This paper reports the results of a series of competitive labour market experiments in which subjects have the possibility to reciprocate favours. In the high stake condition subjects earned between two and three times their monthly income during the experiment. In the normal stake condition the stake level was reduced by a factor of ten. We observe that both in the high and the normal stake condition fairness concerns are strong enough to outweigh competitive forces and give rise to non-competitive wages. There is also no evidence that effort behaviour becomes generally more selfish at higher stake levels. Therefore, our results suggest that, contrary to common beliefs, fairness concerns may play an important role even at relatively high stake levels.
Public choice theory takes citizens as rationally ignorant about political issues, because the costs of being informed greatly exceed the utility individuals derive from it. The costs of information (supply side) as well as the utility of information (demand side), however, can vary substantially depending on the political system under which citizens live. Using survey data from the European Union and Switzerland, we present empirical evidence that citizens are politically better informed when they have more extended political participation rights. The results corroborate theoretical arguments and circumstantial evidence that voter information should be treated as endogenously determined by political institutions.
Economics and psychology are both sciences of human behaviour. This paper gives a survey of their interaction. First, the changing relationship between the two sciences isndiscussed: while economics was once imperialistic, it has become a science inspired by psychological insights. In order to illustrate this, recent developments and evidence for three major areas are presented: bounded rationality, non-selfish behaviour, and the economics of happiness.
Survival in academia depends on publications in refereed journals. Authors only get their papers accepted if they intellectually prostitute themselves by slavishly following the demands made by anonymous referees without property rights on the journals they advise. Intellectual prostitution is neither beneficial to suppliers nor consumers. But it is avoidable. The editor (with property rights on the journal) should make the basic decision of whether a paper is worth publishing or not. The referees only give suggestions on how to improve the paper. The author may disregard this advice. This reduces intellectual prostitution and produces more original publications.
"In Europe, ever more private museums are now entering the field. This paper investigates the behavior of one of these private museums, using an institutional approach of cultural economics. The Beyeler museum in Basle, Switzerland, is a privately founded art museum with an extraordinary collection of art works. Though less than five years old, it is acknowledged to be the most successful museum in Switzerland in terms of number of visitors. However, the Beyeler museum is not completely private but receives public support. We analyze how this influences the museum’s behavior: (1) The directorate of the Beyeler museum stays away from the art market with its collection as public institutions do. (2) The museum embarks on a self-propelling process concerning special exhibitions, therewith losing some of its uniqueness. (3) Concerning visitors’ amenities, differences between private and publicnmuseums emerge but to a lesser extent than expected according to theory."
This paper presents an attempt to create competition in the water market by means of direct competition. We argue that the usual liberalisation device, competition for the market by franchise bidding, is problematic due to particular features in the water industry. Our approach proposes the implementation of product market competition, i.e. competition in the market. In such a situation several water utilities using a single set of pipes compete for customers in the same area. nUsing a two way access model with vertically integrated water suppliers, we show that: (i) Even without any regulation, an inefficient incumbent will give up its monopoly position and lower the access price far enough so that the low-cost competitor can enter his home market. (ii) Efficiency of production will rise due to liberalization. (iii) In contrary to prejudicial claims, investment incentives are not destroyed by the introduction of competition. Investments of low-cost firms may even increase.
"In many business transactions, in labor-management relations, in international conflicts, and welfare state reforms bargainers seem to hold strong entitlements that shape negotiations. Despite their importance, the role of entitlements in negotiations has not received much attention. We fill the gap by designing an experiment that allows us to measure the entitlements and to track them through the whole negotiation process. We find strong entitlement effects that shape opening offers, bargaining duration, concessions and reached (dis-)agreements. We argue that entitlements constitute a “moral property right” that is influential independent of negotiators’ legal property rights."
"The potential duration of benefits is generally viewed as an important determinant of unemployment duration. This paper evaluates a unique policy change that prolonged entitlement to regular unemployment benefits from 30 weeks to a maximum of 209 weeks for elderly individuals in certain regions of Austria. In the evaluation, we explicitly account for the fact that the program was an endogenous policy response to a crisis affecting individuals with severe labor market problems. The main results are: (i) REBP reduced the transition rate to jobs by 17 ; (ii) accounting for endogenous policy adoption is important and quantitatively significant."
"Starting from the reward-risk model for portfolio selection introduced in De Giorgi (2004), we derive the reward-risk Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) analogously to the classical mean-variance CAPM. The reward-risk portfolio selection arises from an axiomatic definition of reward and risk measures based on few basic principles, including consistency with second order stochastic dominance. With complete markets,nwe show that at any financial market equilibrium, investors’ optimal allocations arencomonotonic and therefore the capital market equilibrium model can be reduced to a representative investor model. Moreover, the pricing kernel is an explicitly given,nmonotone function of the market portfolio return, corresponding to the increments of the distortion function characterizing the representative investor’s risk perceptions.nFinally, an empirical application shows that the reward-risk CAPM better captures the cross-section of US stock returns than the mean-variance CAPM does."
We construct a tractable model of divisible money and equilibrium heterogeneity in money balances and prices. We do so by considering randomized monetary trades in a standard search-theoretic model of money where agents can hold multiple units of indivisible 'tokens'. By studying a simple trading pattern, we can generate monetary distributions that match those observed in numerically simulated economies with fully divisible money and price heterogeneity.
