infonet-economy

We study the optimal policies and mean-variance frontiers (MVF) of a multiperiod mean-variance optimization of assets and liabilities (AL). This makes the analysis more challenging than for a setting based on purely exogenous liabilities, in which the optimization is only performed on the assets while keeping liabilities fixed. We show that, under general conditions for the joint AL dynamics, the optimal policies and the MVF can be decomposed into an orthogonal set of basis returns using exterior algebra. This formalism, novel to financial applications, allows us to study analytically the structure of optimal policies and MVF representations under endogenous liabilities in a multidimensional and multiperiod setting. Using a numerical example, we illustrate our methodology by analysing the impact of the rebalancing frequency on the MVF and by highlighting the main differences between exogenous and endogenous liabilities.

Die gängigen Beratungsprozesse der Finanzinstitute berücksichtigen die Risikofähigkeit und die Risikobereitschaft
der Anlagekunden. Aber nur die Beratungsprozesse, die auch die Risikowahrnehmung des Kunden mit einbeziehen, machen diesen wirklich sicherer in seinen Anlageentscheiden. Die verhaltensbasierte Finanztheorie (Behavioural Finance) liefert nützliche Einsichten dazu.

In this paper we examine the competitive equilibria of a dynamic stochastic economywith complete markets. We show that the completeness of the market requires both theset of asset payo¤s and collateral levels to be su¢ ciently rich, so as to allow to decentral-ize the equilibrium allocations obtained in Arrow-Debreu markets subject to a series ofappropriate limited pledgeability constraints. We provide then su¢ cient conditions forequilibria to be Pareto e¢ cient and show that when collateral is scarce equilibria are alsooften constrained ine¢ cient, in the sense that imposing tighter borrowing restrictionscan make everybody in the economy better o¤.We derive su¢ cient conditions for the existence of Markov equilibria and show thatthey often have ?nite support. The model is then tractable and its equilibria can becomputed with arbitrary accuracy. We carry out on this basis a quantitative assessmentof the risk sharing and e¢ ciency properties of equilibria.

This paper examines a dynamic stochastic economy with a benevolent government that cannot commit to future policies. Following Phelan and Stacchetti (2001), we consider sequential sustainable equilibria (SSE). We numerically solve for the set of equilibrium payoffs, and investigate whether the time consistency problem of capital income tax is quantitatively important. For a realistically calibrated economy, we find that the optimal sustainable capital income tax rate is pro-cyclical and close to zero on average, while the labor income tax is countercyclical.
Moreover, the welfare cost of no commitment is very small (0:22%) when compared with the Ramsey allocation. We also find that the best sustainable equilibrium outcome may achieve substantially higher social welfare than the
Markov-perfect equilibrium as considered by Klein, Krusell and Rios-Rull (2008).

Given a firms investment policy, its dividend policy is irrelevant (Miller and Modigliani (1961)). REITs, by law, pay at least 90 % of their corporate income as dividends, so that their dividend policy is given. This is a reversal of the dividend irrelevance theorem through regulatory means. Such a high dividend payment also means lower retained earnings, leaving firms with little free cash flow. Jensen (1986) argues that lower free cash flow results in mitigated agency problems. In this paper, I ask two questions. First, how does an average REIT, given its dividend policy restricted through regulation, respond to its investment opportunities? Second, does an average REIT, with mitigated agency problems, face less severe financing constraints? In response to the first question, I find that an average REITs investment responsiveness (as measured by Tobins q) is higher than that of firms in other industries. In response to the second question, I find that, despite mitigated agency costs, an average REIT faces, in fact, more severe financing constraints (as measured by sensitivity to cash ow) than other firms. Finally, using the natural experiment provided by the 2001 REIT Modernization Act (RMA) that allowed REITs to own taxable REIT subsidiaries (TRS) and reduce their dividend distribution from 95% to 90%, I show that, for a given increase in internal funds, the negative impact arising from increased agency problems dominates the positive impact of the wealth effect, resulting in a lower overall responsiveness of REITs to their investment opportunities.

We examine the stock price reactions of four Swiss banks to negotiations between Switzerland and the European Union and between Switzerland and the United States to (i) obtain an estimate of the value of banking secrecy to Swiss banks, and (ii) distinguish between tax evasion and genuine privacy concerns as sources of that value. We find that the value of banking secrecy to the private banks is large, accounting for 8 to 14% of their market value; in contrast, the value of banking secrecy to the universal banks is small. We further find that tax evasion may be less important and privacy concerns more important a source of value of banking secrecy than might previously have been thought.