Network techniques are applied to a case study. The results show that using a joint approach can help in giving further insight into the analysis of informal ties in an organization. Special emphasis is given to centrality. The concept of mutual awareness, both on an individual and a global levels, is introduced and illustrated.
We study the effect of bank loan announcements on the borrowing firms' bond and equity prices. Our sample consists of 896 loan deals signed between 1997 to 2003 involving 364 different US firms. We report the first comprehensive evidence that also firm bond prices react to bank loan announcements. Using a two-day event window, we find significant abnormal bond credit spreads reduction of 11 basis point spread (BPS) on average. The corresponding average stock price reaction is 26 BPS. While stock returns are unaffected by firm risk, bondholders of riskier firms are more sensitive to the loss given default which increases with bank borrowing. Such firms experience bond credit spread increases. Our analysis also provides an estimate of the net impact on firm value of bank loan announcements, between -5 BPS for riskier and smaller firms and 18 BPS for safer and larger companies. Collectively, the results indicate that the overall positive effect on equity value comes from two sources. First, bank certification reduces information asymmetry. Second, there is a transfer of bondholder's wealth to the shareholders as a result of claim dilution.
Despite their apparent interest, private investors are surprisingly disengaged from sustainable investing, an observation that has received limited scholarly attention. This theory building study draws on the theory of planned behaviour to conceptualize the decision-making process of private investors towards sustainable investing. Findings from literature provide some insights but do not yield a comprehensive answer as to why private investors refrain from sustainable investing. Interviews with wealthy private investors led us to identify a generally high interest in sustainable investing and dominant barriers that prevent actual engagement. Barriers are the perception of high volatility within sustainable investments in combination with, first, a short investment time horizon and, second, recent financial losses. Third, we find that investment advisors withhold required information from their clients. We suggest a decision-making framework that facilitates a better understanding of the engagement of private investors in sustainable investing and outline avenues for future research and implications for practitioners.
Simple, fast methods for modeling the portfolio distribution corresponding to a non-elliptical, leptokurtic, asymmetric, and conditionally heteroskedastic set of asset returns are entertained. Portfolio optimization via simulation is demonstrated, and its benefits are discussed. An augmented mixture of normals model is shown to be superior to both standard (no short selling) Markowitz and the equally weighted portfolio in terms of out of sample returns and Sharpe ratio performance.
We find that stocks exhibiting high dispersion in analysts' earnings forecasts do not only underperform in the U.S. but also in some European countries. However, testing for the dispersion effect in many countries calls for adequate multiple testing controls. Under this paradigm it turns out that none of the naively derived dispersion effects proves to be a sustainable phenomenon. Rationalizing this finding, we document that the dispersion effect's abnormal returns amass in a very narrow time frame and mainly derive from a bet against the technology bubble that would have been rather difficult to implement.
We study the risk-taking channel of monetary policy in Bolivia, a dollarized country where monetary changes are transmitted exogenously from the USA. We find that a lower policy rate spurs the granting of riskier loans, to borrowers with worse credit histories, lower ex-ante internal ratings, and weaker ex-post performance (acutely so when the rate subsequently increases). Effects are stronger for small firms borrowing from multiple banks. To uniquely identify risk-taking, we assess collateral coverage,expected returns, and risk premia of the newly granted riskier loans, finding that their returns and premia are actually lower, especially at banks suffering from agency problems.
