Sättigung bedeutet, dass der Grenznutzen des Einkommens abnimmt und die Arbeitsmotivation sinkt. Die beobachtbare Konsequenz von Sättigung müsste also eine Verkürzung der Arbeitszeit bei den vergleichsweise Reicheren sein. Die vorliegende Arbeit zeigt, dass diese Schlussfolgerung falsch ist. Im Gegenteil und scheinbar paradox gilt: Sättigung wird sich eher in Form von höheren Einkommensforderungen, also gewissermassen als Gier äussern. Umgekehrt kann es jenen, die mit der Zufriedenstellung ihrer Mindestansprüche kämpfen, passieren, dass sie bei niedrigeren Lohnsätzen enden, wenn sie ihre Ansprüche reduzieren, um weniger arbeiten zu müssen.
We provide a direct test of the impact of altruism on remittances. From a sample of 105 male migrant workers from Kerala, India working in Qatar, we elicit the propensity to share with others from their responses in a dictator game, and use it as a proxy for altruism. When the entire sample is considered, we find that only migrants' income robustly explains remittances. Altruism does not seem to matter. However, we document a strong positive relationship between altruism and remittances for those migrants that report a loan obligation back home, which is nearly half the sample. We explain the role of loan obligations with a standard remittance model, extended with reference-dependent preferences.
It is proved that for public goods with zero income effects (also called Ziff public goods) tax evasion does not affect the optimal level of public expenditure. Further examples show that, in general, tax evasion may lead to less but also to more public expenditure.
This paper proposes to offer the taxpayer a choice of tax-enforcement schemes for self-selection. More specifically, the taxpayer should have the possibility of opting for the prevailing regime with a certain penalty on the evaded tax or for an alternative regime with a higher penalty on the evaded tax but a reduced tax rate. It is shown that this leads to a separation of taxpayers characterized by a relatively high degree of evasion (H-evaders) from taxpayers who evade only a relatively small amount of tax (L-evaders). Furthermore, the procedure is not self-defeating, it is effectively possible to direct the efforts of auditing towards the H-evaders. At the end of the game the L-evaders experience a welfare gain, the H-evaders are induced to reduce their evasion activities and the government can expect higher yields.
The paper develops an endogenous growth model which is based on lexicographical consumer preferences. The central variable determining the long-run rate of growth is personal income distribution. Its role in the process of growth depends crucially on the assumption about productivity growth. If productivity grows proportionally to product diversity, then an unequal distribution of incomes, measured by the rate of proportion of top to average incomes, has a positive effect on growth. However, under alternative assumptions, for instance, if productivity is a function of average income, inequality turns out to be harmful for economic growth.
This paper is concerned with the analysis of zero-inflated count data when time of exposure varies. It proposes a modified zero-inflated count data model where the probability of an extra zero is derived from an underlying duration model with Weibull hazard rate. The new model is compared to the standard Poisson model with logit zero-inflation in an application to the effect of treatment with thiotepa on the number of new bladder tumors.
We study how the willingness to enter long-term bilateral relationships affects cooperation even when parties have little information about each other, ex ante, and cooperation is otherwise unenforceable. We experimentally investigate a finitely-repeated Prisoner’s Dilemma, allowing players to endogenously select interaction durations. Consistent with prior research, longer interactions facilitate cooperation. However, many individuals avoid long-term commitment, with uncooperative types less likely to commit than conditional cooperators. Endogenously chosen long-term commitment yields higher cooperation rates (98% in one condition) than exogenously imposed commitment. Thus, the willingness to enter into long-term relationships provides a means for fostering - and screening for - efficient cooperation.
