Das Kreislaufwirtschaftsgesetz wird die Aufarbeitung, Reparatur, Instandsetzung und Modernisierung von Investitionsgütern (Remanufacturing) vorantreiben und die
Strukturen des Gebrauchtmaschinenmarktes verändern. Unternehmen können auf diesem Markt nur dann erfolgreich sein, wenn sie ihre Strategie an diesen Veränderungen ausrichten.
So far the “market power view” has been the dominant perspective of looking at the institutional setup of North American major leagues. As useful as the insights generated by this approach may be at the level of competition policy, they do not shed much light on the question of internal league organization. The reason is straightforward. A wide range of hybrid as well as all integrated structures of league organization provide an institutional infrastructure for crafting regulations aimed at the extraction of monopoly rents. A different perspective is needed in order to understand institutional choice within the range of structures, allowing for the potential abuse of market power. This paper shows that basic structures of major league organization can be explained as the result of a general attempt to increase internal efficiency in sports production. They contribute to the reduction of shirking in teams and to the protection of specific investments.
Software developed and producedin open source projects has become an importantcompetitor in the software industry. Since itcan be downloaded for free and no wages arepaid to developers, the open source endeavorseems to rest on voluntary contributions byhobbyists. In the discussion of this puzzle twobasic patterns of argumentation stand out. Inwhat we call rent-seeker approaches, emphasisis put on the fact that although no wages arepaid to contributors, other pay-offs may turntheir effort into a profitable investment. Inwhat we call donator approaches the point ismade that many people contribute to open sourceprojects without expecting to ever receive anyindividual rewards.
We argue that the basic institutionalinnovation in open source has been the craftingof a governance structure, which enablesrent-seeking without crowding out donations.The focus of the presented analysis lies on thespecific institutional mechanisms, by which theopen source governance structure achieves toreconcile the interests of rent-seekers anddonators.
