Die Wirksamkeit und Sicherheit der beiden in der Schweiz zur Behandlung der Hepatitis C zugelassenen Kombinationstherapien (Pegasys®/Copegus®, PAC; PegIntron®/Rebetol®, PIR) ist sehr ähnlich. Das Ziel dieser Arbeit ist, die Kosten der beiden Therapien zu vergleichen und ihren kostengünstigsten Einsatz zu definieren. Die Durchschnittskosten für Genotyp-1-Patienten liegen zwischen CHF 21700.- (PAC) und CHF 19700.- (PIR), bzw. CHF 15600.- (PAC) und CHF 15000.- (PIR) für Genotyp-2/3-Patienten. Ein konsequenter Einsatz von PIR ist 9 bis 12% kostengünstiger als PAC. Weitere Kosteneinsparungen von 3% könnten bei einem Einsatz von PIR bei allen Patienten unter 85 kg (Genotyp 1) bzw. unter 75 kg (Genotyp 2/3) und von PAC bei solchen über 85 kg (Genotyp 1) bzw. über 75 kg (Genotyp 2/3) erreicht werden.
This paper argues that an unequal distribution of political power, biased to landed elites and owners of natural resources, in combination with openness to trade is a major obstacle to development of natural resource- or land-abundant economies. We develop a two-sector general equilibrium model and show that in an oligarchic society public investments conducive to industrialization - schooling for example - are typically lower in an open than in a closed economy. Moreover, we find that, under openness to trade, development is faster in a democratic system. We also endogenize the trade regime and demonstrate that in a land-abundant economy the landed elite has an interest to support openness to trade. We present historical evidence for Southern economies in the Americas that is consistent with our theoretical results: resistance of landed elites to mass education, comparative advantages in primary goods production in the 19th century globalization wave, and low primary school enrollment and literacy rates.
The previous literature on the determinants of individual well-being has failed to fully account for the interdependencies in well-being at the family level. This paper develops an ordered probit model with multiple random effects that allows to identify the intra-family correlation in wellbeing. The parameters of the model can be estimated with panel data using Maximum Marginal Likelihood. The approach is illustrated in an application using data for the period 1984-1997 from the German Socio-Economic Panel in which both inter-generational and intra-marriage correlations in well-being are estimated.
I consider the problem of estimating the effect of a health care reform on the frequency of individual
doctor visits when the reform effect is potentially different in different parts of the outcome distribution.
Quantile regression is a powerful method for studying such heterogeneous treatment effects. Only
recently has this method been extended to situations where the dependent variable is a (non-negative
integer) count. An analysis of a 1997 health care reform in Germany shows that lower quantiles, such
as the first quartile, fell by substantially larger amounts than what would have been predicted based
on Poisson or negative binomial models.
We examine vertical backward integration in a reduced-form model of successive oligopolies. Our key findings are: (i) There may be asymmetric equilibria where some firms integrate and others remain separated, even if firms are symmetric initially; (ii) Efficient firms are more likely to integrate vertically. As a result, integrated firms also tend to have a large market share. The driving force behind these findings are demand/mark-up complementarities in the product market. We also identify countervailing forces resulting from strong vertical foreclosure, upstream sales and endogenous acquisition costs.
Under certain cost conditions the optimal insurance policy offers full coverage above a deductible, as Arrow and others have shown. However, many insurance policies currently provide coverage against several losses although the possibilities for the insured to affect the loss probabilities by several prevention activities (multiple moral hazard) are substantially different. This article shows that optimal contracts under multiple moral hazard generally call for complex reimbursement schedules. It also examines the conditions under which different types of risks can optimally be covered by a single insurance policy and argues that the case for umbrella policies under multiple moral hazard is limited in practice.
This paper examines the interplay of endogenous vertical integration and cost-reducing downstream investment in successive oligopoly. Analyzing a linear Cournot model, we establish the following key results: (i) Vertical integration increases own investment and decreases competitor investment (intimidation effect). (ii) Asymmetric integration is a non-degenerate equilibrium outcome. (iii) Compared to a benchmark model without investment, complete vertical separation is a less likely outcome. We argue that these findings generalize beyond the linear Cournot model under reasonable assumptions.
We consider a reduced form model with acquisitions and entry. There are two investors and several small non-investing firms. One investor can acquire a small firm, the other investor decides about market entry. After that all firms play an oligopoly game. We derive conditions under which increasing market concentration arises with myopic firms. We apply the framework to a Cournot model with cost synergies and a Bertrand model where acquisitions extend the product spectrum of a firm.
This paper purports to develop a simple microeconomic model designed to shed light on behavioral change induced by improved information about smoking risks. It predicts the conditions in which improved information indeed increases the demand for cigarettes. After recalling the economic rationale of an anti-tobacco policy, the article points out a few startling implications of improved information about the risks of smoking.
Uniform, risk-independent insurance premiums are accepted as part of ‘managed competition’ in health care. However, they are not compatible with optimality of health insurance contracts in the presence of both ex ante and ex post moral hazard. They have adverse effects on insurer behaviour even if risk adjustment is taken into account. Risk-based premiums combined with means-tested, tax-financed transfers are advocated as an alternative.
