We examine the efficiency properties of labor taxation. A spatial model of an economy is introduced whose key feature is a new approach to restricted labor mobility.We characterize the efficient allocation of labor and properties of a decentralized equilibrium. An efficient allocation of labor can be compatible with marginal productivity differentials stemming from binding mobility restrictions. We investigate two scenarios of labor taxation (firmspecific taxes and country-specific taxes) and in both setups we give a complete characterization of the cases for which there is scope for redistribution without affecting efficiency. Finally, we discuss the applicability of our model in the context of the place of employment and place of residence principle of taxation.
The modern state has monopolized the legitimate use of force. This concept is twofold. First, the state is empowered with enforcement rights; second, the rights of the individuals are restricted. In a simple model of property rights with appropriation and defense activity, we show that a restriction of private enforcement is beneficial for the property owner, even if there are no economies of scale from public protection. We emphasize the role of the state as a commitment device for a certain level of enforcement. However, commitment will only work if the state can regulate private protection, such as private armies and mercenaries.
This paper presents a generalised model of overlapping generations with economic ageing of households. Economic age is defined as a set of personal attributes such as earnings potential and tastes that are characteristic of a person's position in the life-cycle. We separate the concepts of economic age and time since birth by assuming only a small number of different states of age. Agents sharing the same economic characteristics are aggregated analytically to a small number of age groups. The model thus allows for a very parsimonious approximation of life-cycle differences in earnings, wealth and consumption. As an illustration, we apply the model quantitatively to study the impact of demographic change.
We develop a two-region model where the decentralized provision of spillover goods and other public expenditures is financed by means of user fees. We show that a decentralized solution tends to be inefficient. If the regional spillover goods are substitutes, user fees tend to be inefficiently low, whereas they tend to be inefficiently high if the spillover goods are complements.
The paper analyzes the strategic effects of decentralized user-fee and enforcement
policies for the financing of interregional spillover goods. We derive the equilibrium pricing and enforcement rules for a n-region economy.We show that under mild conditions on the pattern of substitution between spillover goods and contrary to the 2-region case, the decentralized equilibrium cannot be Pareto improved by coordinated policy changes. However, decentralized equilibria are suboptimal from the point of view of utilitarian welfare.We characterize the direct on of the distortion for this case. The regions' incentives for user-fee enforcement are ambiguous in general. With only two regions and if regions only charge non-residents, however, there is overinvestment in user-fee enforcement in the decentralized equilibrium. For the case of a Tullock enforcement function and linear demand for the spillover goods we show that welfare is u-shaped in a parameter that measures the technological advantage of user-fee enforcement.
