The paper proposes a basic definition of intergenerational neutrality in the overlapping generations model when agents have a pure life cycle motive of savings. The derivation of intergenerationally neutral tax effects provides a redistribution free benchmark case that isolates the relative price effects of taxes and the deadweight losses associated with them. The paper clarifies the intergenerational incidence which has to be determined simultaneously with the substitution effects of taxes on savings. A tax reform example demonstrates how taxes with diverging intergenerational incidence may be combined to achieve intergenerational neutrality. Finally, the paper extends the analysis of generational tax incidence to the case of a small open economy.
This commentary reflects on the recommendations of the Mirrlees Review on tax reform with a special focus on capital income taxation. Regarding the alternatives of moving to a consumption based tax system, the commentary discusses the relative merits of choosing an ACE system (allowance for corporate equity) rather than a cash-flow tax on the company level. It reviews the arguments in favour of full elimination of tax on the normal return to savings at the personal level which contrasts with alternative tax reform proposals recommending a positive but low and flat tax rate on personal capital income. It also discusses how existing computational models would have to be extended for a meaningful quantification of the gains and costs of implementing a tax reform along the lines of the Mirrlees Review.
The paper compares the impact of corporate taxation and social insurance on foreign direct investment (FDI) and unemployment. Four main results are derived: (i) the optimal size of the welfare state depends on the degree of risk-aversion and the unemployment rate as a measure of labor income risk. The unemployment rate partly reflects the country's exposure to globalization; (ii) corporate taxation and social insurance have equivalent effects on unemployment and outbound FDI; (iii) while an increase in the corporate tax can raise corporate tax revenue, it is rather likely to worsen the government's total fiscal stance. A corporate tax cut can thus be self-financing due to fiscal increasing returns in the presence of a large public sector; (iv) a corporate tax should be used to contribute to welfare state financing only in exceptional cases when job creation is excessive and unemployment is inefficiently low. These conditions are probably unlikely to hold in Europe's generous welfare states with high structural unemployment rates.
The paper proposes an intertemporal equilibrium model of vintage capital and monopolistic competition. Reflecting a tradeoff between the number and capacity of new machines, investment may be extensive or intensive. External gains from specialization and rationalization result in distorted investment decisions. The paper compares the effectiveness of a general investment tax credit with a start-up subsidy that shifts the direction of investment towards a more extensive form. An optimal policy of investment promotion is derived.
