The present work focuses on the choice of the elicitation technique within a contingent valuation (CV) framework. We simultaneously apply three different elicitation techniques to elicit willingness-to-pay (WTP) values for three programs against Alzheimer's disease. First, the dichotomous choice approach is used, which is the standard procedure. However, giving respondents only a yes/no response alternative seems to result in overestimated WTP values. Therefore, we secondly apply the dissonance-minimizing format which screens respondents for their preferences and thus avoids possible yea-saying and protest answers against the payment vehicle. The third format, a modified version of the payment card, allows respondents to express a level of voting certainty and to make less of a commitment. With our findings we show that a well-designed CV method is a suitable instrument for helping decision makers in the health care sector and that the Swiss population favors highly a program which improves the situation of informal caregivers.
We present a new approach to endogenizing technological spillovers. Firms choose levels of a cost-reducing innovation from a continuum before they engage in competition for each other's R&D-employees. Successful bids for the competitor's employee then result in higher levels of cost reduction. Finally, firms enter product market competition. We apply the approach to the long-standing debate on the effects of the mode of competition on innovation incentives. We show that incentives to acquire spillovers are stronger and incentives to prevent spillovers are weaker under quantity competition than under price competition. As a result, for a wide range of parameters, price competition gives stronger innovation incentives than quantity competition.
We develop a new approach to endogenizing technological spillovers. We analyze a game in which firms can first invest in cost-reducing R&D, then compete on the human-capital market for their knowledge-bearing employees, and finally enter the product market. If R&D employees change firms, spillovers arise. We show that technological spillovers are most likely when they increase total industry profits. We use this result to show that innovation incentives are usually stronger for endogenous than for exogenous spillovers and that endogenous spillovers may reverse the result that innovation incentives are stronger under quantity competition than under price competition. Finally, we explore the robustness of our results with respect to contractual incompleteness and the number of R&D workers.
We analyze a model of oligopolistic competition with ongoing investment. Special cases include incremental investment, patent races, learning by doing, and network externalities. We investigate circumstances under which a firm with low costs or high quality will extend its initial lead through investments. To this end, we derive a new comparative statics result for general games with strategic substitutes, which applies to our investment game. Finally, we highlight plausible countervailing effects that arise when investments of leaders are less effective than those of laggards, or in dynamic games when firms are sufficiently patient.
This paper develops a two-sector general-equilibrium model in which firms in the primary economy have to create workplaces prior to production and product market competition. For this, we introduce the endogenous sunk-cost approach with two-stage decisions of firms from IO in the macro labor literature. By hypothesizing that technological change has lowered marginal costs but has raised nonproduction requirements for providing workplaces, we are able to explain downsizing of low-skilled jobs in the primary economy despite wage flexibility exante. This leads to more accentuated labor-market segmentation, i.e., an increase in wage pressure in the secondary economy.
This article is concerned with the analysis of correlated count data. A class of models is proposed in which the correlation among the counts is represented by correlated latent effects. Special cases of the model are discussed and a tuned and efficient Markov chain Monte Carlo algorithm is developed to estimate the model under both multivariate normal and multivariate-t assumptions on the latent effects. The methods are illustrated with two real data examples of six and sixteen variate correlated counts.
In Switzerland the new law on health insurance, effective since 1996, introduced pro competitive changes in the market of sickness funds. The legislator expected high mobility between sickness funds of both healthy and sick insured as open enrolment was introduced with the new law. That is why the risk adjustment scheme, that was already introduced 1993, was limited until 2005. However, consumer mobility remained low and risk selection strategies are still profitable, since risk-adjustment is based only on demographic variables. This paper describes risk adjustment, consumer mobility, risk selection activities of sickness funds and the impact of imperfect risk adjustment on the development of HMO and PPO models. The paper concludes with a description of the current political and scientific discussion in Switzerland.
From the mid-1990s citizens in Belgium, Germany, Israel, the Netherlands and Switzerland have a guaranteed periodic choice among risk-bearing sickness funds, who are responsible for purchasing their care or providing them with medical care. The rationale of this arrangement is to stimulate the sickness funds to improve efficiency in health care production and to respond to consumers’ preferences. To achieve solidarity, all five countries have implemented a system of risk-adjusted premium subsidies (or risk equalization across risk groups), along with strict regulation of the consumers’ direct premium contribution to their sickness fund. In this article we present a conceptual framework for understanding risk adjustment and comparing the systems in the five countries. We conclude that in the case of imperfect risk adjustment—as is the case in all five countries in the year 2001—the sickness funds have financial incentives for risk selection, which may threaten solidarity, efficiency, quality of care and consumer satisfaction. We expect that without substantial improvements in the risk adjustment formulae, risk selection will increase in all five countries. The issue is particularly serious in Germany and Switzerland. We strongly recommend therefore that policy makers in the five countries give top priority to the improvement of the system of risk adjustment. That would enhance solidarity, cost-control, efficiency and client satisfaction in a system of competing, risk-bearing sickness funds.
We present results of a negative binomial model on the determinants of the number of days of absence in a given year for a sample of 2049 workers drawn from three factories. We find evidence of the terms of the remuneration contract being important and we offer an interpretation of the differential effect of the company sickpay scheme on the behaviour of workers contracted to work four or five days a week.
