Despite the attention that strategic change as a topic of research has received, there remain considerable difficulties in conceptualizing the actual sources of strategic change. Using the concept of strategic episodes, this paper develops an endogenous theory of change, where the sources of change are located in the organization itself. We argue that processes of organizational reproduction lead to inconsistencies which manifest themselves as conflicting demands on those working in the organization. Such inconsistencies have the potential to place considerable strain upon the actors experiencing them but we argue that organizations possess suppression mechanisms which prevent the organization from openly dealing with the tensions that these inconsistencies would introduce. Hence, these suppression mechanisms are not a deficiency of the organization but are in fact, crucial for its very functioning. The paper examines strategy workshops as episodes which suspend these organizational suppression mechanisms so that previously experienced inconsistencies can be voiced. We therefore build an explanation of strategic change where inconsistencies are not so much solved by bringing in new principles, rules or schemas from outside, but by the novel rearrangement or recombination of existing or previous aspects of the organization. We examine three case studies of strategy workshops and observe that the process of strategic change typically involves several consecutive workshops before significant changes are carried beyond the workshop environment and into ongoing organizational process.
The aim of this article is to provide a new theoretical perspective on the possibilities for clients to manage their consultants. The existing perspectives on managing consultants share the voluntaristic assumption that in principle it is possible to manage the consultant–client relationship. In this article we introduce a new and opposed systemic perspective. From a systems-theoretical point of view, clients and consultants can be conceptualized as two autopoietic communication systems that operate according to idiosyncratic logics. They are structurally coupled through a third system, the so-called “contact system”, which itself constitutes a separate system. Due to the different logics of the three systems there is a barrier to the transfer of meaning between them. Consequently, the possibilities of any kind of direct and intentional intervention by clients in the consultant system appear limited. Hence, a different, more moderate concept of intervention is needed. For that we draw on Helmut Willke’s concept of “contextual guidance”: instead of any direct interventions in the consultant system, the systemic perspective (1) points to the necessity for self-guidance on behalf of the client and (2) directs interventions to the context of the contact system.
Based on the competing theories of superstar formation proposed by Rosen (1981) and Adler (1985) it is controversial if first hand observable talent or other factors like past consumption and popularity influence stardom. This article investigates the emergence of superstars in German soccer. We use data on market values and individual player performance and publicity data to differentiate between Rosen's and Adler's theory of superstar formation. Running quantile regressions we find evidence that Adler's theory applies to German soccer stars. Therefore, not only investments in physical talent but also the cultivation of popularity is an adequate strategy for becoming a superstar.
Legitimacy can be understood as the social acceptance of actions or institutions and is a vital resource for the sustained survival of companies in competitive environments. Legitimacy is subjectively perceived and ascribed to institutions and activities in processes of social construction. In recent times organizational legitimacy has been maintained primarily by either adapting to the social expectations of the company’s environment or by actively influencing the expectations of relevant stakeholder groups by means of advertising, public relations or strategic manipulation. During the process of globalization, however, companies are facing situations of increased complexity and heterogeneity in their environments so that the legitimacy strategies of adaptation and strategic manipulation may easily fail. In such situations, companies have to build on a third strategy, moral reasoning, in order to (re-)establish their legitimacy. However, moral reasoning cannot completely substitute both the other legitimacy strategies. We suggest that in order to survive in complex and competitive environments companies have to establish the organizational capacity to activate all of the three legitimacy strategies. In the present paper will develop a theoretical framework for three legitimacy strategies and their organizational implementation. We will build upon systems theory and empirical evidence from exemplary case studies.
Neuroeconomics is one prominent example of the technology driven shift in social sciences. As a new and interdisciplinary field combining Neuroscience, Psychology and Economics, it is expected to provide the premise of fundamentally new insights into human behaviour and in improving the existing models in rational choice and game theory or to advance attempts in marketing. New research options are opened up for economics with the progress of Neuroscience and especially brain imaging technologies like functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). Besides the benefits of interdisciplinary research and the emerging trend of doing “business with the brain” only view effort has been made to stimulate a critical discussion of ethical issues in Neuroeconomics. So far a neuroethical debate is most notably held for Neuroscience and the use of brain imaging technologies for medical purposes. Given the fact that Neuroeconomics uses the same technologies as for clinical research and medical application, a consideration about ethical issues appears as a vital duty. Further is neuroeconomic research about to enter a level of application in daily business life which can provoke even new aspects of ethical risks. Hence this contribution advises to fulfil that duty and starts to consider ethical questions in Neuroeconomics. We see three points of contact where ethical issues have already occurred or are about to develop: within experimental settings of Neuroeconomics, the way research results are reported in public and academic media, and when brain imaging technologies enter the stage of commercial use (e.g. Neuromarketing, Neurofinance). After a clear outline of ethical issues within Neuroeconomics the contribution further depicts, to what extend existing ethical debates of Neuroethics or Business Ethics are beneficial to address ethical dilemmas in the “neuralized world” of economics.
This paper applies the five standard economic performance criteria to gauge the contribu-tion of Managed Care (MC) to the performance of three healthcare systems, viz. Germany, the Netherlands, and Switzerland. The criteria are (1) matching of consumer preferences, (2) technical efficiency, (3) adaptive capacity, (4) dynamic efficiency, and (5) a rent-free distribution of income that provides incentives for producers to attain criteria (1) through (4). Being insurance-based, the German, Dutch, and Swiss healthcare systems comprise three contractual relationships that can be judged in the light of these criteria. The maximum contribution of MC to the performance of the healthcare system is found for the Netherlands followed by Switzerland. The Independent Practice Associations rep-resenting MC in the Netherlands, and the Health Maintenance Organizations representing MC in Switzerland score 15 respectively 6 out of 30 points. By way of contrast, the con-tribution of the Disease Management Programs to the performance of the German health-care system remains limited (3 out of 30 points).
This article calls attention to a difficulty with insurers' investment policies that seems to have been overlooked so far. There is the distinct possibility that insurers cannot satisfy the demands of different stakeholders in terms of expected returns and volatility. While using the capital asset pricing model as the benchmark, this article distinguishes two groups of stakeholders that impose additional constraints. One is “income security” in the interest of current beneficiaries and older workers; the other is “predictability of contributions” in the interest of contributing younger workers and sponsoring employers. It defines the conditions for which the combination of these constraints results in a lack of feasibility of investment policy. Minimum deviation from the capital market line is proposed as the performance benchmark in these situations.
In response to population aging, pay-as-you-go pensions are being reduced in almost all developed countries. In many countries, governments aim to fill the resulting gap with subsidized private pensions. This paper exploits the recent German pension reform to shed new light on the uptake of voluntary, but heavily subsidized private pension schemes. Specifically, we investigate how the uptake of the recently
introduced “Riester pensions” depends on state-provided saving incentives, and how well the targeting to families and low-income households works in practice.
We show that, after a slow start, private pension plans took off very quickly. While saving incentives were effective in reaching parents, they were less successful in attracting low-income earners, although Riester pensions exhibit a more equal pattern by income than occupational pensions and unsubsidized private pension plans.
We also provide circumstantial evidence on displacement effects between saving for old-age provision and other purposes. Households who plan to purchase housing are less likely to have a Riester pension. The same holds for households who attach high importance to a bequest motive. Occupational pensions and other forms of private pensions, however, act as complements rather than as substitutes.
