Are national or multinational firms better lobbyists? This paper analyzes the extent of national environmental regulation when policy is determined in a lobbying game between a government and firm. We compare the resulting regulation levels for national and multinational firms. We identify three countervailing forces, the easier-to-shut-down effect, the easier-to-curb-exports effect and the multiple-plant effect. The interplay of these three forces determines whether national or multinational firms produce more, depending on such parameters as the potential environmental damages, transportation costs and the in uence of the firm. We also show that welfare levels are higher with multinational firms than with national firms when there is no lobbying, but that lobbying can reverse the welfare ordering.
Every year thousands of firms are engaged in research joint ventures (RJV), where all knowledge gained through R&D is shared among members. Most of the empirical literature assumes members are non-cooperative in the product market. But many RJV members are rivals leaving open the possibility that firms may form RJVs to facilitate collusion. We examine this by exploiting variation in RJV formation generated by a policy change that affects the collusive benefits but not the research synergies associated with a RJV. We use data on RJVs formed between 1986 and 2001 together with firm-level information from Compustat to estimate a RJV participation equation. After correcting for the endogeneity of R&D and controlling for RJV characteristics and firm attributes, we find the decision to join is impacted by the policy change. We also find the magnitude is significant: the policy change resulted in an average drop in the probability of joining a RJV of 34% among telecommunications firms, 33% among computer and semiconductor manufacturers, and 27% among petroleum refining firms. Our results are consistent with research joint ventures serving a collusive function.
Eating disorders are an important and growing health concern, and bulimia nervosa (BN) accounts for the largest fraction of eating disorders. Health consequences of BN are substantial and especially serious given the increasingly compulsive nature of the disorder. However, remarkably little is known about the mechanisms underlying the persistent nature of BN. Using a unique panel data set on young women and instrumental variable techniques, we document that unobserved heterogeneity plays a role in the persistence of BN, but strikingly up to two thirds is due to true state dependence. Our results, together with support from the medical literature, provide evidence that bulimia should be considered an addiction. Our findings have important implications for public policy since they suggest that the timing of the policy is crucial: preventive educational programs should be coupled with more intense (rehabilitation) treatment at the early stages of bingeing and purging behaviors. Our results are robust to different model specifications and identifying assumptions.
Traditionally, the virtue of democratic elections has been seen in their role as means of screening and sanctioning shirking public officials. This paper proposes a novel rationale for elections and political campaigns considering that candidates incur psychological costs of lying, in particular from breaking campaign promises. These non-pecuniary costs imply that campaigns influence subsequent behavior, even in the absence of reputational or image concerns. Our lab experiments reveal that promises are more than cheap talk. They influence the behavior of both voters and their representatives. We observe that the electorate is better off when their leaders are elected democratically rather than being appointed exogenously - but only in the presence of electoral campaigns. In addition, we find that representatives are more likely to serve the public interest when their approval rates are high. Altogether, our results suggest that elections and campaigns confer important benefits beyond their screening and sanctioning functions.
We provide a Bayes–Nash equilibrium analysis of the simultaneous ascending auction (SAA) when local bidders interested in a single item compete against global bidders interested in aggregating many items. We first assume that each local bidder values only a specific item, e.g. the license for the region where it has monopoly power, and that global bidders' valuation functions are convex. For this environment we show that a global bidder faces an exposure problem with adverse consequences for revenue and efficiency. In the limit when the number of items grows large, the SAA is revenue and efficiency equivalent to the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves (VCG) mechanism. We extend our analysis to include the case where items are substitutes for local bidders, so that price arbitrage will occur as observed in many spectrum auctions. This environment, which combines substitutes and complements, results in an aggravated exposure problem. Consequently, the SAA is no longer efficient and may yield dramatically lower revenues than the VCG mechanism. Finally, we relax the assumption that global bidders' valuation functions are convex by considering an environment with medium-sized global bidders who demand fewer than all items. We show that global bidders divide the market at low prices when market sharing is feasible while they engage in mutually destructive bidding when there is a fitting problem. In both cases, the SAA again underperforms relative to the VCG mechanism.
How does risk tolerance vary with stake size? This important question cannot be adequately answered if framing effects, nonlinear probability weighting, and heterogeneity of preference types are neglected. We show that, contrary to gains, no coherent change in relative risk aversion is observed for losses. The increase in relative risk aversion over gains cannot be captured by the curvature of the utility function. It is driven predominantly by a change in probability weighting of a majority group of individuals who exhibit more rational probability weighting at high stakes. These results not only challenge expected utility theory, but also prospect theory.
It has long been recognized that there is considerable heterogeneity in individual risk taking behavior but little is known about the distribution of risk taking types. We present a parsimonious characterization of risk taking behavior by estimating a finite mixture regression model for three different experimental data sets, two Swiss and one Chinese, over a large number of real gains and losses. We find two distinct types of individuals: In all three data sets, the choices of roughly 80% of the subjects exhibit significant deviations from rational probability weighting consistent with prospect theory. 20% of the subjects weight probabilities linearly and behave essentially as expected value maximizers. Moreover, the individuals are assigned to one of these two groups with probabilities of close to one resulting in a low measure of entropy. The reliability and robustness of our classification suggest using a mix of preference theories in applied economic modeling.
We consider sample covariance matrices constructed from real or complex i.i.d. variates with finite 12th moment. We assume that the population covariance matrix is positive definite and its spectral measure almost surely converges to some limiting probability distribution as the number of variables and the number of observations go to infinity together, with their ratio converging to a finite positive limit. We quantify the relationship between sample and population eigenvectors, by studying the asymptotics of a broad family of functionals that generalizes the Stieltjes transform of the spectral measure. This is then used to compute the asymptotically optimal bias correction for sample eigenvalues, paving the way for a new generation of improved estimators of the covariance matrix and its inverse.
Volunteer work is an increasingly large, yet ill-understood sector of the economy. We show that monetary rewards undermine the intrinsic motivation of volunteers. A unique data set from Switzerland allows us to assess the effects of financial rewards on the effort put into volunteer work. There is a fairly standard pattern regarding the volunteers reaction e.g. to more labor market work hours. But we obtain the puzzling result that, when rewarded, volunteers work less. These findings are in line with a large literature in social psychology emphasizing that external rewards can undermine the intrinsic motivation for an activity. We show the implications for public policy towards volunteering.
