Der vorliegende Beitrag untersucht das Beförderungskalkül von Topmanagement-Beratungen. Wir zeigen, dass die Auswahl von Kandidaten durch die spezifischen Produktionsbedingungen, unter denen Beratungen agieren, beeinflusst wird. Entzieht sich die Arbeit von Partnern einer unmittelbaren Beobachtbarkeit durch den Klienten und sind die angebotenen Beratungsdienste Vertrauensgüter, ist zu erwarten, dass gerade nicht die besten Berater zu Partnern gewählt werden.
Institutions of Higher Education certify students' quality by issuing degrees and other credentials. Information asymmetries between the university and its clients, however, require valid signals of the universities' quality, too. A performance based university compensation scheme can be viewed as a bonding-mechanism. Tuition which is not contingent on the value added through Higher Education extenuates the mechanism's efficiency. We show that tuition nevertheless can create economic value, preventing an adverse selection of wealthy but less talented students and individuals who consume education rather than investing in future earnings. In addition, tuition increases the signaling content of some degrees. Individuals from groups more likely to consume education, like women for example, are able to signal their intention to engage in a lasting and demanding career. Thus, the allocation in some segments of the labor market can be improved.
