This paper shows that debt crises do not always have a fiscal nature and suggests that fiscal retrenchment may not be the optimal response to a crisis that did not originate from irresponsible fiscal policies. The paper starts by discussing the origin of debt crises and the unexplained part of public debt and for avoiding debt explosions linked to financial crises or poor debt management. The paper concludes with a discussion on liquidity and solvency crises.
Understanding the institutional features that can improve learning outcomes and reduce inequality is a top priority for international and development organizations around the world. Economists appear to have a good case for support to non-governmental alternatives as suppliers of schooling. However, unlike other policy domains, freer international trade or privatization, economists have been remarkably unsuccessful in promoting the adoption of this idea. We develop a simple general positive model of why governments typically produce schooling which introduces the key notion of the lack of verifiability of socialization and instruction of beliefs, which makes third party contracting for socialization problematic. We use the model to explain variations around the world in levels of private schooling. We also predict the circumstances in which efforts to promote the different alternatives to government production like charter, voucher, and scholarship- are likely to be successful.
This article examines the procurement of goods and services by multilateral organisations from suppliers, based on a panel data including industrialised countries and emerging economies over 11 years. It presents the results of an empirical study – the first of its kind – on the explanatory factors of variations between countries, which are mainly attributable to such factors as the strength of the manufacturing sector and business ties established in the past. The results seem to indicate that the contributions paid by donor countries may have a positive influence on the procurement of goods and services, despite the fact that multilateral organisations purchase goods and services through international tendering procedures. Geographical proximity, cultural and linguistic affinities and the presence of the headquarters of a multilateral organisation in the country also play a positive role. The purchase of goods and services by multilateral agencies may be considered as an indirect effect of official development assistance (ODA). With many donor countries facing serious economic and budgetary constraints, documentation of the ‘return on investment’ may serve as a means of encouraging policymakers to increase – or at least to not reduce – ODA budgets, including for multilateral agencies. Such arguments must nevertheless remain marginal with respect to the key debates on aid effectiveness and on on the performance of multilateral organisations.
It is well established that private information is critical to our understanding of asset prices. In this paper we argue that it also affects international capital flows and use a simple two-country DSGE model to illustrate its impact. We show that private information (i) increases the volatility of both net and gross capital flows, (ii) leads to a high correlation between capital inflows and outflows, (iii) leads to a disconnect of capital flows from observed macro fundamentals and (iv) implies that capital flows contain information about the future macro fundamentals. We also show that dispersed information affects capital flows both through asset prices and directly, so that the impact on flows is not just the mirror image of the impact on prices.
This paper studies how minimum wage policies affect firm employment in China using a unique county level minimum wage data set matched to disaggregated firm survey data. We investigate both the effect of imposing a minimum wage, and the effect of the policies that tightened enforcement in 2004. We find that the average effect of minimum wage changes is modest and positive, and that there is a detectable effect after enforcement reform. Firms have heterogeneous responses to minimum wage changes which can be accounted for by differences in their wage levels and profit margins: firms with high wages or large profit margin increase employment, while those with low wages or small profit margin downsize. The increase in enforcement of China’s minimum wage in 2004 has since amplified this heterogeneity, which implies that labor regulation may reduce the monopsony rent of firms.Our results provide evidence for the theoretical predictions of the positive minimum wage-employment relationship in a monopolistic labor market.
While the impact of exchange rate changes on economic growth has long been an issue of key importance in international macroeconomics, it has received renewed attention in recent years, owing to weaker growth rates and the debate on “currency wars”. However, in spite of its prevalence in the policy debate, the connection between real exchange rates and growth remains an unsettled question in the academic literature. We fill this gap by providing an empirical assessment based on a broad sample of emerging and advanced economies. We assess the impact of appreciations, productivity booms and capital flow surges using a propensity-score matching approach to address causality issues. We show that appreciations associated with higher productivity have a larger impact on growth than appreciations associated with capital inflows. Furthermore, the appreciation per se tends to have a negative impact on growth. We provide a simple theoretical model that delivers the contrasted growth-appreciation pattern depending on the underlying shock. The model also implies adverse effects of shocks to international capital flows, so concerns about an appreciation are not inconsistent with concerns about a depreciation. The presence of an externality through firms’ destruction leads to inefficient allocations. Nonetheless, addressing them does not require a dampening of exchange rate movements.
A recurring puzzle to many academics and some policymakers is why impact evaluations, which have become something of a cottage industry in the development field, have so little impact on actual policymaking. In this paper, I study the impact of impact evaluations. I show, in a simple Bayesian framework embedded within a standard contest success function-based model of competition amongst anti-evaluation policymakers, Bayesian policymakers, and frequentist evaluators,that the likelihood of a program being cancelled is a decreasing function both of the impact estimated by the evaluation and of the prior on whose basis the program was approved to begin with. Moreover, the probability of cancellation is a decreasing function of the effectiveness of the influence exerted by frequentist evaluators. Since the latter’s effectiveness in terms of lobbying in favor of their findings in the real world is likely to be close to zero, the likelihood of cancelling a program that was approved in the first place, despite its suffering a highly negative evaluation, is extremely low. The model thus provides one possible explanation for why impact evaluations have so little impact in the realm of decisionmaking, and why they have contributed so little to evidence-based policymaking.
