Synchrony between events in different senses has long been considered the critical temporal cue for multisensory integration. Here, using rapid streams of auditory and visual events, we demonstrate how humans can use temporal structure (rather than mere temporal coincidence) to detect multisensory relatedness. We find psychophysically that participants can detect matching auditory and visual streams via shared temporal structure for crossmodal lags of up to 200 ms. Performance on this task reproduced features of past findings based on explicit timing judgments but did not show any special advantage for perfectly synchronous streams. Importantly, the complexity of temporal patterns influences sensitivity to correspondence. Stochastic, irregular streams - with richer temporal pattern information - led to higher audio-visual matching sensitivity than predictable, rhythmic streams. Our results reveal that temporal structure and its complexity are key determinants for human detection of audio-visual correspondence. The distinctive emphasis of our new paradigms on temporal patterning could be useful for studying special populations with suspected abnormalities in audio-visual temporal perception and multisensory integration.
Many postulated relations in finance imply that expected asset returns strictly increase in an underlying characteristic. To examine the validity of such a claim, one needs to take the entire range of the characteristic into account, as is done in the recent proposal of Patton and Timmermann (2010). But their test is only a test for the direction of monotonicity, since it requires the relation to be monotonic from the outset: either weakly decreasing under the null or strictly increasing under the alternative. When the relation is non-monotonic or weakly increasing, the test can break down and falsely ‘establish’ a strictly increasing relation with high probability. We offer some alternative tests that do not share this problem. The behavior of the various tests is illustrated via Monte Carlo studies. We also present empirical applications to real data.
This paper analyzes how all-pay auctions with endogenous prizes can be used to provide effort incentives. We show that wide classes of effort distributions can be implemented as equilibrium outcomes of such games. We also ask how all-pay auctions have to be structured so as to induce high expected highest efforts without generating excessive wasteful efforts of losers. All-pay auctions with endogenous prizes can do better than all-pay auctions with fixed prizes in this respect, in particular, when the prize function is approximately linear. We use the results to compare patents and prizes as innovation incentives, and to explore promotion incentives in organizations.
We study the stability of voluntary cooperation in response to varying group growth rates. Using a laboratory public-good game, we construct a situation where increasing group size yields potential efficiency gains, but only with sustained cooperation. We then study the effect of exogenously varying growth rates on cooperation. Slow growth yields higher cooperation rates and welfare than fast growth, both for incumbents and entrants, which is consistent with optimistic self-reinforcing beliefs persisting under slower growth. Allowing incumbent group members to select growth rates also sustains high cooperation rates, but growth stalls at intermediate group sizes, leaving potential efficiency gains unrealized.
In this paper we analyze R&D collaboration networks in industries where firms are competitors in the product market. Firms’ benefits from collaborations arise by sharing knowledge about a cost-reducing technology. By forming collaborations, however, firms also change their own competitive position in the market as well as the overall market structure. We analyze incentives of firms to form R&D collaborations with other firms and the implications of these alliance decisions for the overall network structure. We provide a general characterization of both equilibrium networks and endogenous production choices, and compare it to the efficient network architecture. We also allow for firms to differ in their technological characteristics, investigate how this affects their propensity to collaborate and study the resulting network architecture.
Consumers make many decisions in everyday life involving finances, food, and health. It is known from behavioral economics research that people are often driven by short-term gratification, that is, people tend to choose the immediate, albeit smaller reward. But choosing the delayed reward, that is, delaying the gratification, can actually be beneficial. How can we motivate consumers to resist the "now" and invest in their future, leading to sustainable or healthy habits? We review recent developments from behavioral and neuroimaging studies that are relevant for understanding consumer decisions. Further, we present results from our field research that examined whether we can increase the perceived value of a (delayed) environmental benefit using tailored communication, that is, change the way it is framed. More specifically, we investigated whether we can boost the value of an abstract, long-term "green" claim of a product by expressing it as a concrete, short-term benefit. This is a new application area for behavioral economics.
We conducted an experiment with 182 inmates from a maximum security prison to analyze the impact of criminal identity salience on cheating. The results show that inmates cheat more when we exogenously render their criminal identity more salient. This effect is specific to individuals who have a criminal identity, because an additional placebo experiment shows that regular citizens do not become more dishonest in response to crime-related reminders. Moreover, our experimental measure of cheating correlates with inmates' offenses against in-prison regulation. Together, these findings suggest that criminal identity salience plays a crucial role in rule violating behavior.
We sort currencies into portfolios by countries’ past consumption growth. The excess return of the highest- over the lowest-consumption-growth portfolio – our consumption carry factor – compensates for negative returns during world-wide downturns and prices the cross-section of portfolio-sorted and of bilateral currency returns. Empirically, sorting currencies on consumption growth is very similar to sorting currencies on interest rates. We interpret these stylized facts in a habit formation model: sorting currencies on past consumption growth approximates sorting on risk aversion. Low (high) risk-aversion currencies have high (low) interest rates and depreciate (appreciate) in times of global turmoil.
This paper introduces a model of limited consumer attention into an otherwise standard new trade theory model with love-of-variety preferences and heterogeneous firms. In this setting, we show that international integration needs not be welfare enhancing if the consumers' capacity to gather and process information is limited. Rather, it intensifies competition for scarce consumer attention, which causes mutual overbidding of producers in their advertising expenditures. The mutual overbidding renders advertising—which is informative in principle—wasteful and diverts purchases to imported goods at an inefficient scale. Wasteful advertising provides scope for policy intervention in the form of an advertising tax. However, if the tax instrument is not allowed to discriminate against foreign producers, it cannot eliminate inefficient diversion of consumer purchases to imports; hence it needs not be successful in securing gains from international integration in this framework.
