Volunteering constitutes one of the most important pro-social activities.nFollowing Adam Smith, helping others is the way to higher individual well-being. This viewncontrasts with the selfish utility maximizer who avoids costs from helping others. The twonrival views are studied empirically. We find robust evidence that volunteers are morensatisfied with their life than non-volunteers. Causality is addressed taking advantage of annatural experiment: the collapse of East Germany and its infrastructure of volunteering.nPeople who accidentally lost their opportunities for volunteering are compared to peoplenwho experienced no change in their volunteer status.
In a recent paper Engelmann and Strobl claim that a combination of a preference for efficiency and a Rawlsian motive for helping the least well-off is far more important than inequity aversion. Here we show that the relevance of the efficiency motive is largely restricted to students of economics and business administration. Students from other disciplines, adult academics from various disciplines and senior citizens value equality much higher than efficiency. Moreover, there is rather strong evidence that the relevance of the efficiency motive and the Rawlsian motive is largely restricted to non-strategic interactions.
In many occupations workers’ labor supply choices are constrained by institutionalnrules regulating labor time and effort provision. This renders explicit tests of the neoclassicalntheory of labor supply difficult. Here we present evidence from studies examining labornsupply responses in “neoclassical environments” in which workers are free to choose whennand how much to work. Despite the favorable environment the results cast doubt on thenneoclassical model. They are, however, consistent with a model of reference dependentnpreferences exhibiting loss aversion and diminishing sensitivity.
People spend more and more time commuting and often find it a burden.nAccording to economics, the burden of commuting is chosen when compensated eithernon the labor or on the housing market so that individuals' utility is equalized. However, inna direct test of this strong notion of equilibrium, we find that people with longerncommuting time report systematically lower subjective well-being. Additional empiricalnanalyses rule out institutional explanations of the empirical finding that commutersnsystematically incur losses. We discuss several possibilities of an extended model ofnhuman behavior able to explain this 'commuting paradox'.
This paper analyzes the causal relationships between marriage and subjective well-being in a longitudinal data set spanning 17 years. We find evidence that more happy singles opt more likely for marriage and that there are large differences in the benefits from marriage between couples. Potential, as well as actual, division of labor seems to contribute to spouses' well-being, especially for women and when there is a young family to raise. In contrast, large differences in the partners' educational level have a negative effect on experienced life satisfaction.
The portfolio selection problem is traditionally modelled by two different approaches. The first one is based on an axiomatic model of risk-averse preferences, where decision makers are assumed to possess an expected utility function. The second approach, first proposed by Markowitz (1952), reduces the portfolio choice to a set of two criteria, reward and risk. Usually the reward-risk model is not consistent with the first approach, even when the decision is independent from the specific form of the risk-averse expected utility function. In this paper we generalize the reward-risk model for portfolio selection. We define reward measures and risk measures by giving a set of properties these measures should satisfy. One of these properties will be the consistency with second order stochastic dominance, to obtain a link with the expected utility portfolio selection. We characterize reward and risk measures and we discuss the implication for portfolio selection.
"We present a model in which two of the most important features of the long-run growth process are reconciled: the massive changes in the structure of production and employment; and the Kaldor facts of economic growth. We assume that households expand their consumption along a hierarchy of needs and firms introduce continuously new products. In equilibrium industries with an expanding and those with a declining employment share co-exist, and each such industry goes (or has already gone) through a cycle of take-off, maturity, and stagnation. Nonetheless macroeconomic aggregates grow pari passu at a constant rate."
This paper investigates the effectiveness of benefit sanctions in reducing unemployment duration. Data from the Swiss labor market allow making a distinction between the effect of a warning that a person is not complying with eligibility requirements and the effect of the actual enforcement of a benefit sanction. We find that both warning and enforcement have a positive effect on the exit rate out of unemployment. Moreover, the stricter the sanction policy the shorter is the duration of unemployment of the non-sanctioned. This can be taken as evidence of a strong ex-ante effect of a strict sanction policy.
We suggest a new micro-foundation of money in which markets are well-organized but consumers' preferences are stochastic. In this model, we solve for stationary equilibria and show that there is an optimum quantity of money. The rational solution of our model is compared with actual behavior in a laboratory experiment. It turns out that the experiment gives support to our theoretical results.
Empirical evidence is provided for the importance of non-reciprocal pro-social behavior of individuals in an anonymous, n-person pure public good setting. A unique panel data set of 136,000 observations is matched with an extensive survey.nEven under anonymous conditions, a large number of individuals are prepared to donate a not insignificant sum of money. Cooperation conditional on giving by specific other personsn(reciprocity) is present but the causal relationship is ambiguous. It is crucially important, whether, and in what way, one is asked to donate. Identification with the organization is also important.
