Following a trend of sustained and accelerated growth, the VIX futures and options market has become a closely followed, active and liquid market. The standard stochastic volatility models—which focus on the modeling of instantaneous variance—are unable to fit the entire term structure of VIX futures as well as the entire VIX options surface. In contrast, we propose to model directly the VIX index, in a mean-reverting local volatility-of-volatility model, which will provide a global fit to the VIX market. We then show how to construct the local volatility-of-volatility surface by adapting the ideas in Carr (Local variance gamma. Bloomberg Quant Research, New York, 2008) and Andreasen and Huge (Risk Mag 76–79, 2011) to a mean-reverting process.
We treat information acquisition by potential investors in initial public offerings as endogenous. With endogenous information, the critical question is why underwriters would allow investors to spend resources acquiring superior information intended solely to effect a wealth transfer. We show that an investment banking syndicate is an institutional arrangement designed to avoid such a transfer. By inviting rival banks to share in the offering, a managing underwriter ensures they have a strong incentive to remain ignorant. We characterize the resulting outcome as one of symmetric ignorance. The desire to maintain symmetric ignorance is consistent with the observed passivity of nonmanaging syndicate participants.
An agent can choose to forego bene ts from side opportunities and to instead provide bene ts to the principal. In return, the principal o¤ers rewards. If this exchange is not contractible, typically repeated interaction will be required to sustain it. This model allows the agents productivity in contractible and possibly also non-contractible actions inside the relationship to be correlated with productivity in side activities. This arguably realistic assumption yields several novel implications for the feasibility of relational contracts and for agent selection by principals. The analysis reveals, for example, that optimal agent productivity is often non-monotonic in the importance, to the principal, of ensuring agent reliability.
The depth of the recent financial crisis is often attributed to excessively high leverage of corporations and banks. This column analyses corporate leverage in the long-run, and in particular the shift from bilateral to multilateral firm-bank relationships in the UK. This shift is related to the firms’ use of debt finance, and subsequently to their increased leverage
Banks play a special role as providers of informative signals about the quality and value of their borrowers. Such signals, however, may have a quality of their own as the banks’ selection and monitoring abilities may differ. Using an event study methodology, we study the importance of the geographical origin and organization of the banks for the investors’ assessments of firms’ credit quality and economic worth following loan announcements. Our sample comprises 986 announcements of bank loans to US firms over the period of 1980–2003. We find that investors react positively to such announcements if the loans are made by foreign or local banks, but not if the loans are made by banks that are located outside the firm’s headquarters state. Investor reaction is, in fact, the largest when the bank is foreign. Our evidence suggest that investors value relationships with more competitive and skilled banks rather than banks that have easier access to private information about the firms. These results are applicable also to the European markets where regulatory and economic borders do not coincide and bank identities and reputation seem to matter a great deal.
How best to measure banking competition? The empirical banking literature typically resorts to well-known concentration measures such as the Herfindahl–Hirschman index, or performance indicators like the Lerner or Boone indexes. While these have their merits, none of them explicitly takes into account that banks may actively compete with some banks but not with others. This chapter presents micro evidence on the determinants of such dyadic banking competition, and argues that this concept can advance our understanding of how banking competition affects firms’ access to credit.
