In this paper we assess the quality and coherence of the use of economics in dispute settlement in two fields of international economic law: international trade and international investment law. We argue that four economic concepts are frequently used and/or of critical importance for both international trade and investment law. Those concepts are the concepts of “likeness”/”like circumstances”, causality, “necessity” and damage calculation. We highlight differences in the way in which economics has been applied to assess these concepts and argue that coherence in the use of economics can be increased by reassessing the way in which economics is brought into submissions by parties and the processes that are relevant for adjudicators when interpreting economic evidence. We argue that a common set of guidelines for submitting quantitative evidence in WTO or investor-state dispute settlement proceedings can contribute greatly to setting quality standards and to creating trust as to the reliability and acceptability of economic evidence submitted to adjudicators. In an appendix to this paper we make suggestions as to what such guidelines could look like.
The paper reviews the latest technological tools that arguably can contribute to reducing the excessively high costs of remittance transactions in Africa. Indeed, despite huge remittance inflows to and within the continent, Africa is the most expensive destination to send money to. As remittances have become more important than Overseas Development Assistance and Foreign Direct Investment inflows in some countries, it has become crucial to explore technological advances that can contribute to reducing their transaction costs. Such reduction would enable the end beneficiaries to capture a larger share of these external resources, which in turn could have an even bigger impact on development in Africa. In addition to revisiting the role of mobile banking in lowering remittance transaction prices, the paper takes a closer look at the newest available technology, the Bitcoin block chain technology that underpins digital currencies. Although, a few top schools, such as Cambridge University’s Judge School of Business, Georgetown’s McDonough School of Business, and UNSW Business School in Sydney, have conducted research into bitcoin and the blockchain, at this early stage, still very few social science researchers have addressed the role that such digital currency could play in the reduction of the remittance transaction prices, in addition to a few innovative Bitcoin operators. The paper proceeds as follows. It first looks at the causes of the high remittance transaction costs. Then, it reviews, presents and analyses the official remittances data downloaded from the World Bank's Remittances Prices Worldwide database. It also briefly reviews a few remittance transfer technological instruments. Given the novelty of the topic, the review of the most recent existing "literature" on Bitcoin is mainly retrieved from either online news sources or information from a few leading Bitcoin operators. In the light of the UN Global Working Group Post-2015 Development Agenda and Sustainable Development Goal proposal to reduce by 2030 the remittance transaction costs to even less than 3%, the effectiveness of these new technological instruments to reach such objective are discussed. Finally, a number of appropriate policy actions to foster the economic impact of remittances are proposed.
Motivated by a set of stylized facts, we develop a model of cross-border mergers and acquisitions (M&As;) to study foreign direct investment (FDI) in emerging markets. We compare acquisitions undertaken during financial crises – so called fire-sale FDI –with acquisitions made during non-crisis periods to examine whether the outcomes differ in the ways predicted by the model. Foreign acquisitions are driven by two sources of value creation. First, acquisitions by a foreign firm relax the target's credit constraint (i.e., a liquidity motive). Second, acquisitions exploit operational synergies between the target and the acquirer (i.e., a synergistic motive). During crises credit conditions tighten in the target economy and the liquidity motive dominates. The model predicts that during crisis relative to non-crisis periods, (1) the likelihood of foreign acquisitions is higher; (2) the proportion of foreign acquisitions in the same industry is lower; (3) the average size of ownership stakes is lower; and (4) the duration of acquisitions is lower (i.e., acquisition stakes are more likely to be flipped). We find support for (1) but not for the other three predictions. The results thus suggest that foreign acquisitions in emerging markets do not differ in these important ways between crisis and normal periods.
This paper aims to provide the first evidence concerning the relationship between time ans risk preferences and illegal migration in an African context. Based upon our theoretical model and using a unique data set on potential migrants collected in urban Senegal, we evaluate a measure of time and risk preferences through the individual's intertemporal discount rate and coefficient of absolute risk aversion. Remarkably, our results show that these individual preferences matter in the willingness to migrate illegally and to pay a smuggler.
The educational gender gap has closed or reversed in many countries. But what of gendered labour market inequalities? Using micro-level census data for some 40 countries, the authors examine the labour force participation gap between men and women, the “marriage gap” between married and single women’s participation, and the “motherhood gap” between mothers’ and nonmothers’ participation. They find significant heterogeneity among countries in terms of the size of these gaps, the speed at which they are changing, and the relationships between them and the educational gap. But counterfactual regression analysis shows that the labour force participation gap remains largely unexplained by the other gaps.
Does the government control of school systems facilitate equality in school quality? Whether centralized or localized control produces more equality depends not only on what ‘could’ happen in principle, but also on what does happen in practice. We use the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) database to examine the association between school sector and the variance in school fixed effects. We find, on average, the same inequality in adjusted learning achievement across the private and public schools. However, in some countries, such as Denmark, there is more equality across the public sector schools, while in others, such as Mexico, there is more equality across the private schools. Among the 18 non-OECD countries, the standard deviation across schools in adjusted quality is, on average, 36% higher in government schools. Our findings suggest that top-down educational systems in weak states can be lose-lose relative to localized systems relying on bottom-up control, producing both worse average performance and higher inequality.
Countries with weaker domestic investor protection hold less diversified international portfolios. An equilibrium business cycle model of North-South capital flow with corporate governance frictions between outside investors and corporate insiders explains this phenomenon through two channels. First,weak governance leads to concentrated ownership in the South because international diversification by insiders is penalized by lower stock market valuation. This reduces the float portfolio, or the supply of South assets. Second, weak governance tilts the demand of South outside investors towards domestic assets to hedge labor income risk. This is due to a higher share of labor in income, which increases labor income risk. In addition, the dynamics of investment under insider control leads relative dividend and labor income to be more negatively correlated in the South, making domestic assets a better hedge against local labor income risk. I find that the insider ownership and hedging channels are responsible for at least 29% and 11%, respectively, of the cross-country variation in international diversification. Thus, weak institutions lower international diversification primarily through concentrated ownership of firms, with outsider hedging also playing a quantitatively significant role.
