In the recent macro literature the effect of competition has been analyzed by comparing economies with the same market structure but different degrees of substitutability. In this note, we argue that this approach may mingle the price effect of competition with a pure allocation effect. To illustrate the limitations of using the elasticity of substitution as a measure of competition, we present an example in which changes in the elasticity alter equilibrium allocations, but changes in the degree of market power do not. We use a simple static general equilibrium model in which sectors have different productivity. Then, higher substitutability always shifts resources towards the more productive sectors. Instead, changes in the market structure (monopolistic competition versus Bertrand duopoly) do not affect the relative price of consumption goods if the markups are symmetric, implying that the induced changes in competition do not have any price effect on equilibrium allocations.
The authors investigate how labor market institutions such as unemployment insurance, unions, firing regulations, and minimum wages have affected the evolution of wage inequality among male workers. Results of estimations using data on institutions in eleven OECD countries indicate that changes in labor market institutions can account for much of the change in wage inequality between 1973 and 1998. Factors found to have been negatively associated with male wage inequality are union density, the strictness of employment protection law, unemployment benefit duration, unemployment benefit generosity, and the size of the minimum wage. Over the 26-year period, institutional changes were associated with a 23% reduction in male wage inequality in France, where minimum wages increased and employment protection became stricter, but with an increase of up to 11% in the United States and United Kingdom, where unions became less powerful and (in the United States) minimum wages fell.
Wage inequality, investment and skills In flexible labour markets, capital increases the productivity of skilled workers more than that of unskilled workers, and in the US faster investment is associated with wider wage inequality. But labour market institutions that keep unskilled workers' wages high also imply that firms may find it profitable to invest so as to boost those workers' productivity. Our empirical analysis based on industry-level data confirms that a higher capital intensity in Germany is associated with smaller wage differentials and with a larger share of unskilled workers in the labour costs. Changes in capital-labour ratios during the 1980s reduced wage differentials by 5-8% in German industries, while in the US capital deepening in such industries as machinery and retail was accompanied by an increase of wage differentials larger than 7%.
Geographic mobility is important for the functioning of labor markets because it brings labor resources to where they can be most efficiently used. It has long been hypothesized that individuals' migration propensities depend on their attitudes towards risk, but the empirical evidence, to the extent that it exists, has been indirect. In this paper, we use newly available data from the German Socio-Economic Panel to measure directly the relationship between migration propensities and attitudes towards risk. We find that individuals who are more willing to take risks are more likely to migrate between labor markets in Germany. This result is robust to stratifying by age, sex, education, national origin, and a variety of other demographic characteristics, as well as to the level of aggregation used to define geographic mobility. The effect is substantial relative to the unconditional migration propensity and compared to the conventional determinants of migration. We also find that being more willing to take risks is more important for the extensive than for the intensive margin of migration
