This article deals with the analysis of large or complex system dynamics (SD) models, exploring the benefits of a multimethodological approach to model analysis. We compare model analysis results from SD and social network analysis (SNA) by deploying SNA techniques on a pertinent example from the SD literature—the world dynamics model. Although SNA is a clearly distinct method from SD in that it focuses on social actors and their interrelationships, we contend that SD can indeed learn from SNA, particularly in terms of model structure analysis. Our argumentation follows renowned system dynamicists who acknowledge the potential of SD to synthesize and advance theories in social science at both the conceptual and technical levels.
We examine the effect of a change in the director election system—the switch from a plurality voting standard to a more stringent standard known as majority voting (MV). Using a regression discontinuity design, we document abnormal returns of 1.43–1.60 % around annual meeting dates where shareholder proposals to adopt MV are voted upon, suggesting that shareholders perceive the adoption of MV as value-enhancing. We document an increase in boards’ responsiveness to shareholders at MV firms. In particular, relative to a propensity score-matched control sample, firms adopting MV exhibit an increase in the rate of implementation of shareholder proposals supported by a majority vote and in the responsiveness to votes withheld from directors up for election. We do not find a relation between votes withheld and subsequent director turnover, regardless of the election standard. Overall, it appears that, rather than a channel to remove specific directors, director elections are viewed by shareholders as a means to obtain specific governance changes and that, in this respect, their ability to obtain such changes is stronger under a MV standard.
