We explored how apparently painful stimuli and the ability to identify with the person on whom the pain is inflicted modulate EEG suppression in the mu/alpha range (8-12 Hz). In a 2 × 2 design, we presented pictures of hands either experiencing needle pricks or being touched by a Q-tip. In the dissimilar-other condition, the hand was assigned to a patient suffering from a neurological disease in which Q-tips inflicted pain, whereas needle pricks did not. In the similar-other condition, the hand was assigned to a patient who responded to stimulation in the same way as the healthy participant. Participants were instructed to imagine the feeling of the person whose hand was shown and to evaluate his or her affective state. Pain conditions elicited greater EEG suppression than did nonpain conditions, particularly over frontocentral regions. Moreover, an interaction between pain and similarity revealed that for similar others, the pain effect was significant, whereas in the dissimilar-other group, suppression was equally large in the pain and no-pain conditions. We conclude that mu/alpha suppression is elicited both automatically, by observing a situation that is potentially painful for the observer, and by empathy for pain, even if the other person is different from oneself.
Der Mensch strebt seit Urzeiten danach, seine Möglichkeiten zu erweitern und seine Leistungsfähigkeit zu steigern. Mittel dazu reichen von den ersten Werkzeugen bis zur Computertechnik, von der Erfindung des Buchdrucks bis zum drahtlosen Internet. Zunehmend beobachtbar ist die Tendenz, dass gesunde Personen Wirkstoffe zu sich nehmen in der Hoffnung auf einen besseren Lernerfolg im Studium oder auf eine gesteigerte Leistungsfähigkeit im Berufsleben. Allerdings fehlen verlässliche Angaben dazu, inwiefern dieses Human Enhancement durch Medikamente oder andere Substanzen bei gesunden Menschen überhaupt wirkt. Ziel dieses Buches ist es, Chancen und Risiken des Human Enhancement für die Bereiche Schule, Arbeitswelt und Freizeit abzuschätzen.
Recent evidence indicates that priming participants with religious concepts promotes prosocial sharing behaviour. In the present study, we investigated whether religious priming also promotes the costly punishment of unfair behaviour. A total of 304 participants played a punishment game. Before the punishment stage began, participants were subliminally primed with religion primes, secular punishment primes or control primes. We found that religious primes strongly increased the costly punishment of unfair behaviours for a subset of our participants—those who had previously donated to a religious organization. We discuss two proximate mechanisms potentially underpinning this effect. The first is a ‘supernatural watcher’ mechanism, whereby religious participants punish unfair behaviours when primed because they sense that not doing so will enrage or disappoint an observing supernatural agent. The second is a ‘behavioural priming’ mechanism, whereby religious primes activate cultural norms pertaining to fairness and its enforcement and occasion behaviour consistent with those norms. We conclude that our results are consistent with dual inheritance proposals about religion and cooperation, whereby religions harness the byproducts of genetically inherited cognitive mechanisms in ways that enhance the survival prospects of their adherents.
This paper provides a tractable characterization of feasibility of asymmetric reduced form auctions. Using this, auction design problems can be stated in terms of the reduced form only. This allows to solve optimal auction problems when classical solution techniques fail.
The finite-sample size and power properties of bootstrapped likelihood ratio system cointegration tests are investigated via Monte Carlo simulations when the true lag order of the data generating process is unknown. Recursive bootstrap schemes are employed which differ in the way in which the lag order is chosen. The order is estimated by minimizing different information criteria and by combining the corresponding order estimates. It is found that, in comparison to the standard asymptotic likelihood ratio test based on an estimated lag order, bootstrapping can lead to improvements in small samples even when the true lag order is unknown, while the power loss is moderate.
We analyse a two-country model of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and R&Doffshoring. In the basic model, two firms, each of which is originally situated in only one of the two countries, first decide whether to build a plant abroad. Then,they decide whether to relocate R&D activities offshore. Finally, they engage in product-market competition. In this model, FDI liberalization causes a relocation of R&D activities if intrafirm communication is sufficiently well developed, external spillovers are substantial, competition is not too strong and foreign markets are not too small. Surprisingly, such a relocation of R&D activities usually nevertheless increases
domestic welfare.
The paper shows that several game-theoretic solution concepts provide similar comparative statics predictions over a wide class of games. I start from the observation that, in many experiments, behavior is affected by parameter shifts that leave the Nash equilibrium unchanged. I explain the direction of change with a heuristic structural approach, using properties such as strategic complementarities and increasing differences. I show that the approach is consistent with general comparative statics results for (i) the Nash equilibrium of a game with perturbed payoff functions, (ii) the quantal response equilibrium, (iii) level-k reasoning. I also relate the structural approach to equilibrium selection concepts.
This paper investigates the relationship between income satisfaction of adult children and their relative economic status, using data from the German Socio-Economic Panel and income rank as an indicator of status. The results show that children appear to compare their actual economic status with that of their parents, deriving large satisfaction gains from an income rank that is higher than that of their parents. The effect is asymmetric with regard to parents, as these seem not to be ifluenced by their children's income rank.
The paper analyzes the e?ects of more intense competition on ?rms’ incentives to invest in process innovations. We carry out experiments based on two-stage games, where R&D investment choices are followed by product market competition. As predicted by theory, an increase in the number of ?rms from two to four reduces investments. However, a positive e?ect is observed for a switch from Cournot to Bertrand, even though theory predicts a negative e?ect in the four-player case.
This paper investigates the design of incentives in a dynamic adverse selection framework when agents’ production technologies display learning effects and agents’ rate of learning is private knowledge. In a simple two-period model with full commitment available to the principal, we show that whether learning effects are over- or under-exploited crucially depends on whether learning effects increase or decrease the principal’s uncertainty about agents’ costs of production. Hence, what drives the over- or underexploitation of learning effects is whether more efficient agents also learn faster (so costs diverge through learning effects) or whether it is the less efficient agents who learn faster (so costs converge). Furthermore, we show that if divergence in costs through learning effects is strong enough, learning effects will not be exploited at all, in a sense to be made precise.
