The paper offers an overview of what structural models of the IS-LM and Mundell-Fleming variety can tell about the macroeconomics of economic crises. In addition to demonstrating how the emergence of risk premiums in money and capital markets can generate liquidity traps at positive interest rates and may drive economies into recessions, it shows the following: (1) Fiscal policy works even in a small, open economy under flexible exchange rates when the country is stuck in a liquidity trap; (2) Near the fringe of liquidity traps, there may be perfect traps, in which neither monetary nor fiscal policy works when used in isolation but policy coordination is called for; and (3) Massive financial crises in the domestic money market may even destabilize the economy.
This paper evaluates the effects of awarding vouchers for vocational training on the employment outcomes of unemployed voucher recipients in Germany, as well as the potential mechanism through which they operate. This study assesses the direct effects of voucher assignment net of ac¬tual redemption, which may be driven by preference shaping and learning about possible human capital investments or simply by the costs of information gathering. Using a formal mediation analy-sis framework based on sequential conditional independence assumptions and semiparametric match¬ing estimators, our results suggest that the negative short-term and positive long-term em-ployment ef¬fects of receiving a voucher are mainly driven by actual training participation. However, the direct ef¬fect of just obtaining a voucher is negative over the short-run as well. This result points to potential losses in the effectiveness of such training provision systems if individuals decide not to redeem vouchers, as employment chances are lower than under non-award over the short-run and under redemption over the long-run, which makes non-re¬demption the least attractive option.
This chapter considers hidden teacher effort in educational production and discusses the implications of multiple teacher effort dimensions on optimum incentive contracts in a theoretical framework. The analysis of educational production in a multitask framework is a new and unique contribution of this chapter to the economics of education. We first characterize the first-best and second-best outcomes. The model is extended to address specific questions concerning teacher incentive schemes: We compare input- to output-based accountability measures and study the implication of the level of aggregation in performance measures. Against the background of the empirical evidence on the effectiveness of teacher incentives, we argue that performance measures should be as broad as possible. Further, we present the optimum contract for motivated teachers. Finally, if education is produced in teacher teams, we establish the conditions for optimum team-based and individual incentives: The larger the spillover effects across teacher efforts and the better the measurability of educational achievement, the stronger the case for team-based incentives.
There is a large body of literature on the effect of educational resources on student performance, such as teacher qualification, class size, and physical resources in school. It is dominated by empirical studies which often find ambiguous effects of resource spending on student outcomes. The unique contribution of this paper is the provision of a framework to study educational production with differentiated input factors, which allows for closed-form solutions. We try to interpret the empirical findings on the basis of a simple theoretical model of educational production: Class size, employed school resources and student effort are endogenously determined in order to account for differences in educational achievement. We also discuss the choice of integrated vs. segregated classes. Optimum class size and school quality increase with higher discipline, while in equilibrium overall classroom disruption is equal in all classes.
This paper analyzes the effects of an aging population on individual skill choices and the production structure by means of a dynamic general equilibrium model with overlapping generations and probabilistic aging. The model allows for capital-skill complementarity, which strongly affects the outcomes in a small open economy setting vs. a closed (or equivalently worldwide) economy. In an open economy with a fixed real interest rate, the necessary increase in the contribution rate discourages labor supply and depresses GDP. With a variable real interest rate, however, capital usage increases and - by the capital-skill complementarity - also employment of high skilled labor. The mobilization of highly productive labor gives a boost to GDP. Hence, the often cited adverse effects of aging are mitigated and can be overcome when taking into account a more realistic production structure.
We discuss the ongoing liberalization process in the market for addressed letter mail in Switzerland. The core of the paper is an assessment of the liberalization's impact on the financial viability of various universal service obligations with and without access to the incumbent's downstream delivery network for customers and competitors. We propose a simple calibrated model of the Swiss letter
market offering theoretical insights into the mechanics of market opening along with quantitative conclusions bearing direct policy relevance. The extent of the entrants' market coverage and the equilibrium in the resulting price competition are endogenously determined. Our simulations suggest caution in introducing full market opening. For the scenarios considered, the model shows that either the burden of the uso must be reduced (e.g. with respect to the frequency and the coverage of delivery and / or through price differentiation). Alternatively, other means of assuring financial stability of Swiss Post must be sought, be it through external funds or demand stimulation through new producs, possibly in the worksharing domain.
