Several graphical methods for testing univariate composite normality from an i.i.d. sample are presented. They are endowed with correct simultaneous error bounds and yield size-correct tests. As all are based on the empirical CDF, they are also consistent for all alternatives. For one test, called the modified stabilized probability test, or MSP, a highly simplified computational method is derived, which delivers the test statistic and also a highly accurate p-value approximation, essentially instantaneously. The MSP test is demonstrated to have higher power against asymmetric alternatives than the well-known and powerful Jarque-Bera test. A further size-correct test, based on combining two test statistics, is shown to have yet higher power. The methodology employed is fully general and can be applied to any i.i.d. univariate continuous distribution setting.
We develop a simple integration of banks into the Solow model. The objective is to provide a tractable benchmark for analyzing the long-term impact of crises on economic activities and growth. A fraction of firms have to rely on banks for financing their investments while banks face themselves an endogenous leverage constraint. Informed lending by banks and uninformed lending through capital markets spur capital accumulation. The ensuing coupled accumulation rules for household wealth and bank equity yield a uniquely determined steady state. We highlight three properties when shocks to wealth, productivity or trust affect the economy. First, typically bond and loan financing react in opposite directions to such shocks. Second, negative temporary shocks to household wealth (financial crisis) or negative sectoral production shocks can surprisingly cause persistent booms of banking and even of the entire economy -- after an initial bust. Third, shocks to bank equity (banking crisis), however, lead to large and persistent downturns associated with high output losses.
"Wer Moral hat, geht zur Bank." Wirtschaftsnobelpreisträger Robert Shiller meint dies ernst: Jede menschliche Tätigkeit von Bedeutung muss finanziert werden, und man kann wenig Gutes für die Welt im Alleingang erreichen.
This chapter combines recent findings from the empirical banking literature with established insights from studies of banking competition and regulation. It starts with a concise overview and assessment of the different methodological approaches taken to address banking competition. While market structure indicators are readily available, they may not be overly informative about the competitive conditions in banking markets. The literature has focused to date on “non-market structure” indicators such as the Panzar-Rosse H-statistic, the Lerner index, and the Boone indicator. The chapter then structures a discussion on the empirical findings based upon a framework that finds its roots in the different theories of financial intermediation. Many other specific approaches to infer banking competition are discussed, in particular, the impact that regulation and information-sharing between banks may have on banking competition.
Die Schweiz geht zu einer neuen Wirtschaftsform über. Weiss (freie Marktwirtschaft) oder Schwarz (reine Staatswirtschaft) war zwar nie, dem Bundesrat schwebt aber eine besondere Schattierung von Dunkelgrau vor. Er sieht die Unternehmen neu als verlängerten Arm des Staates. «Der Bund erwartet von den Wirtschaftsakteuren, dass sie ihre gesellschaftliche Verantwortung wahrnehmen», heisst es in der Medienmitteilung zu einem am 1. April veröffentlichten Positionspapier.
Given a theoretical pricing model, an implied volatility can be extracted from an option’s market price. Given a set of options with the same maturity and a range of strike prices, it is possible to extract (an approximation to) the entire risk-neutral probability density without having to assume a theoretical pricing model. There are a variety of related methods to do this, but all are subject to certain problems, including the fact that the data never exist to allow full estimation of the tails. Some methods produce improper densities with negative portions. In this article, Ludwig introduces a neural network approach to extract risk-neutral densities from option prices, imposing only a small number of constraints, such as probabilities must be nonnegative and an option’s price must be above intrinsic value. The resulting densities are smooth and sensible, even for days that other approaches find extremely difficult to handle.
This article jointly analyses a behavioural and a cultural concept to explain household debt portfolio choice. The behavioural approach explores the role of time preferences on household debt maturity in a theoretical model and a numerical analysis. We derive a positive relationship between the long-term discount factor δ and the optimal maturity of household loans. The cultural approach examines whether national culture is a reasonable predictor for household debt maturity. We show that culture is an important factor for households’ borrowing decisions and has even more predictive power than time preferences. Countries with higher scores on the Hofstede dimension of long-term orientation tend to have shorter household debt maturity. Time preferences incur a primarily mediating role, because the effect of national culture on the borrowing decision is reduced, as the long-term discount factor δ increases.
In a recent experimental study of intertemporal risky decision making, Andreoni and Sprenger (2012) find that subjects exhibit a preference for intertemporal diversification, which is inconsistent with discounted expected utility theory. It was claimed that their results are also at odds with models involving probability weighting, such as rank-dependent utility and cumulative prospect theory. Here we demonstrate, however, that rank-dependent probability weighting explains intertemporal diversification if decision makers care about portfolio risk. Moreover, we provide a unified account of all of Andreoni and Sprenger's key findings.
There is a widely held view within the general public that large corporations should act in the interests of a broader group of agents than just their shareholders (the stake- holder view). This paper presents a framework where this idea can be justified. The point of departure is the observation that a large firm typically faces endogenous risks that may have a significant impact on the workers it employs and the consumers it serves. These risks generate externalities on these stakeholders which are not inter- nalized by shareholders. As a result, in the competitive equilibrium, there is under- investment in the prevention of these risks. We suggest that this under-investment problem can be alleviated if firms are instructed to maximize the total welfare of their stakeholders rather than shareholder value alone (stakeholder equilibrium). The stake- holder equilibrium can be implemented by introducing new property rights
(employee rights and consumer rights) and instructing managers to maximize the total value of the firm (the value of these rights plus shareholder value). If there is only one firm, the stakeholder equilibrium is Pareto optimal. However, this is not true with more than one firm and/or heterogeneous agents, which illustrates some of the limits of the stake- holder model.
