Publications des institutions partenaires

S'abonner aux flux infonet economy   4861 - 4880 of 4892

Robustness Properties of Inequality Measures: The Influence Function and the Principle of Transfers

Inequality measures are often used fot summarise information about empirical income distributions. However, the resulting picture of the distribution and of changes in the distribution can be severely distorted if the data are contaminated. The nature of this distortion will in general depend upon the underlying properties of the inequality measure. We investigate this issue…

Institution partenaire

Université de Genève

Full Text

English / 01/01/1993

New social movements and political opportunities in Western Europe

We present a number of concepts and hypotheses concerning the impact of the political opportunity structure on the mobilisation pattern of new social movements in Western Europe. The hypotheses refer to the general level of mobilisation in a given country, the general forms and strategies of action employed, the system level at which mobilisation is typically oriented and the…

Institution partenaire

Université de Genève

Full Text

English / 01/01/1992

On optimal public good provision with tax evasion

It is proved that for public goods with zero income effects (also called Ziff public goods) tax evasion does not affect the optimal level of public expenditure. Further examples show that, in general, tax evasion may lead to less but also to more public expenditure.

Full Text

English / 01/06/1991

A new approach for modeling economic count data

A new parametric model for the econometric analysis of non-negative integers is proposed. Its distinguishing feature is that it allows for more flexible variance-mean relationships than the models used hitherto. Estimation with maximum likelihood is illustrated using a dataset on ship damage incidents.

Full Text

English / 01/01/1991

Separating small and big fish: The case of income tax evasion

This paper proposes to offer the taxpayer a choice of tax-enforcement schemes for self-selection. More specifically, the taxpayer should have the possibility of opting for the prevailing regime with a certain penalty on the evaded tax or for an alternative regime with a higher penalty on the evaded tax but a reduced tax rate. It is shown that this leads to a separation of taxpayers…

Full Text

English / 01/01/1991

Rewards Versus Penalties: on a New Policy against Tax Evasion

The theoretical analysis of tax evasion has typically concentrated on the role of Abstract penalties and on the probability of being investigated and penalized. This article introduces into the standard model of tax evasion the possibility of pecuniary rewards as an economic incentive for taxpaying. The analysis shows that introducing a reward for payment of taxes leads to a welfare…

Full Text

English / 01/01/1991

Optimal price adjustment under imperfect information

Variations in cost and demand do not have symmetrical impact on the optimal price of the imperfectly competitive firm. This asymmetry is not so important as long as information regarding both cost and demand is sufficient. However, it becomes crucially important in case of incomplete information. Usually firms have more complete or ‘harder’ information on cost than on demand. This…

Full Text

English / 01/07/1990

Profit-Sharing Arrangements in a Team and the Cost of Information

The LEN-Model (referring to "linear functions", "exponential utility" and "normal distribution" as major properties of the LEN-Model) allows to study profit-sharing agreements in a team of principal and agent. First, this article describes and analyses the LEN-Model again (which was originally presented in 1987 by the same author). Second, agency costs…

Full Text

English / 01/03/1988

Seiten

Le portail de l'information économique suisse

© 2016 Infonet Economy