Profit-Sharing Arrangements in a Team and the Cost of Information

Auteur(s)

Klaus Spremann

Accéder

Beschreibung

The LEN-Model (referring to "linear functions", "exponential utility" and "normal distribution" as major properties of the LEN-Model) allows to study profit-sharing agreements in a team of principal and agent. First, this article describes and analyses the LEN-Model again (which was originally presented in 1987 by the same author). Second, agency costs are identified and calculated. Agency costs in a principal-agent relationship are seen as an information value. The question behind the nature of agency costs is: how much would principal and agent be willing to pay to overcome the disadvantages of asymmetric information they have in their relationship. The answer is given by the information value.

Langue

English

Datum

1988

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