Trust in others’ honesty is a key component of the long-term performance of firms, industries, and even whole countries1, 2, 3, 4. However, in recent years, numerous scandals involving fraud have undermined confidence in the financial industry5, 6, 7. Contemporary commentators have attributed these scandals to the financial sector’s business culture8, 9, 10, but no scientific evidence supports this claim. Here we show that employees of a large, international bank behave, on average, honestly in a control condition. However, when their professional identity as bank employees is rendered salient, a significant proportion of them become dishonest. This effect is specific to bank employees because control experiments with employees from other industries and with students show that they do not become more dishonest when their professional identity or bank-related items are rendered salient. Our results thus suggest that the prevailing business culture in the banking industry weakens and undermines the honesty norm, implying that measures to re-establish an honest culture are very important.
In the models of Young (1993, Econometrica61, 57–84; 1993, J. Econ. Theory 59, 145–168), boundedly rational individuals are recurrently matched to play a game, and they play myopic best replies to the recent history of play. It could therefore be an advantage to instead play a myopic best reply to the myopic best reply, something boundedly rational players might conceivably also do. We investigate this possibility in the context of Young's (J. Econ. Theory 59, 145–168) bargaining model. It turns out that “cleverness” in this respect indeed does have an advantage in some cases. However, if all individuals are equally informed about past play, in a statistical sense, then the Nash bargaining solution remains the unique long-run outcome when the mutation rate goes to zero. Journal of Economic Literature Classification Numbers C70, C78.
RATIONALE: People often face decisions that pit self-interested behavior aimed at maximizing personal reward against normative behavior such as acting cooperatively, which benefits others. The threat of social sanctions for defying the fairness norm prevents people from behaving overly selfish. Thus, normative behavior is influenced by both seeking rewards and avoiding punishment. However, the neurochemical processes mediating the impact of these influences remain unknown. Several lines of evidence link the dopaminergic system to reward and punishment processing, respectively, but this evidence stems from studies in non-social contexts. OBJECTIVES: The present study investigates dopaminergic drug effects on individuals' reward seeking and punishment avoidance in social interaction. METHODS: Two-hundred one healthy male participants were randomly assigned to receive 300 mg of L-3,4-dihydroxyphenylalanine (L-DOPA) or a placebo before playing an economic bargaining game. This game involved two conditions, one in which unfair behavior could be punished and one in which unfair behavior could not be punished. RESULTS: In the absence of punishment threats, L-DOPA administration led to more selfish behavior, likely mediated through an increase in reward seeking. In contrast, L-DOPA administration had no significant effect on behavior when faced with punishment threats. CONCLUSIONS: The results of this study broaden the role of the dopaminergic system in reward seeking to human social interactions. We could show that even a single dose of a dopaminergic drug may bring selfish behavior to the fore, which in turn may shed new light on potential causal relationships between the dopaminergic system and norm abiding behaviors in certain clinical subpopulations.
Empathy and morality have an important yet very complex relation. This complexity is most likely due to the multifaceted nature of empathy and the uncertainty of knowledge about the nature of morality. This chapter first considers the philosophical debate on the nature of morality. Second, it presents empirical data from social neuroscience and psychology to differentiate empathy from related, but distinct social emotions (such as sympathy or compassion). Based on these considerations, it provides a framework in which the relation of morality and empathy can be described. It then reviews empirical evidence making the case that empathy is but one constitutive element of morality, and can even trigger amoral behavior under certain circumstances. Finally, the chapter discusses how empathy—by enabling people to understand how their behavior affects others— can play a fundamental role in promoting morality’s goal of maximizing everyone’s well-being.
PURPOSE: To determine the subjective experience of subjects undergoing 7T magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) compared to a mock scanner with no magnetic field.
METHODS AND MATERIALS: In all, 44 healthy subjects were exposed to both the B0 field of a 7T whole-body MRI and a realistic mock scanner with no magnetic field. Subjects were blinded to the actual field strength and no scanning was performed. After exposure, subjects rated their experience of potential sensory perceptions.
RESULTS: The most frequently observed side effect was vertigo while entering the gantry, which was reported by 38.6% (n = 17). Other frequent side effects were the appearance of phosphenes (18.2%, n = 8), thermal heat sensation (15.9%), unsteady gait after exposure (13.6%, n = 6), and dizziness (13.6%). All side effects were reported significantly more often after 7T exposure. Nine subjects (20.5%) did not report any sensory perceptions at all, ie, neither in the 7T scanner nor in the mock scanner.
CONCLUSION: Light, acute, and transient sensory perceptions can occur in subjects undergoing ultrahighfield MRI, of which vertigo seems to be the most frequently reported. Possible psychological effects might contribute to the emergence of such sensory perceptions, as some subjects also reported them to appear in a realistic mock scanner with no magnetic field.
Offshoring of production can have a deep impact on the wages and welfare of workers with different abilities through its effect on technological progress. This column argues that, when labour is sufficiently cheap abroad, firms have incentives to offshore low-skill tasks and invest in skill-biased technologies at home. Over time, however, offshoring raises foreign wages. This increases demand for all firms and makes innovations complementing low-skill workers more profitable. As a result, offshoring can eventually lead to higher wages for everybody and less inequality.
The market for multi-channel video programming has undergone considerable change in the last 15 years. Direct-Broadcast Satellite service, spurred by 1999 legislation that leveled the playing field with cable television systems, has grown from 3% to 33% of the U.S. MVPD (cable, satellite, and telco video) market. Telephone operators have entered in some parts of the US and online video distributors are a growing source of television viewing. This chapter considers the merits of cable television regulation in light of these developments. It surveys the
dismal empirical record on the effects of price regulation in cable and the more encouraging but incomplete evidence on the benefits of satellite and telco competition. It concludes with a consideration of four open issues in cable markets: horizontal concentration and vertical integration in the programming market, bundling by both cable systems and programmers, online video distribution, and temporary programming blackouts from failed carriage negotiations for both broadcast and cable programming. While the distribution market is clearly now more competitive, concerns in each of these areas remain.
Little is known about how different bonus schemes affect traders' propensity to trade and which bonus schemes improve traders' performance. We study the effects of linear versus threshold bonus schemes on traders' behavior. Traders buy and sell shares in an experimental stock market on the basis of fundamental and technical information (past share price evolution, realized earnings, analysts' earnings forecasts, and evolution of the market index). We find that linear and threshold bonus schemes have different effects on trading behavior: traders make more transactions but of a smaller size under the threshold than under the linear bonus scheme. Furthermore, transaction frequency significantly decreases when bonus thresholds are reached but only after building in a safety margin. Under the threshold scheme, the traders' performance is lower (even when there are no transaction costs) than under the linear bonus scheme as a consequence of poorer market timing. This is especially the case when earning money by trading is relatively difficult (i.e., under low profitability conditions). Nevertheless, under low profitability conditions, traders seem to collect more information about the relationships between share price and market returns, earnings, and earnings forecasts, put more effort into understanding those relationships, and thus eventually learn to perform better.
BACKGROUND: Negative symptoms of schizophrenia can be grouped in 2 dimensions: apathy and diminished expression. Increasing evidence suggests that negative symptoms are associated with altered neural activity of subcortical and cortical regions in the brain reward system. However, the neurobiological basis of the distinct symptom dimensions within negative symptoms is still poorly understood. The primary aim of our study was to examine the neural correlates of the negative symptom dimensions apathy and diminished expression during a reward processing task.
METHODS: Patients with schizophrenia and healthy controls underwent event-related fMRI while performing a variant of the Monetary Incentive Delay Task. We assessed negative symptom dimensions using the Brief Negative Symptom Scale.
RESULTS: We included 27 patients and 25 controls in our study. Both groups showed neural activation indicated by blood oxygen-level dependent signal in the ventral striatum during reward anticipation. Ventral striatal activation during reward anticipation showed a strong negative correlation with apathy. Importantly, this effect was not driven by cognitive ability, medication, depressive or positive symptoms. In contrast, no significant correlation with the diminished expression dimension was observed.
LIMITATIONS: Although the results remain significant when controlling for chlorpromazine equivalents, we cannot fully exclude potential confounding effects of medication with atypical antipsychotics.
CONCLUSION: The specific correlation of ventral striatal hypoactivation during reward anticipation with apathy demonstrates a differentiation of apathy and diminished expression on a neurobiological level and provides strong evidence for different pathophysiological mechanisms underlying these 2 negative symptom dimensions. Our findings contribute to a multilevel framework in which apathy and motivational impairment in patients with schizophrenia can be described on psychopathological, behavioural and neural levels.
