dependence.
This paper analyzes individual decision making under risk. It is assumed that an individualndoes not have a preference relation on the set of risky lotteries. Instead, an individual possesses a probability measure that captures the likelihood of one lottery being chosen over the other. Choice probabilities have a stochastic utility representation if they can benwritten as a non-decreasing function of the difference in expected utilities of the lotteries.nChoice probabilities admit a stochastic utility representation if and only if they are complete, strongly transitive, continuous, independent of common consequences andninterchangeable. Axioms of stochastic utility are consistent with systematic violations of betweenness and a common ratio effect but not with a common consequence effect. Special cases of stochastic utility include the Fechner model of random errors, Luce choice model and a tremble model of Harless and Camerer (1994).
We present a theoretical basis for testing related endpoints. Typically, it is known hownto construct tests of the individual hypotheses, and the problem is how to combine them into a multiple test procedure that controls the familywise error rate. Using the closure method, we emphasize the role of consonant procedures, from an interpretive as well as a theoretical viewpoint. Suprisingly, even if each intersection test has an optimality property, the overallnprocedure obtained by applying closure to these tests may be inadmissible. We introduce annew procedure, which is consonant and has a maximin property under the normal model. The results are then applied to PROactive, a clinical trial designed to investigate the effectivenessnof a glucose-lowering drug on macrovascular outcomes among patients with type 2 diabetes.n
This chapter discusses the role of environmental morale and environmental motivation in individual behavior from the point of view of economics and psychology. It deals with the fundamental public good problem, and presents empirical (laboratory and field) evidence on how the cooperation problem can be overcome. Four different theoretical approaches are distinguished according to how individuals’ underlying environmental motivation is modeled. Specifically, we look at the interaction between environmental policy and environmental morale through the lens of cognitive evaluation theory (also known as crowding theory).
Health Economics presents a systematic treatment of the economics of health behavior and health care delivery. Appropriate both for advanced undergraduate and graduate students of economics, this text provides the background required to understand current research,presenting theoretical models as well as empirical evidence and summarizing key results. Without neglecting ethical concerns, modern microeconomic theory is applied to
formulate theoretical implications and predictions. Issues discussed include the economic valuation of life and health, moral hazard in health care utilization, supplier-induced demand, the search for remuneration systems with favorable incentives, risk selection in health insurance markets, and technological change in medicine.
We analyze the interaction between risk sharing and capital accumulation in a stochastic OLG model with production. We give a complete characterization of interim Pareto optimal competitive equilibrium allocations. Furthermore, we provide
tests of Pareto optimality/suboptimality based on (risky) rates of return only.
Introduction: Self-esteem is one of the most prominent and influential constructs in psychological science, yet very few neuropsychological/neuroscientific investigations have been undertaken in this area of research. The current study investigated the possibility of hemispheric lateralisation of self-esteem.
Methods: By creating an auditory version of the Implicit Association Test (IAT) for self-esteem, we were able to present stimuli dichotically and thereby compare left- versus right-hemispheric measurements of self-esteem in 46 healthy adults.
Results: Although left- and right-hemispheric self-esteem measurements were correlated, withinparticipant analysis revealed that self-esteem levels (as reflected by IAT score) were significantly greater when elicited under right-ear presentation (reflecting left hemispheric processing).
Conclusions: We interpret this asymmetry with reference to the approach-withdrawal model of emotion processing and suggest avenues for future research.
Experimental studies of search behavior suggest that individuals stop searching earlier than the optimal, risk-neutral stopping rule predicts. Two different classes of
decision rules could generate this behavior: rules that are optimal conditional on utility functions departing from risk neutrality, or heuristics derived from limited cognitive processing capacities and satisficing. To discriminate between these possibilities, we conduct an experiment that consists of a search task as well as a lottery task designed to elicit utility functions. We find that search heuristics are not related to measures of risk aversion, but to measures of loss aversion.
This paper addresses three empirical findings of the literature on initial public offerings. (i) Why do investment banks earn positive profits in a competitive market? (ii) Why do banks receive lower gross spreads in venture capitalist (VC) backed than in non-VC backed IPOs? (iii) Why is underpricing more pronounced in VC than in
non-VC backed IPOs? While each phenomenon can be explained by itself, there is no explanation yet why all three occur simultaneously. We propose an integrated theoretical framework to address this issue. The IPO procedure is modeled as a two-stage signaling game: In the second stage banks set offer prices given their private information and the level of the spread. Issuing firms anticipate their bank’s pricing decision and, in the first stage, set spreads to maximize expected revenue. Investors are aware of this process and subscribe only if their expected profits are non-negative. Firms’ equilibrium spreads are large so as to induce banks to set high prices, allowing
banks to make profits. Superiorly informed VC backed firms impose smaller spreads but face larger underpricing than non-VC backed firms.
