We develop a macroeconomic framework where money is supplied against only few eligible securities in open market operations. The relationship between the policy rate, expected inflation and consumption growth is affected by money market conditions, i.e. the varying liquidity value of eligible assets and the associated risk. This induces a liquidity premium, which explains the observed systematic wedge between the policy rate and consumption Euler interest rate that standard models equate. It further implies a dampened response of consumption to policy rate shocks that is humpshaped when we account for realistic central bank transfers and the dynamics of bond holdings.
This paper develops a liquidity measure tailored to the foreign exchange (FX) market, quantifies the amount of commonality in liquidity across exchange rates, and determines the extent of liquidity risk premiums embedded in FX returns. The new liquidity measure utilizes ultra high frequency data and captures cross-sectional and temporal variation in FX liquidity during the financial crisis of 2007-2008. Empirical results show that liquidity co-moves across currency pairs and that systematic FX liquidity decreases dramatically during the crisis. Extending an asset pricing model for FX returns by the novel liquidity risk factor suggests that liquidity risk is heavily priced.
While price-setting models usually suggest constant or increasing hazard functions for price changes, empirical studies often find decreasing hazards, possibly due to misspecified or neglected heterogeneity. This paper attempts to disentangle the downward bias into various sources: observed and unobserved heterogeneity which can be either constant or time-varying. Based on micro data from the Swiss CPI, the paper finds that in order to resolve the downward bias of the hazard function for price changes, we have to (i) control for time-varying heterogeneity in addition to cross-sectional factors and (ii) exclude temporary price changes such as sales prices from the data set. Among the time-varying factors affecting the probability of price changes, various proxies of firms' marginal costs seem to be key. The empirical findings presented in this paper are consistent with recent menu cost models which stress the role of time-varying heterogeneity and temporary price cuts for price setting.
We explain the currency carry trade performance using an asset pricing model in which factor loadings are regime-dependent rather than constant. Empirical results show that a typical carry trade strategy has much higher exposure to the stock market and is mean-reverting in regimes of high FX volatility. The findings are robust to various extensions, including more currencies, longer samples, transaction costs, international stock indices, and other proxies for volatility and liquidity. Our regime-dependent pricing model provides significantly smaller pricing errors than a traditional model. Thus, the carry trade performance is better explained by its time-varying systematic risk that magnifies in volatile markets-suggesting a partial explanation for the Uncovered Interest Rate Parity puzzle.
This paper looks into the determinants of the Swiss franc exchange rate against the euro. Based on the monetary approach to exchange rates, we start from the premise that monetary policy has an influence on the exchange rate. To measure this effect, we apply the structural vector-autoregression methodology on a set of Swiss macroeconomic variables and the euro area interest rate. Overall, we find that Swiss monetary policy contributes between 7 and 15% to variations of the exchange rate between 1981 and 2008. Focusing on the episode between 2003 and 2005 we attribute more than half of the depreciation of the franc to Swiss monetary policy.
The implementation of monetary policy is prevalently done by interest rate targeting with a short term market rate serving as operational target. The instruments for achieving the operational target are the provision of reserves and the interest rate charged in these transactions. This paper presents a model for the estimation of the demand curve for reserves, derived from the central bank's fixed rate tender auction and the interbank money market. Using data from Switzerland, the slope of the demand curve is estimated. Furthermore, properties of the demand curve such as the slope patterns in the course of a maintenance period and the slope in different monetary regimes are assessed. We find a steeper demand curve towards the end of the maintenance period and an increasing slope when the general interest rate level is high. Further, we investigate the role of the Swiss National Bank's (SNB) interest rate in the fixed rate tender auctions. There is evidence that the SNB uses its auction rate to guide the interbank market rate.
The Swiss National Bank (SNB) provides reserves to market participants via fixed rate tender auctions. We analyze the banks' bidding behavior and identify the determinants for the decision to participate as well as on the amount to tender. Therefore, we estimate bidding functions for banks which participate regularly in the SNB's auctions. We find that a bank's bids from the previous day and the amount of maturing repo operations with the SNB have for most banks a significant effect. The autonomous factors (government balances at the SNB and currency in circulation) are of only minor importance. A further determinant of the bidding behavior is the attractiveness of the SNB's auction rate compared to the prevailing interbank market repo rate. The spread of unsecured and repo rates as well as the attractiveness of funding Euros indirectly via a Swiss franc repo transaction with the SNB are only for few banks significant. Further, the question is addressed whether the bidding behavior changed in the financial market crisis of 2007/2008. There is little evidence of a systematic change in bidding behavior in the crisis. This results from the fact that the SNB has addressed the volatile demand for reserves in the crisis with overnight fine-tuning operations.
In this paper, we analyse the sources of economic growth in Switzerland during the period 1991-2005. The results suggest that labour input and capital input contribute 0.57 pp and 0.45 pp, respectively, to the average annual GDP growth of 1.28%. The remaining 0.25 pp represent growth in multi-factor productivity, which is calculated as a residual. The estimate of growth in multi-factor productivity is lower than in previous studies because our measure of labour input takes changes in labour quality into account. Changes in labour quality explain 0.39 pp of the 0.45 pp contribution from labour input.
Male and female labor are imperfect substitutes and some sectors are more suitable for female employment than others. Clearly, expansions of those sectors that use female labor intensively must affect aggregate female labor force participation (FLFP). We suggest that FLFP actually drops when trade and international specialization expand sectors that use female labor intensively. This effect arises because expansions of the former sectors come along with contractions of others. The latter contractions, in turn, induce male workers to move to the expanding sectors, driving female workers out of formal employment. Thus, a country that is exporting female labor content is actually substituting male labor for female. Finally, building on U.S.-Mexican trade data, we provide empirical evidence that support our argument.
This paper shows that transparency in banking can be harmful from a social planner's point of view. According to our model, enhancing transparency above a certain level may lead to the inefficient liquidation of a bank. The reason lies in the nature of a standard deposit contract: its payoff scheme has limited upside gains (cap) but leaves the depositor with the downside risk. Accordingly, depositors will not take into account possible future upside gains of the bank when deciding whether or not to withdraw their deposits. Our result points towards a trade-off the regulator faces: while enhancing transparency may be useful to reduce incentives for excessive risk-taking (moral hazard), it may also increase the risk of inefficient bank runs.
