In this paper we identify conditions under which the introduction of a pay-as-you-go social security system is ex-ante Pareto-improving in a stochastic overlapping genera-
tions economy with capital accumulation and land. We argue that these conditions are consistent with realistic specifications of the parameters of the economy. In our model, financial markets are complete and competitive equilibria are interim Pareto e¢ cient.
Therefore, a welfare improvement can only be obtained if agents' welfare is evaluated ex ante, and arises from an improvement in intergenerational risk sharing.
We examine the various effects of social security, on the prices of long-lived assets and the stock of capital, and hence on output, wages and risky rates of returns, can
be clearly identified. In addition, we analyze the optimal size of a given social security system as well as its optimal reform.
As early as 1934 Graham and Dodd conjectured that excess returns from value investment originate from a tendency of stock prices to converge towards a fundamental value. This paper confirms their insights within the evolutionary finance model of Evstigneev et al. (Econ Theory 27:449–468, (Evstigneev et al. 2006)). Our empirical results show the predictive power of the evolutionary benchmark valuation for the relative market capitalization and its dynamics in the sample of firms listed in the Dow Jones Industrial Average index in 1981–2009.
We develop an incomplete contracts model to study the extent to which control rights of different financings affect corporate growth. The model admits a standard hold-up problem under equity financing; insiders may be disincentivized to do R&D because outside investors can use their control rights to expropriate large parts of the returns by hiring more efficient managers in the future. Debt financing may give rise to a double moral hazard problem; both managers and shareholders may divert corporate resources to themselves before debt is serviced. However, in many cases, these phenomena do not occur in equilibrium and control rights are irrelevant. Cross-sectional predictions are derived from those cases where control rights matter. Consistent with the empirical evidence, leverage is inversely related to growth and to profitability.
We study the optimal policies and mean-variance frontiers (MVF) of a multiperiod mean-variance optimization of assets and liabilities (AL). This makes the analysis more challenging than for a setting based on purely exogenous liabilities, in which the optimization is only performed on the assets while keeping liabilities fixed. We show that, under general conditions for the joint AL dynamics, the optimal policies and the MVF can be decomposed into an orthogonal set of basis returns using exterior algebra. This formalism, novel to financial applications, allows us to study analytically the structure of optimal policies and MVF representations under endogenous liabilities in a multidimensional and multiperiod setting. Using a numerical example, we illustrate our methodology by analysing the impact of the rebalancing frequency on the MVF and by highlighting the main differences between exogenous and endogenous liabilities.
Die gängigen Beratungsprozesse der Finanzinstitute berücksichtigen die Risikofähigkeit und die Risikobereitschaft
der Anlagekunden. Aber nur die Beratungsprozesse, die auch die Risikowahrnehmung des Kunden mit einbeziehen, machen diesen wirklich sicherer in seinen Anlageentscheiden. Die verhaltensbasierte Finanztheorie (Behavioural Finance) liefert nützliche Einsichten dazu.
In this paper we examine the competitive equilibria of a dynamic stochastic economywith complete markets. We show that the completeness of the market requires both theset of asset payo¤s and collateral levels to be su¢ ciently rich, so as to allow to decentral-ize the equilibrium allocations obtained in Arrow-Debreu markets subject to a series ofappropriate limited pledgeability constraints. We provide then su¢ cient conditions forequilibria to be Pareto e¢ cient and show that when collateral is scarce equilibria are alsooften constrained ine¢ cient, in the sense that imposing tighter borrowing restrictionscan make everybody in the economy better o¤.We derive su¢ cient conditions for the existence of Markov equilibria and show thatthey often have ?nite support. The model is then tractable and its equilibria can becomputed with arbitrary accuracy. We carry out on this basis a quantitative assessmentof the risk sharing and e¢ ciency properties of equilibria.
This paper examines a dynamic stochastic economy with a benevolent government that cannot commit to future policies. Following Phelan and Stacchetti (2001), we consider sequential sustainable equilibria (SSE). We numerically solve for the set of equilibrium payoffs, and investigate whether the time consistency problem of capital income tax is quantitatively important. For a realistically calibrated economy, we find that the optimal sustainable capital income tax rate is pro-cyclical and close to zero on average, while the labor income tax is countercyclical.
Moreover, the welfare cost of no commitment is very small (0:22%) when compared with the Ramsey allocation. We also find that the best sustainable equilibrium outcome may achieve substantially higher social welfare than the
Markov-perfect equilibrium as considered by Klein, Krusell and Rios-Rull (2008).
